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ABSTRACT 
 
This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad 
philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism. 
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the 
following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical 
inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake 
an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when 
deploying it in a linguistic practice. 
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to 
which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of 
instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the 
canonical consequences of the quantifier.  
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and 
develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is 
one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer 
to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a 
domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to 
determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is 
subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard 
the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the 
universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified 
sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context.  
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual 
quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a 
commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier 
faces. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This Thesis focuses on the concept of universal quantification, and defends an 
inferentialist and contextualist account of that concept based on the notion of a 
canonical commitment.  
In sketching this account, it investigates issues that lie at the intersection of two 
broad philosophical projects. 
 
The first is inferentialism about the logical concepts: about the concepts, that 
is, corresponding to expressions such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if…then’, ‘for all’, etc. 
Inferentialism about the logical concepts can be rendered as the view that our 
logical concepts are constituted by their inferential role. The idea that such concepts 
are so constituted, amounts to three general claims: 
 
• All the properties relevant for a characterization of a logical concept are 
captured by the role that the concept plays in (a sub-set of) the inferences in 
which it is deployed; 
 
• The inferential role of a logical concept is the contribution that the concept 
makes to the verification conditions, on the one hand, and to the determination 
of what counts as a consequence, on the other hand, of the statements in which 
it figures; 
 
• The inferential role of a logical concept constrains what counts as the correct 
semantics for the concept, and is not constrained in any way by the semantics. 
 
The three claims above constitute the core of a general view that can, in turn, be 
developed in a number of ways. In defending the view that a logical concept C is 
constituted by its inferential role, one might hold that: 
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• All the relevant (inferential) properties of C are determined by the basic rules of 
inference for C. Proponents of this option normally take the rules constitutive of 
C to be the standard introduction and elimination rules for C; 
 
• All the relevant (inferential) properties of C are determined by a set of idealized 
inferential practices. That is: they are determined by a normatively constrained 
sub-set of the inferences that we may perform, from and to statements in which 
C figures; 
 
• All the relevant (inferential) properties of C are determined by a sub-set of our 
actual inferential practices. It is, in other words, in virtue of how we use C in 
reasoning that C consists in the relevant inferential role. 
 
The option that I endorse in the Thesis is the last one. An upshot of this choice is 
that we should view our basic principles of inference as the means via which a logical 
concept’s inferential role, independently constituted by (a suitably qualified sub-set of) 
our actual inferential practices, can be reconstructed and expressed (displayed). The 
status of a basic logical rule thus becomes that of a tool in a reconstructive project. 
 
The scope of the discussion that I offer of this option should be regarded as 
restricted in the following sense. 
 There are three different levels at which one may address the problem of 
concept-constitution for a logical concept C - roughly, the two-fold problem of which 
kind of facts determine C’s inferential role, and of what we should conceive such a 
‘determination’ to consist in. These are. 
 
• The level of metaphysics: in virtue of which metaphysical facts is C constituted 
by a certain inferential role, and how should we characterize the metaphysical 
aspects of the ‘constitution’ relation? 
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• The level of epistemology: in virtue of which epistemic facts, do we take C to be 
constituted by a certain inferential role, and how do those facts impact on the 
cognitive architecture of an epistemic subject who grasps, or possesses, C? 
 
• The level of pragmatics: in virtue of which pragmatic facts do competent 
speakers of a language deploy (the expressions that denote) the logical concepts 
in the way in which they do? 
 
This Thesis does not address the metaphysical perspective, focusing instead on the 
epistemology and pragmatics of our logical concepts. 
 
The second broad philosophical project relevant to this Thesis is the 
contextualist project. Contextualism can be articulated in terms of two competing 
positions, characterized by the answer that they choose to give to the question: at 
which level does context affect our usages of the language? 
 
• Semantic contextualism: the view that in a wide range of areas of discourse, the 
proposition expressed by an utterance (what is said by it) is not settled merely in 
the ways conceived by traditional semantics, but also depends on the features 
of the context in which the utterance takes place. Such features typically 
include speakers’ intentions, beliefs, stakes and interests. According to the 
semantic contextualist, context-sensitivity extends far beyond the set of 
expressions conventionally regarded as being context-sensitive (e.g. indexicals 
and expressions such as “enemy”, “left”, etc)1. 
 
• Pragmatic contextualism: the view that the context of utterance impacts not on 
the proposition expressed via an utterance U (a proposition that is settled 
                                                
1  This highly simplified characterization of semantic contextualism is meant to include 
varieties of contextualism, which are usually refereed to as pragmatic, according to which the 
impact of the pragmatic features of context is pre-propositional, in the sense that no complete 
proposition is expressed via the utterance of a sentence unless certain pragmatic processes take 
place. 
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independently of pragmatic features of the context), but the proposition 
conveyed, or pragmatically communicated via U. 
 
The contextualist view that I endorse is the first one: context impacts on the 
proposition expressed by a sentence uttered in context.  
My endorsement of this view is to be understood as an assumption of the whole 
discussion of contextualism in the final chapter of this Thesis, within which I also 
attempt to define certain aspects of my contextualist view in relation to the impact of 
pragmatic features of context on propositional determinacy. 
 
The commitment-theoretic view that I endorse is inferentialist in nature. It consists 
in a series of claims that can be rendered as specific articulations of four main ideas: 
 
• The concept of universal quantification is constituted by the canonical inferences 
that we perform when deploying the universal quantifier in the course of our 
linguistic and reasoning practices; 
 
• To grasp the concept of universal quantification is to undertake an inferential 
commitment to the canonical consequences of statements in which it figures, 
when deploying the concept in a communicative practice; 
 
• At the level of the definition of the concept’s purely inferential role (that is: at 
the level of its definition as an uninterpreted concept), the generality expressed 
by the universal quantifier is what I characterize as full inferential generality; 
 
• Model-theoretic treatments of this kind of generality are inadequate, and should 
thus be dispensed with in favor of the commitment-theoretic account. 
 
Two of the key-notions above, of canonical inference and of inferential 
commitment, also receive a general treatment in this Thesis. They are discussed, in 
Part 1, with respect to the logical concepts in general, in the framework of the 
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articulation of a series of theoretical options for the inferentialist (Chapter II). They are 
then further developed with specific reference to the concept of universal 
quantification in Chapter III. 
 
The idea that the context-sensitivity of certain fragments of our language(s) is 
context-sensitivity of the proposition expressed, is instead investigated only with respect 
to a specific (kind of) expression: the linguistic expression that, in a given language, we 
deploy to denote the concept of universal quantification (Chapter IV). In particular, it 
is investigated primarily with respect to the pragmatic and epistemic status that the 
commitment-theoretic account of universal quantification ascribes to speakers’ 
inferential commitments.  
 
The reason for this asymmetry in the treatment of the two philosophical projects is 
to be found in the line of reasoning that led to this Thesis.  
I started with the thought that the correct treatment of the concept of universal 
quantification should be inferentialist in nature, and that it should respect certain 
general methodological and epistemological constraints, which I spell out in Chapter 
II. The idea was also that the treatment offered should not be ad-hoc: that is, it should 
be consistent with a global inferentialist story about our logical concepts. The 
motivation for the general discussion of the problems of concept-constitution and 
concept-possession in Chapter II was developed in this spirit.  
In the case of the universal quantifier, however, a widespread, and plausible, 
intuition is that expressions denoting the concept are context-sensitive. In particular, 
those who share the intuition maintain that context affects the range of (an interpreted 
instance of) the universal quantifier, and that it does so in a way that contributes to 
what we may express, or convey, by uttering statements in which the universal 
quantifier occurs. The problem that I had to address, then, was the following: how 
does the intuitive context-sensitivity of the concept square with the commitment-
theoretic account? 
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The discussion in Chapter IV originates from an attempt to sketch an answer to 
this question2. 
 
The division of the Thesis in two parts is also meant to reflect this line of 
reasoning. The first part is devoted to a discussion of various aspects of the 
inferentialist project, a discussion in the course of which I articulate and argue for my 
own inferentialist views about the logical concepts. The second part consists in: 
 
• A presentation of the commitment-theoretic account, the grounds for which are 
laid in Chapter II, with respect to the concept of universal quantification 
(Chapter III); 
 
• An extensive qualification, in Chapter IV, of the role that the context-sensitivity 
of the concept should play in this account. 
 
To say that this qualification is extensive is not, of course, either to say that it 
consists in a systematic account or that it intends to be conclusive. The account of the 
context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier that I offer focuses on: 
 
• A rejection of the standard treatment of this context-sensitivity in terms of the 
idea that context supplies an interpretation for an occurrence of the concept by 
specifying a domain of quantification3; 
 
• A series of proposals about how we should understand both the role of 
inferential commitments in contextual speech-act practices involving the 
universal quantifier, and about how we should understand the intuitive idea 
                                                
2  As I remark in the conclusion of this Thesis, my initial interest in contextualism (in 
particular: in semantic contextualism) has now become my main area of interest. 
3  An important claim of the Thesis is, then, that the (model-theoretic) notion of a domain 
of quantification should be dispensed with both in the definition of the universal quantifier’s 
inferential role and in the explication of its context-sensitivity. The claim is suitably qualified, 
in the last chapter, via a distinction between foundational and descriptive semantics. 
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that context determines the range of (specific occurrences of) the universal 
quantifier4. 
 
The proposals in question are intended to lay the ground for further research – 
some of the challenges that confront them are also spelt out in the last chapter of this 
Thesis. 
 
In the light of this structure, Chapter I can be taken independently of the rest of 
the Thesis. That chapter consists in a discussion of Boghossian’s epistemology of basic 
logical rules. The principal aim of Boghossian’s account is to claim, against epistemic 
relativism, that we can hope to achieve an objective justification for our basic logical 
principles. I argue that Boghossian’s views are subject to a series of difficulties, which 
ultimately depend on:  
 
• The absence of a suitable inferentialist story about concept-constitution and 
concept-possession; 
 
• The suspicion that any plausible direction that such a story might take will be 
incompatible with Boghossian’s main contention: that in order to effectively 
counter the relativist’s challenge, inferences that are instances of concept-
constituting rules should be rendered as blind inferences, with no reflectively 
appreciable impact. 
 
In the light of this, one can take Chapter I both as an attempt to introduce: 
 
                                                
4  The proposals amount to the following: 
 
• We should view the undertaking of the relevant inferential commitments as an 
objective and stable presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a 
determinate proposition in context; 
 
• We should regard contexts as providing an interpretation for (an occurrence of) the 
universal quantifier by determining the scope of a speaker’s inferential commitments. 
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• Some of the main notions and conceptual tools deployed in the rest of the 
Thesis; 
• Important aspects of the Thesis’s very subject matter; 
 
and as an attempt to highlight: 
 
• The relevance that inferentialism about the logical concepts has for another 
important philosophical project, namely the epistemology of our basic logical 
principles; 
• The challenges that inferentialism potentially raises for such a project5. 
  
 A final note. The commitment-theoretic picture that this Thesis sketches for 
the concept of universal quantification is not a fully developed picture. In particular, it 
faces a series of challenges, the articulation of a sub-set of which forms part of the 
conclusions of the Thesis.  
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5 In virtue of these considerations, both the articulation of an anti-relativist constraint on 
the commitment-theoretic model of universal quantification (in Chapter III), and the proposal 
that we regard canonical commitments as objective presuppositions of propositional 
determinacy (in Chapter IV), should not be taken in connection with Boghossian’s specific aim, 
and should instead be understood as motivated by independent considerations. 
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PART I 
 
CHAPTER I 
THE LOGICAL CONCEPTS AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BASIC LOGICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
The arguments that I present in this chapter aim at uncovering some of the 
difficulties faced by Paul Boghossian’s epistemology of basic logical principles6. 
Although their formulation is thus restricted in scope, some aspects of the discussion 
that follows are directly relevant for both the subject matter and the conceptual 
apparatus deployed in the rest of the Thesis. Before we start, then, it is a good idea to 
clarify the general framework in which my objections to Boghossian should be 
understood. 
 
Boghossian’s epistemology of basic logical laws is based on an inferentialist 
account of the logical concepts. It relies on the general view that the logical concepts 
are constituted by the role that they perform in the basic inferences in which we 
deploy them, and that these inferences are those licensed by what he refers to as our 
‘basic logical principles’. This view has a direct impact on the aims and structure of his 
project. For the latter consists in: 
 
• The attempt to articulate, against the threat of epistemic relativism, what an 
objective justification of such basic principles might look like, in terms of the 
notion of a blind inference; 
 
• The contention that the source of this justification is to be found in the fact 
that the principles in question are concept-constituting, and that our accepting 
                                                
6  [Boghossian 2000; 2002; 2003]. 
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them (and inferring in the way licensed by them) is a necessary condition of our 
being able to grasp the relevant concepts7. 
 
The two notions of a concept being constituted by a rule of inference, on the one 
hand, and of grasping a logical concept as accepting, or being disposed to reason in 
the way licensed by, the relevant inference rule, thus play a crucial role in the account.  
 
Now, my objections to Boghossian concern precisely the treatment that these 
notions receive in his project. In particular, this chapter focuses on a defense of the 
following two-fold claim.  
 
A) On the one hand, Boghossian’s epistemology of basic logical principles is 
subject to a series of difficulties that depend on the absence of a story about: 
 
• Which facts determine whether a basic rule of inference, or the practice of 
inferring according to it, is concept-constituting; 
 
• What the epistemic impact of these facts is on the subjects to whom we ascribe 
possession of a logical concept – that is: how the facts that determine that a 
given rule, or inferential practice, is concept-constituting, bear on the relation 
between the subject and the rule. 
 
A story of this kind is in principle needed to support Boghossian’s main contentions 
against epistemic relativism8. In particular, it is in principle needed to defend the 
plausibility of his two contentions that:  
 
                                                
7  [Boghossian 2000: 248-50; 2002: 41]. However, it is not entirely clear whether, in 
Boghossian’s account, we should take rules of inference or inferential practices to be concept-
constituting – I will explicitly discuss this issue in Section 3. 
8  The claim here is, of course, merely one of necessity, not sufficiency – as the 
considerations in part B) of the claim will make clear. 
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• A logical principle being concept-constituting generates what he calls 
‘blamelessness’ in reasoning in the way licensed by the principle; 
 
• The ‘blamelessness’ of our basic inferential practices implicates that such 
practices are entitling, or justification-transferring. 
 
These two contentions can only be supported via the provision of a suitable 
inferentialist epistemology of concept-possession. In turn the latter task requires that 
we clarify two things.  
The first can be rendered in terms of the question: in virtue of which facts is a 
basic logical principle concept-constituting?  
The second consists in the question: how do these facts bear on the epistemic 
quality of a subject’s grasp of a logical concept? 
 
B)  On the other hand, the suspicion is that Boghossian’s account, in virtue of the 
very idea on which it relies, is incompatible with any direction that an answer to the 
second question above might take.  
This idea is that an inference’s being blameless (and thus, in Boghossian’s view, 
entitling) ultimately depends, in the case of a basic inference, on its being blind. It 
depends, that is, on the requirement that – if we are to give an effective reply to the 
relativist’s challenge – a subject’s disposition to infer in the appropriate way be 
rendered as independent of any reflectively appreciable stance.  
However, answering the second question above in a way that is effective against 
the relativist, requires that the epistemic impact of a basic inference be rendered as 
precisely what it can’t be – that is, as a reflectively appreciable impact. 
 
If this is the case, then it seems to me that the two broad theoretical alternatives 
left to an epistemology of basic logical principles are the following: 
 
• Abandon the idea of a blind inference, and find, via the rejection of the very 
premises of Boghossian’s project, another route to objective justification;  
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• Abandon the anti-relativist target of Boghossian’s project – abandon, that is, 
the hope that that we can articulate an objective justification of our basic logical 
principles on the basis of an inferentialist account of concept-constitution and 
concept-possession. 
 
In the light of the picture just sketched, the relevance of this chapter to the rest of 
the Thesis may be rendered as follows. 
 
 On the one hand, one can take this chapter as an attempt to introduce: 
 
• Some of the main notions and conceptual tools deployed in the rest of the 
Thesis; 
• Important aspects of the Thesis’s very subject matter, which includes an 
inferentialist account of concept-constitution and concept-possession. 
 
On the other hand, the chapter is intended to highlight: 
 
• The relevance of inferentialism about the logical concepts for another 
important philosophical project, consisting in an epistemology of our basic 
logical principles; 
• The challenges that an appeal to inferentialism potentially raises for such a 
project. 
  
The structure of this chapter is the following. Section 1 sketches the anatomy 
of Boghossian’s project, and is intended both to introduce the discussion in the 
subsequent sections by reminding the reader of the battlefield, as it were, in which 
Boghossian’s philosophical weapons are deployed, and to reconstruct his arguments9. 
                                                
9  The reader who is familiar with Boghossian’s discussion of the options available for 
countering relativism about basic logical principles, and with the terms of his own proposal, 
can thus skip this section and turn directly to the discussion in Section 2. 
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In Section 2 I present an argument against Boghossian’s view that concept-
constitution implicates blamelessness in reasoning, and defend it from possible 
objections. In Section 3 I tackle the question of whether entitlement follows from 
blamelessness in reasoning, and argue against Boghossian’s contention that it does. 
Finally, in Section 4 I briefly discuss one aspect of the problem of concept-
constitution, namely: whether we should take basic rules of inference or basic 
inferential practices to be constitutive of the logical concepts. The discussion in this 
last section is directly related to the first section of Chapter II, and can be read as a 
preliminary introduction to the account that I present there. 
 
1. CONCEPT-CONSTITUTION, BLAMELESSNESS AND ENTITLEMENT  
 
Much of the work that Paul Boghossian has devoted to the epistemology of 
basic logical laws is intended to vindicate the idea that we can offer an objective 
justification of our fundamental logical beliefs. Although this project is no doubt 
familiar, it will be useful to briefly remind ourselves of its scope and structure. 
 As already noted, the main target of Boghossian’s discussion is relativism about 
logical knowledge: the idea that there is no objective fact of the matter as to ‘which 
epistemic principles are true, and, consequently, which sets of rules a thinker ought to 
employ to shape his beliefs, if he is to arrive at beliefs that are genuinely justified’10. In 
what follows, I shall refer to this general idea as epistemic relativism (ER). 
 
Boghossian’s strategy against ER consists of the following steps. 
 
• The reconstruction of the possible directions that a reply to ER could take; 
 
• The analysis of the problems encountered by such replies; 
 
                                                
10  [Boghossian 2002]: 17. 
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• The defense of a solution to these problems, consisting in a quasi-internalist 
epistemology of basic logical principles, based on the notion of concept-
constitution11. 
 
1.1 Against Epistemic Relativism 
 
The problem of whether a basic rule of inference can be objectively justified 
can be regarded as a general heading for two sets of questions that one may ask about 
a basic rule of inference. Questions in the first set have to do with the validity of such a 
rule; questions in the second set concern whether the inferences performed in 
accordance with the rule are entitling.  
Each set in turn comprises two sub-questions – one has to do with whether or 
not a basic rule possesses the relevant feature (that is: whether or not a basic rule is 
valid or entitling)12, and one has to do with whether or not we may objectively claim that 
it does. The two sets can thus be represented as follows. 
 
Set 1 – Validity 
 
a) Is a given basic rule of inference R (for example: the introduction rule 
for the conditional) valid? 
b) Can we objectively claim that R is valid? 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11  In fact, Boghossian’s proposal is best characterized as a mixed proposal, drawing on 
aspects of both the internalist and the externalist view. 
12  What I mean by a rule’s being entitling, in the current framework, is this: that an 
application of the rule allows a subject to move from justified beliefs to beliefs that are also 
justified (and to which the subject who reasons in the way licensed by the rule is, thus, 
entitled). I am, in other words, using ‘entitling’ as a synonym of ‘justification-transferring’. 
Strictly speaking, then, the property of being entitling is instantiated by the inferences licensed by 
a rule, rather than by the rule itself [e.g. Boghossian 2000: 230; 2002: 16, 47] – talk of a rule 
being entitling is to be understood simply as a way to ease the exposition. 
15 
Set 2 – Entitlement 
 
c) Is a given basic rule of inference R entitling, i.e., does it allow an 
epistemic subject who reasons in accordance with it to move from 
justified premises to conclusions that are also justified? 
d) Can we objectively claim that R is entitling? 
 
Which relations one takes to hold between the members of these two sets will 
partly depend on the stand that one chooses to take in the internalism-externalism 
debate about knowledge and justification. For questions b) and d) ultimately concern 
the status of our justification for claiming that a rule of inference is valid or entitling, 
and the requirement that our claims be objective amounts to the requirement that our 
justification for them be so. In turn, the idea that we have an objective justification for 
a (true) claim amounts to the idea that the claim is supported by our knowledge that 
things are as the claim says they are. 
 
In the light of this, we can reconstruct the framework in which Boghossian’s 
proposal is to be understood by considering the following options for articulating (the 
relevant subset of) the relations among a), b), c) and d). 
 
• The relation between a) and c): Whether an affirmative answer to a) provides 
sufficient grounds for answering c) affirmatively will depend on what is 
required of a rule in order for it to be justification-transferring. An externalist 
view (more precisely: what [Boghossian 2000: 40] calls ‘simple externalism’) will 
take an affirmative answer to a) to be both necessary and sufficient for giving an 
affirmative answer to c). According to the simple externalist, all that is required 
for an inference to be entitling, aside from the epistemic subject’s possession of 
a suitable warrant for believing its premises, is that the rule governing the 
inference is valid13. On the other hand, an inference in which truth is not 
                                                
13  As [Wright 2001: 52] puts it: no reflectively appreciable warrant is required for the 
inference to be justification-transferring – according to the simple externalist, we don’t need to 
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transferred from the premises to the conclusion cannot entitle us to the beliefs 
that we form as a result of carrying out that inference.  
A proponent of the internalist view will instead hold an affirmative answer 
to a) to be necessary but not sufficient for giving an affirmative answer to c) - in 
order for a rule of inference R to be entitling, simple internalism additionally 
requires that the subject reasoning in accordance with R be, as Boghossian puts 
it, epistemically responsible in doing so. The internalist requirement of epistemic 
responsibility ultimately amounts to a subject’s possessing knowledge of the fact 
that R is valid14. 
 
• Re. the relation between b) and c): as a consequence of the considerations above, 
the simple externalist will take an affirmative answer to b) to be sufficient, but 
not necessary, for an affirmative answer to c). According to the internalist, an 
affirmative answer to b) is both necessary and sufficient for c) 
 
• Re. the relation between b) and d): the internalist will deem an affirmative answer 
to b) to be both necessary and sufficient for an affirmative answer to d)15.  
 
In the light of this reconstruction, the challenge that Boghossian’s arguments aim 
to meet can be characterized as two-fold. On the one hand, it comes from the idea that 
we are never in a position to objectively claim that our rules of inference are valid. Call 
                                                                                                                                            
enter into any epistemic relation with the facts in virtue of which a(n inference licensed by a) 
rule is justification-transferring. 
14  The assumption in this paragraph, and in all the discussion that follows, is of course 
that neither the simple internalist nor the simple externalist are relativists about knowledge. To 
see that this is a possibility, consider that the question that internalism and externalism both 
attempt to answer (that is: what are the conditions given which we may say that a subject S 
knows X?) is distinct from the question that bears on the issue of relativism, i.e., is there an 
objective fact of the matter as to whether the relevant conditions hold? 
15  It is tempting, here, to say that the simple externalist will endorse the weaker claim that 
an affirmative answer to b) is sufficient but not necessary for an affirmative answer to d).  
However, matters are not so straightforward. For consider that the ability to objectively 
claim entitlement for an inference is the ability to provide an objective justification for our belief 
that the inference is entitling; whether one endorses internalism or externalism, it appears that 
this does require being able to provide an objective justification for the validity of the rule of 
which the relevant inference is an instance. 
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this the Validity Challenge. On the other hand, it comes from the idea that we are never 
in a position to objectively claim entitlement for beliefs arrived at employing those 
rules. Call this the Entitlement Challenge16. 
 
What are the options for responding to such challenges? 
 
With respect to the Validity Challenge, Boghossian considers the inferential and the 
non-inferential route to justification. Attempts to provide a non-inferential justification 
of a basic principle (for example, Modus Ponens) may draw on two general ideas. They 
are either inspired by some kind of non-factualism about justification17, or they boil 
down to the idea that our fundamental logical beliefs, such as the belief in the validity 
of Modus Ponens, are, as it were, default-reasonable18. 
Attempts to provide an inferential justification of an underived epistemic principle 
invariably deploy that very epistemic principle, and thus are of a rule-circular sort 
[Boghossian 2002: 24] and  [Boghossian 2000: 231]19. 
 
                                                
16  Due to Boghossian’s anti-externalist stand, question b) becomes crucial in his project – 
for any sympathy with the internalist idea that a rule’s being entitling will depend on a subject’s 
insight into its validity, is doomed to view the difficulties with which an attempt to answer b) 
affirmatively is presented as having a direct impact on whether an affirmative answer to d) is 
available, in virtue of the relation between b) and d). 
17  Simply put: the idea that epistemic principles are the result of conventional 
stipulations, and as such do not admit – or even call for – any evidential justification: there are 
no facts the appeal to which could count as justificatory evidence of the relevant sort 
[Boghossian 2000: 237-8]. 
18  Strictly speaking, the default-reasonableness view should not be regarded as an attempt 
to provide a justification for our basic logical principles, as default-reasonable beliefs are taken 
to be neither justifiable nor refutable. A more careful qualification of default-reasonableness is, 
then, that our basic logical beliefs are to be regarded as not unjustified. For possible articulations 
of this idea, cf [Boghossian 2000: 238-9]. 
19  The thought is this: basic logical principles such as Modus Ponens are underived, and 
thus any inferential argument for them would either have to use them or use other rules whose 
justification depends on the basic principles. An extensive discussion of rule-circularity can be 
found in [Boghossian 2000]. 
 As already noted, the aim of the present reconstruction is simply to lay the ground for 
understanding the rationale of Boghossian’s own proposal – as I do not intend, in the next 
sections, to object to such rationale, but rather to the proposal itself, I am leaving aside any 
issue concerning whether Boghossian’s claims about the options available for responding to ER 
can indeed be regarded as conclusive or even plausible. 
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With respect to the Entitlement Challenge, the options available to an opponent of 
ER will be constrained by the parameter highlighted in my discussion of questions a) 
to d), that is: by the answer that one gives to the question: which conditions have to be 
met in order for a deductive inference to be entitling?  
A simple externalist’s reply to ER’s challenge will consist in reducing the 
Entitlement Challenge for a basic rule of inference to the question of the rule’s validity 
[Boghossian 2002: 40]. 
In order for the internalist to meet the challenge posed by ER, she will have to 
offer an argument to the conclusion that there is a fact of the matter as to whether the 
required epistemic relation between a subject S and the validity of the inferences that 
she performs occurs – that is: that we can indeed objectively claim knowledge of the 
validity of the relevant basic rule of inference.  
  
1.2 Difficulties for Anti-Relativist Arguments 
 
With respect to the Validity Challenge, Boghossian deems non-inferentialist 
responses to ER to be themselves infected by some form of relativism, and as such 
ineffective against ER. Because of its main assumption, non-factualism will share with 
ER the idea that there are no objective logical facts to which we may appeal in 
justifying the correctness of an inference – justification is relative to the system of 
norms to which an epistemic subject happens to adhere [Gibbard 1990]. 
Default-reasonableness, on the other hand, either runs the risk of relativizing 
the answer to the validity question to purely subjective criteria (which epistemic 
principles are default-justified depends on what epistemic subjects find self-evident, 
and this is likely to vary across epistemic subjects) or simply fails to provide an answer 
to the question of which facts decide of the correctness of a given rule of inference, by 
failing to offer an explanation of why some of our rules of inference are indeed default-
reasonable [Boghossian 2000: 238-40]. 
 As for inferentialist responses, they appear to fail in virtue of their supposedly 
rule-circular structure. Rule-circular justifications either achieve, as it were, too much 
(we end up being able to justify blatantly incorrect rules of inference if we allow an 
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appeal to those very rules in the process of justifying them) or too little – in allowing 
the inferential justification of a rule to take at least a step in accordance with that rule, 
they end up presupposing what they were trying to show, and thus loose suasive force. 
 
Attempts to vindicate the objectivity of our basic logical principles against ER also 
seem doomed to fail when tackling the Entitlement Challenge: while the difficulties 
encountered by simple externalism are well-known, simple internalism is subject to 
the following dilemma.  
In order to neutralize the challenge posed by ER, the simple internalist must be 
able to claim that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the epistemic 
subject who reasons, say, in accordance with Modus Ponens (henceforth: MP), is able to 
thus arrive at justified beliefs from justified beliefs. The arguments that she may offer 
in support of her claim can either deploy the inferential strategy or follow the non-
inferential route. Consider the non-inferential route first. 
For an internalist who chooses this route, the natural option consists in advocating 
some sort of direct rational insight into the validity of an inference. The rational insight 
strategy is subject to two major difficulties. The first consists in the apparent 
unavailability of plausible options for clarifying the very notion of a ‘rational insight’ 
[Boghossian 2003: 231]. The second consists in accounting for the gap between a 
subject’s possessing an insight into the validity of a particular inference licensed by a 
basic logical principle, and a subject’s possessing such an insight into the validity of 
the principle itself (Boghossian’s ‘Carrollian Circularity’)20. 
If the internalist chooses the inferential route, her reasoning is, once again, 
doomed to be rule-circular: for in the attempt to justify the validity of an underived 
rule of inference, she will be bound to reason in accordance with that very rule.  
Furthermore, the appearance of a rule-circularity problem every time some form of 
inferential reasoning is appealed to in the justification of a basic inference seems to 
suggest that the directly inferential strategy against ER is not a real option from the 
start [Boghossian 2003: 229]. 
 
                                                
20  [Boghossian 2003: 232-3] 
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 The upshot of Boghossian’s discussion of the options available for responding 
to the challenges considered, is, then, that none of them is effective against the threat 
of relativism. In this scenario, Boghossian’s own solution consists in an attempt to 
rescue the inferential route to justification from the difficulties of rule-circularity, by 
appeal to a mixed internalist and externalist strategy. 
 
1.3 Concept-Constitution and the Epistemology of Basic Logical Principles 
 
In Boghossian’s proposal the Validity Challenge and the Entitlement Challenge 
receive the same response. This plays on the key-idea that there is a special case in 
which we are blameless in reasoning in accordance with a valid rule of inference, and in 
fact we are entitled to the beliefs formed via an application of that rule, even in the 
absence of a reflective warrant. This is the case of concept-constituting rules: when a rule 
is constitutive of an ingredient concept, our inferring in accordance with that rule is 
both blameless and entitling21. And our basic rules of inference (plausibly: the 
standard introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants) are indeed to be 
regarded as concept-constituting. 
 
More precisely, with respect to the Validity Challenge, Boghossian’s strategy 
consists in arguing as follows. An epistemic subject S cannot be deemed blameworthy 
for reasoning in accordance with a valid, underived rule of inference, for example MP. 
Because MP is constitutive of the concept of the conditional, if S were not disposed to 
reason thus, she would not possess the concept of the conditional. Concept possession 
amounts precisely to a disposition to reason according to concept-constituting rules of 
inference:  without this disposition S could not as much as form a belief about the 
validity of the rule in question. Therefore, S is blameless when taking a step according 
to the very rule that she is attempting to justify [e.g. Boghossian 2003: 240]. 
 
                                                
21  As already noted, it is not clear whether in Boghossian’s project the property of being 
concept-constituting is instantiated by inferential rules or by inferential practices. Before 
explicitly discussing this issue, and to ease the exposition, I will simply refer to rules of 
inference as being concept-constituting. 
21 
Boghossian’s response to the Entitlement Challenge also builds on the thought that 
our basic inference rules are constitutive of the logical concepts.  
Remember that the blamelessness that characterizes reasoning in the way licensed 
by a concept-constituting rule comes from the fact that we cannot be judged 
epistemically irresponsible for thus reasoning. Concept-constitution, in fact, appears to 
generate an obligation to reason in accordance with the relevant rule: for example, if I 
am not willing to reason in accordance with MP (under the assumption that MP is 
indeed constitutive of the concept of the conditional), I will be open to the allegation 
of not grasping the concept of the conditional22. The relation between an epistemic 
subject and a concept-constituting rule of inference consists in this obligation – in our 
having no epistemic alternatives. But if this is the case, Boghossian claims, then there is a 
sense in which our basic rules of inference are also entitling. Lack of irresponsibility, is 
the thought, suffices for entitlement (to the relevant inferentially acquired beliefs) 
when the inferences whose entitling character is in question are instances of a 
concept-constituting rule. True, this may be a weaker notion of entitlement than the 
simple internalist had in mind – in particular, it is one in which reflectively appreciable 
support is replaced by mere lack of epistemic irresponsibility [Boghossian 2003: 248]. 
However, in the light of the difficulties that confront all the other options, it may very 
well be the only one that we have left. 
 
Boghossian’s proposal is open to a number of objections, already more or less 
convincingly formulated by various philosophers23.  
In the next sections, I will offer some structural objections that turn on the ideas that: 
 
• The immediate source of the difficulties met by Boghossian is the absence of a 
suitable story about concept-constitution and concept-possession; 
                                                
22  One must be careful here. There is an obvious gap between being disposed to reason in 
a certain way, and being obliged to reason thus. The gap is meant to be filled by the thought 
that the relevant disposition is characterized by the lack of epistemic alternatives: it is, as 
[Boghossian 2002: 41] puts it, a precondition for engaging in any reasoning practices in which 
the logical concepts are deployed.  
23  Cf, for example, [Williamson 2003, 2006], and [Wright 2001]. 
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• It is not clear which direction such a story might take if it is to be compatible 
with Boghossian’s main contentions. 
 
2. WHO IS BLAMELESS AND WHO IS ENTITLED? SOME PROBLEMS WITH BOGHOSSIAN’S 
PROJECT 
 
In this and the next section I intend to defend the plausibility of the following 
claims. 
 
• That certain rules of inference are concept-constituting does not per se 
implicate that an epistemic subject who reasons in accordance with them is 
blameless in so doing – in particular, in order to argue that concept-constitution 
entails blamelessness we need to articulate a suitable story both about the facts 
in virtue of which a rule of inference is concept-constituting, and about the 
epistemic impact of these facts.  
 
• That an epistemic subject may be blameless when inferring in the way licensed 
by a concept-constituting rule of inference does not entail that she is entitled to 
the beliefs acquired by so doing; 
 
I will articulate and defend the first claim in the next sub-section; the second claim will 
be defended in sub-section 2.3. 
 
2.1 Concept-Constitution and Blamelessness 
 
 Boghossian’s, then, maintains that if a basic rule R is constitutive of a logical 
concept C, a subject S is blameless in reasoning in accordance with R – in virtue of the 
fact that, in order to grasp C, she is obliged to reason thus. 
 
The relation of obligation sought by Boghossian is an epistemic relation, which 
holds between the subject S and a C-constituting rule R.  
23 
That a certain basic rule, for example MP, is concept-constituting appears to be 
assumed by [Boghossian 2000; 2002] to be a fact about the relevant rule.  
 
Now, given a C-constituting rule R, there are various options for articulating the 
relation between R and C. That is, we may regard the fact that R is constitutive of C as: 
 
• A semantic fact about the truth-conditional contribution that C makes to the 
(propositional contents of) statements in which it figures. The idea would then 
be that the C-constituting rule correctly captures that contribution; 
 
• A metaphysical fact about, as it were, the structure of the logical universe: the 
logical concepts, one might argue, are brought into being by being defined by 
the relevant logical principles; 
 
• A pragmatic fact about the way in which subjects whom we (as theorists or as 
members of their epistemic and linguistic community) deem rational and 
competent speakers deploy the logical concepts: when we say that a rule R is 
constitutive of a concept C, then, we express the idea that R captures, or 
abstracts from, the relevant inferential practice; 
 
• An epistemic fact about the way in which C is grasped by competent speakers of 
a language – the natural articulation of this view would then be that it is because 
we grasp, for example, the conditional in the way in which we do, that we 
accept and perform certain inferences (whose logical form is displayed by R) 
when deploying the concept. 
 
Consider the first three options. In order to claim that a semantic, pragmatic or 
metaphysical fact generates an epistemic relation between a subject S and a 
consequence of the obtaining of this fact (in particular: a relation of epistemic 
obligation between S who grasps C and the rule that constitutes C), we need an 
account about how the fact in question impacts on a subject’s cognitive architecture. 
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In the specific case with which we are concerned, what we need is an epistemology of 
concept-possession, which clarifies the relation denoted by the expression ‘grasps C’. 
There is, in other words, a gap that we need to fill, in order to regard the obtaining 
of the relevant fact as entailing the required epistemic relation – a gap generated by the 
fact that there is a difference in kind between the constitution conditions for a logical 
concept and its possession conditions. 
 
 Now consider the last option. The thought here is that concept-constitution 
should itself be regarded as determined by concept-possession: it is in virtue of the 
fact that we understand C in a certain way (as playing the inferential role that we take it 
to play) that we regard the relevant rule as concept-constituting for C.  
In this last case, it seems prima facie plausible to argue that there is no gap between 
concept-constitutors, as it were, and the epistemic relation that Boghossian wants 
them to generate. For if my grasp of C determines which rule or rules of inference are 
C-constituting, and under the assumption that grasp of C may be ascribed on the basis 
of a disposition to infer in the way licensed by the C-constituting rule, then, when 
engaging in a reasoning practice in which C is deployed, I don’t appear to have any 
other option, provided that I grasp C, but to reason according to the relevant rule: it is 
the very grasp that I have of C that determines that this is the way in which I should 
reason. 
 The option is, however, confronted by a crucial difficulty, which can be 
rendered in the following terms. In order to claim that a subject is disposed to infer in 
accordance with a C-constituting rule R in virtue of her grasp of C (in the sense spelt out 
above), we need to presuppose that a subject’s grasp of C is, as it were, pre-inferential: 
although we may regard it, for example, as being manifested in our inferential 
dispositions, it is not itself to be identified with a disposition24. But, then, we need to 
explain: 
                                                
24  This would of course require that we reformulate Boghossian’s idea that a disposition 
to infer in the relevant way is a necessary condition on our grasping C, as the idea that it is a 
necessary condition on a correct ascription of grasp of C to a subject S. That is, if grasp is pre-
inferential, then the natural option for articulating the relation between such grasp and the 
disposition to which it gives rise is in terms of manifestation.  
25 
 
• What a pre-inferential grasp of C consists in, given that we take C to be 
constituted by a rule of inference; 
 
• How a pre-inferential grasp of C translates, as it were, into an inferential 
disposition. 
 
In the lack of such an explanation, we are left, it seems, with a deeply mysterious 
notion of ‘grasping’ a logical concept. If the notion is mysterious, however, then we are 
not justified in making any claim about it: in particular, we are not justified in claiming 
that it generates any particular relation of obligation between an epistemic subject and 
the relevant concept-constituting rule. 
 
To take stock: the first three options for articulating the thought that it is a fact 
about our basic logical principles that they are concept-constituting require, if they are 
to provide a justification for the claim that such a fact generates a particular epistemic 
relation, that an explanatory gap be filled. The last option, under the provisional 
assumption that it may be formulated in a way compatible with Boghossian’s views 
about inferential dispositions, leaves us with an unclear notion of ‘grasping a concept’. 
In all cases, the upshot of the considerations above appears to be the following. 
Unless a story about the epistemic impact of the relevant concept-constituting facts is 
provided, we have that the fact that a rule R is constitutive of a concept C is in 
principle compatible with a variety of options for articulating what grasp of C consists 
in, and thus that it is compatible with the following two possibilities: 
 
• That R’s being constitutive a logical concept C does not necessarily generate the 
particular relation of obligation sought by Boghossian; 
                                                                                                                                            
This is, however, a thought that I doubt Boghossian would endorse – for, in his project, 
the idea seems to be that our grasp of a logical concept consists in a disposition to reason in the 
way licensed by the relevant concept-constituting rule. If this is the case, then the last option is 
not available to Boghossian – whose proposal would then be confronted by the problem spelt 
out for the first three options. 
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• That R’s being constitutive of a logical concept C does not necessarily generate 
the same relation of obligation for all the epistemic subjects to which we would 
intuitively ascribe possession of C. 
 
That R’s being concept-constituting for a logical concept C does not necessarily 
result in absence of epistemic alternatives (when reasoning in the way licensed by R), 
can be seen by reasoning as follows.  
It is relatively easy to conceive of a competent speaker of a language, to whom we 
would intuitively ascribe possession of a logical concept (say: the concept of the 
conditional), whose explicit beliefs interfere either with her disposition to infer in the 
way licensed by the relevant concept-constituting rule, or with the nature of the 
relation of obligation that obtains between the speaker and the rule25.  
Consider, for example, two friends, Mary and John, who are normally disposed to 
infer in the way licensed by MP.  
Now imagine that one day, after having attended a logic class taught by Vann 
McGee, they acquire the belief that MP is not a valid rule of inference. In response to 
this new belief, they adopt different strategies. Mary will refuse to infer in the way 
licensed by MP – she simply feels that her reasoning thus would qualify her as 
irrational. John, on the other hand, will continue to infer according to MP – after all, 
most of his fellow-students do, and he also leaves open the possibility that his new 
belief in the invalidity of MP might one reveal some flaws – better, in the meantime, to 
conform to the standard practice. 
 
If the scenario above is conceivable, we seem to have a case in which: 
 
• Two competent speakers of a language can intuitively be ascribed grasp of the 
conditional; 
                                                
25  The example presented below is a variant of the ‘McGee case’ often discussed in the 
context of so-called necessity objections to Boghossian’s account [e.g. Williamson 2003]. I will 
discuss a different version of the example in Section 3 of this chapter. 
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• As a result of the acquisition of an explicit belief about a basic rule of inference, 
one of these speakers, Mary, will not be disposed to infer in the way licensed by 
the rule: not only she does not feel obliged to infer thus, she now also believes 
that if she did follow the rule, the conjunction between her inferential behavior 
and her explicit beliefs would qualify her as irrational.   
 
• As a result of the acquisition of the same belief about a basic rule of inference, 
the other speaker, John, will continue being disposed to infer in the way 
licensed by the rule. We can also imagine him as feeling obliged to reason thus: 
we can, for example, imagine him as committed to the idea that one should 
conform to the reasoning practice that is standard in one’s community unless 
one has conclusive reasons not to do so. However, the nature of John’s new 
obligation to reason in accordance with MP (consistency with his conformist 
belief) will now have nothing to do with the fact that the rule is concept-
constituting26. 
 
That R’s status as a concept-constituting rule does not guarantee, as it were, 
sameness in the epistemic quality of the obligation supposedly entailed by R’s such 
status, can also be illustrated by means of an example.  
 
 Imagine a community whose members have learnt the concept of the 
conditional not by being taught how to reason in accordance with MP, but by the 
truth-tables method. They have been taught, in other words, the standard truth- 
conditional semantics for the conditional, and their use of the conditional in reasoning 
and discourse reflects knowledge of this semantics. Imagine, also, that the speakers in 
this community have some sort of insight into the fact that, given the semantics that 
they have learnt for the conditional, MP is a correct rule of inference. Because of this, 
they are disposed to reason according to MP, and never question each other’s grounds 
                                                
26  For the fact that members of a community are disposed to reason in accordance with a 
rule does not, of course, imply that the rule in question is a concept-constituting rule. 
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when reasoning thus. Call the group to which the subjects in question belong Group 
A. 
Now suppose that one day, a sub-group in this community starts learning the 
logical concepts in a different way. The fact that this is a very unlikely possibility does 
not make it completely implausible: imagine, for example, that the linguistic 
community in question comprises a group of very anti-conformist, intentionally self-
isolating families, who wish to differentiate their epistemic habits from the ones of the 
majority. The children in this sub-group, call it Group B, start learning the concept of 
the conditional by being taught how to reason in accordance with the standard 
introduction and elimination rules for the conditional. As a result of this, they will find 
MP compelling, and will be disposed to reason in accordance with it. They have, 
however, no knowledge of the truth tables for the conditional – they simply have never 
associated the inference rules that they have learnt with the truth-conditional behavior 
of the conditional. 
Note that members of Group A and Group B will reason in exactly the same 
way when performing inferences with the conditional. Within their own groups, there 
is never any question concerning the blamelessness of their inferences: both appear to 
have no epistemic alternatives to reasoning in the way they do. If, within each group, 
the correctness of an instance of MP is questioned by a subject, she will be open to the 
allegation of not grasping the conditional. 
One day, the members of Group B temporarily overcome their tendency to 
isolate themselves from the rest of the community, and join the members of Group A 
for a dinner party. During the party, the members of the two groups will engage in 
some very simple reasoning practices, some of which will involve the conditional. 
Members of Group A know of the strange learning techniques popular among 
members of Group B; in particular, they know that members of Group B have no 
knowledge of the truth tables for the conditional.  
  Now, it seems plausible to suppose that, in this scenario, members of Group A 
might question the grounds on which members of Group B may justify their 
performance of the relevant inferences. Why should they consider Group B’s 
inferences blameless? What grounds does this strange, self-secluded group have to 
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claim blamelessness? After all, they don’t even know the truth-tables for the 
conditional!  And vice versa: members of Group B will claim that they are obliged to 
reason in the way they do, because this is the way in which they have been taught to 
use the concept of the conditional. But this is not the case for Group A: what grounds 
do they have to assert q from the premises p and p → q? They can’t appeal to the way 
in which they have learnt the concept! 
 
I take this example to intuitively show the following. Under the assumption that 
MP is constitutive of the conditional, concept-constitution appears not to be sufficient, 
by itself, for blamelessness. It appears not to be sufficient because the epistemic 
relation in which concept-possession consists is left under-determined by the mere 
claim that a basic inference rule is concept-constituting. It may very well be affected by 
other factors, which will have an impact on whether our reasoning in accordance with 
the rule can indeed be deemed blameless.  
One such factor – indeed, the one relevant in the scenario above – may be how 
a subject has learnt a logical concept. In virtue of how they have learnt the concept of 
the conditional, members of each of the two groups A and B do not take members of 
the other group to be in the same epistemic relation with MP. If we share the speakers’ 
intuitions, the source of the obligation to reason in the way licensed by MP differs 
between the two groups. Members of Group A, for example, will feel obliged to reason 
in accordance with the rule in virtue of their acknowledging that the standard truth-
conditions of the conditional license reasoning thus. For members of Group A, the 
obligation will be unmediated by such recognition27. 
                                                
27  The account of concept-possession offered in [Peacocke 1992] does not encounter this 
problem, in virtue of Peacocke’s explicit qualification of the epistemic impact of our basic 
principles of inference. Peacocke characterizes such impact in terms of a psychological state: a 
speaker’ grasp of a logical concept (and the source of her being obliged to infer in accordance 
with its constitutive rule) consists in her finding the rule primitively compelling. However, as I 
will argue in Chapter II, Peacocke’s account encounters other difficulties, precisely in virtue of 
the fact that it identifies the source of an epistemic obligation in a psychological state.  
It should be stressed that the problem of articulating what I refer to as the epistemic 
impact of a concept-constituting rule of inference, is indeed a problem only if one wants an 
inferentialist account of concept-possession to provide the grounds for a justification of our 
basic logical principles. 
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Before we move on to consider possible replies to this interpretation of the 
example, there is an immediate misunderstanding that we should take care of. 
One could object that we cannot conceive of the inferential obligation which 
members of Group A incur as mediated by their acceptance of the truth tables for the 
conditional, because learning the truth-tables already presupposes an inferential grasp of 
the concept. Intuitively, to grasp the fact that if p is true, and p→q is true, then q is 
true, one needs to reason in the way licensed by MP. So, the objection goes, members 
of Group A do have an unmediated obligation to reason in accordance with MP – it’s 
just that they don’t realize this, and are thus mistaken in thinking that the source of 
their inferential obligation differs from Group B’s. 
My reply to this objection is the following. It may very well be that members of 
Group A as mistaken about the source of their inferential obligation, and that this 
source is in fact the same as for members of Group B. However, in order to come to 
this realization, they would need to acquire an explicit belief about what is presupposed 
by their grasp of the truth tables for the conditional. Namely, they would have to 
acquire the belief that the inferences that allowed them to come to such a grasp were 
instances of MP.  
The acquisition of this belief would then affect the relation in which they stand 
with the concept-constituting rule. But the very idea of an inference being blind, in 
Boghossian’s project, is meant to capture the fact that the inference shouldn’t be 
affected by a subject’s explicit beliefs – whether we are blameless in performing it, 
should be entirely independent of any reflective stance. 
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2.2 Replies28 
 
There are various possible replies to my interpretation of this last scenario. In 
what follows, I will focus on the two that I take to be the most plausible, and relevant to 
what I am trying to show. 
 
The First Reply 
 
One could argue that there is a methodological flaw in my interpretation of the 
scenario. In particular, I assumed that for both Group A and Group B MP was a 
concept-constituting rule of inference.  
However, one may reason as follows. The fact that members of the two groups 
do not share the same relation of obligation with MP, shows that the possession- 
conditions for the conditional differ between the two groups. If the possession-
conditions differ, then the constitution-conditions do. For it is plausible to assume 
that whether something instantiates the property of being concept-constituting is also 
determined by what we take the correctness conditions on an ascription of concept-
possession to be.  If we endorse this assumption, we should acknowledge that, because 
the constitution-conditions differ, the concepts will also be different: what is denoted 
by the term ‘conditional’ will not be the same concept for the two groups, and 
therefore we cannot claim that MP is concept-constituting for both29. 
 There are two problems with this reply.  
 
                                                
28  The replies considered in this section are replies to the scenario just discussed, rather 
than to the one, involving Mary and John, that I presented earlier. For possible replies to cases 
similar to the Mary and John example, cf [Boghossian 2003; Williamson 2003].  
Replies to variants of the McGee case, including those given by Boghossian himself, 
usually appeal to the defeasibility of a disposition to infer in accordance with a given concept-
constituting rule. However, it is far from clear how the defeasibility strategy squares with 
Boghossian’s requirement that we regard a subject who infers in the concept-constituting way 
as being obliged to do so.  
29  Unless we make the implausible claim that the same inference-rule can be constitutive 
of more than one concept – an option that, here, I will not be considering. 
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The first is that, in conjunction with Boghossian’s account of blamelessness the 
objection gives rise to an explanatory circularity. For consider the following: in 
Boghossian’s project, blamelessness is generated by my obligation to reason in 
accordance with MP – by the fact that, were I not disposed to thus reason, I would not 
possess the concept of the conditional. The source of this obligation is the fact that MP  
is concept-constituting for the conditional. But now we ask: in virtue of which facts, 
then, is MP concept-constituting? Well, the reply considered suggests, to uncover 
these facts one would have to look at the possession conditions for the conditional: the 
inference rules that are concept-constituting are precisely those rules which generate a 
(special kind of) obligation, on the part of the epistemic subject, to reason in 
accordance with the concept-constituting rule of MP. The explanatory circularity in 
which such a story incurs is evident.  
 
Second, one who offers this reply appears to be bound to endorse a variety of 
contextualism about concept-constitution – one, in particular, whose consequences 
would be undesirable given Boghossian’s aims and polemical target. 
For consider the following.  
According to the proponent of the reply under discussion, although members of 
Group A and of Group B share the same inferential dispositions, and presumably use 
the same linguistic expression (‘conditional’) to denote the concept(s) that they are 
deploying in their inferences, they don’t share a unique concept of conditional. In 
particular, it is not the case that MP is concept-constituting for both groups. The status 
of MP will then vary across contexts: in some contexts, MP will be concept-
constituting, in others it won’t.  
But, then, in a context in which MP is not concept-constituting, inferences 
performed in accordance with it will not be blameless in Boghossian’s sense. For 
remember that, according to Boghossian’s proposal, a rule being concept-constituting 
lowers, as it were, the epistemic standards required by a justification of our inferring 
according to it – we needn’t have a reflectively appreciable warrant for the rule’s 
validity in order to be not-epistemically irresponsible when inferring in accordance 
with that rule. But, then, in a context in which MP is not concept-constituting, the 
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epistemic standards will potentially be raised again: we need more than lack of 
epistemic irresponsibility to claim blamelessness, and in particular to claim it against 
Boghossian’s polemical target.  
If this is the case, however, the rationale of the appeal to concept-constitution, in 
Boghossian’s project, is defeated. For consider that a relativist about basic logical 
principles may now argue that: 
 
• For her, MP is not a concept-constituting rule – therefore, more than mere lack 
of epistemic irresponsibility is required for a subject to be justified in inferring 
according to it; 
 
• In general, there may be no objective fact of the matter as to whether a subject 
is justified in reasoning in the way licensed by a basic logical principle, because 
there may be no objective fact of the matter as to whether the context in which 
the relevant inferences are performed is one in which the principle is concept-
constituting. 
The Second Reply 
 
The second reply consists in arguing as follows.  
Their inferential behavior reveals that the two groups do share the same 
concept of conditional. Independently of how members of the two groups have learnt 
the concept, the concept-constitutors will be the same in the two cases. In particular, 
consistently with the basic inferentialist assumption of Boghossian’s epistemological 
project, it is the same rule of inference, MP, which is constitutive of the concept in both 
cases. Because of this, members of both groups will be blameless when inferring in 
accordance with MP – although either one or both groups might appear to be justified 
in questioning each others’ grounds for reasoning in accordance with MP, the theorist 
of concepts will have a different view, and only the latter is correct. 
 
My reply to this claim is, simply, this: a philosophical theory of concepts whose 
predictions differ so radically from the intuitions of those who use the concepts, is at 
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risk of implausibility, and owes an explanation of why the relevant intuitions are 
wrong. Until such an explanation is given, the claim’s strength is greatly reduced30.  
 
2.3 Blamelessness and Entitlement 
 
Consider, now, the question: what are possible candidates for the notion of 
entitlement that Boghossian needs? 
 Well, to see this, we first need to remind ourselves of a constraint that all such 
candidates will have to respect if they are to play the role that Boghossian wants the 
notion of entitlement to play in his project. 
Since Boghossian’s target is the view according to which we are never in a 
position to objectively claim that (the inferences licensed by) our basic logical 
principles are justification-transferring, we need a notion of entitlement such that we 
are able to say things about it, and in particular to make claims about it that we have 
good reasons for regarding as objective. We want, in other words, a notion that will 
allow us to claim justification for our inferentially formed beliefs. 
 
Now consider what the problem of claiming entitlement is. On pain of 
circularity, the conditions that must be met by an epistemic subject who reasons in 
accordance with a valid rule of inference to be entitled to the beliefs acquired in virtue 
of the inference thus performed, cannot be knowledge of the validity of the inference31. 
It must be, as it were, something less epistemically demanding. So, it cannot be a 
necessary condition on our being entitled to a belief that we know that the inference 
by which the belief was arrived at is valid. What can it be?  
 
There are two ways in which one can go here. One can say that the conditions in 
question amount to: 
 
                                                
30  An alternative reply to (a variant of) this objection is the one that I have given in my 
interpretation of the example. 
31  [Wright 2001]: 49. 
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i) The epistemic relation y (where the value of y is, for the moment, 
indeterminate) that is implicated by the fact that the (rules governing the) 
inferences in question are concept-constituting for a given concept C; 
 
or that they amount to: 
 
ii) The epistemic relation that consists in knowledge of the fact that the (rules 
governing) the inferences in question are concept-constituting. 
 
A Mysterious Epistemic Relation 
 
Consider i) first. What can we say about relation y?  Well, according to 
Boghossian, y consists in a lack of epistemic irresponsibility, which is deemed to be 
sufficient for blamelessness in reasoning. Suppose that, for the sake of the argument, 
we accept this. So the idea is: because a rule of inference R is concept-constituting, our 
relation to R is such that the inferences licensed by R are entitling. In Boghossian’s 
project, the relation that is in place between R and a subject who reasons blamelessly 
in accordance with R is spelt out merely in terms of non-irresponsibility– the point is 
precisely that this is meant to guarantee entitlement in the case of concept-constituting 
rules. In these cases, blamelessness is not only sufficient for claiming entitlement, it is 
also necessary: for basic logical rules, the reasoning was, any other strategy that we 
may adopt to justify our claim that one such rule is entitling will fail. 
The acknowledgment of this fact has the following consequence. Whether we 
can claim entitlement will depend on whether we can claim blamelessness, that is: 
whether the grounds that we have for claiming blamelessness can aspire to an 
objective status. Because, in Boghossian’s project, these grounds amount to the 
concept-constituting character of the relevant rule, then the question becomes: for a 
given rule of inference R, can we objectively claim that R is concept-constituting? 
  How, for example, will we respond to someone who questions the grounds of 
our claim that the rule governing the inference is indeed concept-constituting?  
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In the absence of a detailed account of which conditions have to hold for a rule to be 
concept-constituting, we can only try to sketch the possible directions that such a 
challenge might take.  
It seems to me that there are three natural options for articulating the challenge.  
 
• Option 1: The challenge simply consists in the request for the criteria 
according to which we may classify a given rule as concept-constituting; 
 
• Option 2: The challenge consists in our opponent’s refusal to acknowledge the 
fact that the rule in question is concept-constituting. Note that she does not 
need to have, as it were, a hostile theoretical view about concepts in order to 
raise the challenge. Consider, for example, a scenario in which a sophisticated 
speaker who refuses to infer in accordance with a basic rule of inference 
presents us with the following argument: ‘there is no evidence of the fact that I 
don’t possess the concept in question (for example, I have never been judged to 
be an incompetent speaker by my community), and yet it is my belief that it is, 
instead, another rule that governs the way in which we reason with the 
concept’. 
 
• Option 3: The challenge disguises the contention that sufficient grounds for the 
(objectivity of the) claim that a given basic rule of inference is concept-
constituting are unobtainable. This is, I take it, ER’s position.  
 
Re. option 1: Call this the simple challenge. To the simple challenge, Boghossian 
himself admits that he has no reply: for him, the question of what makes a rule of 
inference concept-constituting is an open question.  But then, once again, until some 
story is told about the constitution conditions for a concept C, the challenge remains 
unanswered. 
 
Re. option 2: Call this the quasi-contextualist challenge. In the absence of a story about 
what the constitution conditions consist in, it seems to me that the only way in which 
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we could respond to the quasi-contextualist challenge is by arguing as follows. Assume 
that the concept in question is the conditional. If our opponent is right, then the 
constitution conditions for the conditional as she grasps it are different from the 
constitution conditions for the conditional as I grasp it. Under the assumption that 
constitution-conditions uniquely determine a logical concept, we simply possess 
different concepts of the conditional, and we are talking past each other. We don’t 
really disagree, we are simply talking about different concepts. Note that this view is 
distinct from ER: we are not directly admitting that that whether a concept-
constituting rule implicates entitlement is a matter of varying epistemic standards. 
Rather, we are simply saying that we don’t share a concept with our opponent: that 
what appears, in our conversation, to be one concept (the conditional) is in fact two 
concepts (my conditional and her conditional). 
As already remarked, however, the natural option for one who follows this line 
of reasoning is to adhere to some variety of contextualism about concepts. Which rules 
are concept-constituting for a concept, and thus what the concept consists in, will then 
depend on a varying contextual parameter. In different contexts different rules of 
inference will be concept-constituting. 
But now the problem is the one that we have already encountered: whether or 
not an inferential rule is concept-constituting will also vary across contexts, and thus 
whether we are blameless or not will co-vary with it. If entitlement is implicated by 
blamelessness, whether we are entitled or not will also thus vary.   
 
Re. option 3: Call this the relativist challenge. In order to suitably respond to the 
relativist challenge, we need knowledge of the fact that a rule of inference is concept-
constituting. More than this, we need to be able to claim such knowledge.  
I will thus deal with the difficulties of this option in the next paragraph.  
 
 
 
 
 
38 
Knowledge of Concept-Constitution 
 
Now consider ii). If we take entitlement to require knowledge of the fact that a 
basic rule of inference is concept-constituting, we find ourselves in the following 
situation.  
First of all, consider that the knowledge requirement can receive two 
formulations.  
 
• (Weak formulation): An epistemic subject needs to possess knowledge of the fact 
that a basic rule is concept-constituting in order for his reasoning in 
accordance with that rule to be entitling.  
 
• (Strong formulation): An epistemic subject needs to be able to claim knowledge 
of the fact that a basic rule is concept-constituting in addition to merely 
possessing such knowledge. 
 
Even the weaker formulation is subject to an intuitive problem.  
It is implausible to claim that knowledge of the fact that a rule is concept-constituting 
is required if an epistemic subject is to be entitled to the beliefs arrived at by reasoning 
in accordance with it. For a necessary condition on entitlement would then be 
possessing theoretical notions that many subjects, of whom we would intuitively say 
grasp the concepts that they use, do not have - subjects for whom entitlement would 
then be unobtainable. These notions include the very notion of a concept, the notion 
of a rule of inference, and the notion of what it is for such a rule to be concept-
constituting. It seems evident that, whatever our views on the correct definition of 
entitlement are, taking this route would lead to an implausible account. 
 
The stronger formulation obviously inherits the difficulty just highlighted, and 
is also subject to the objection that the notion of entitlement that it articulates does no 
better against ER than the simple internalist’s notion criticized by Boghossian. For 
consider the following.  
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 To the claim that we possess knowledge of the fact that, say, MP, is concept-
constituting for the concept of the conditional, our relativist opponent might reply that 
either 
 
(a) There is no evidence for our claim, for example because there are no objective 
facts that determine whether MP is concept-constituting;  
 
or  
 
(b) Knowledge that MP is concept-constituting does not amount to knowledge that 
the inferences that we perform in accordance with it are instances of a concept-
constituting rule. Since it is such inferences that are meant to be entitling, what 
we need is knowledge of the latter fact. There is, however, no objective fact of the 
matter as to whether a specific inference is an instance of a concept-constituting 
rule. 
 
 If the relativist chooses to go for reply (a), then a necessary condition on the 
availability of a response is, once again, that we provide a story about which kind of 
facts determine concept-constitution. Until such a story is provided, we lack a notion 
of entitlement that we may defend against ER’s claims. 
 If the relativist chooses to go for reply (b), it seems that the situation is even 
worse. For an attempt to justify our knowledge of concept-constitution will incur into a 
circularity analogous to the Carrollian circularity in which the rational insight strategy, 
criticized by Boghossian, incurs. The problem may be rendered as follows.  
 
 When I reason in accordance with MP, and the relativist questions my being 
objectively entitled to the beliefs thus formed, I will have to explain how knowledge of 
the fact that MP is concept-constituting allows me to claim entitlement for a particular 
inference performed in accordance with MP. The difficulty here consists in explaining 
what grounds I have for claiming that I know that this particular inference is indeed an 
instance of MP, and thus entitling. For in order to justify such a claim, it seems that I 
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will have to infer in accordance with the very rule (of which an instance is) under 
discussion – I will have, for example, to argue as follows: 
 
I know that MP is concept-constituting. Therefore I know that if an inference is 
performed in accordance with MP, then it is entitling. An inference performed in 
accordance with MP is an inference from premises of the form p and p→q to the 
conclusion that q. The inference that we are discussing has this form. Since if it has 
this form then it is an instance of MP, then it is an instance of MP. Thus it is an 
instance of a concept-constituting rule, and it follows that it is entitling. 
 
The reasoning above evidently contains several inferential steps in accordance with 
MP. But my opponent will then question whether this piece of reasoning itself is 
entitling – we are, as it were, back to the start32.  
 
3. WHAT IS CONCEPT-CONSTITUTING? RULES AND INFERENTIAL PRACTICES 
 
The upshot of the arguments presented in Section 2 may be rendered as 
follows.  
                                                
32   A qualification seems necessary here. [Boghossian 2000: 253] distinguishes between 
what he calls ‘suasive’ and ‘no-suasive’ reasons. The distinction is presented in the context of a 
discussion of a caveat that concerns the target of the project, and in particular the ability of the 
latter to counter skeptical doubts about the availability of an objective justification for our basic 
logical principles. The thought that Boghossian endorses in that discussion is that in the case of 
our basic logical principles, we must be content with providing non-suasive reasons only:  as he 
puts it, ‘…we have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that in certain areas of knowledge, logic 
featuring prominently among them, our warrant can be at most non-suasive, powerless to quell 
skeptical doubts’. We must, in other words, be content with warrants whose objective quality 
cannot be effectively claimed against the skeptic. 
However, it is not clear: 
 
• How this caveat fits, as it were, in the project, given that the explicit aim of Boghossian’s 
account is to defend the possibility of objectively claiming justification for our basic 
logical principles; 
 
• What exactly we are to make of a non-suasive reason for accepting a logical principle, as 
[Wright 2001] remarks. 
 
The first point highlights the possibility of an internal incoherence in Boghossian’s project; the 
second highlights the need for a clarification of the project’s scope and target. 
41 
On the one hand, until an account of concept-constitution and concept-
possession is provided that tells us which facts determine whether a rule of inference 
is concept-constituting, and what the epistemic impact of these facts is, we lack 
evidence for the view that concept-constitution provides us, via blamelessness in 
reasoning, with sufficient grounds for objectively claiming entitlement. 
On the other hand, however, it is far from clear that such an account would 
both be compatible with the aim of Boghossian’s project and with the idea that the 
inferences licensed by a concept-constituting rule are blind inferences. 
 
For recall the discussion in sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2. The claim that I made 
there was that concept-constitution does not necessarily entail blameless in reasoning, 
and that this is because concept-constitution per se is compatible with more than one 
relation of concept-possession. That is: we have no guarantee, given the simple fact 
that a rule of inference is concept-constituting, that the relation of obligation which 
obtains between a C-constituting rule and a subject who possesses C will be a 
determinate and objective relation. The variant on the McGee scenario, involving Mary 
and John, and the example involving Group A and Group B, intended to illustrate this 
claim. In particular, my interpretation of this second example points to the fact that we 
can have cases in which a subject’s obligation to infer in accordance with a C-
constituting rule may be mediated by factors independent of the constitution-
conditions for C, and which may have an impact on the epistemic quality of her 
relation with the rule. 
The upshot of that discussion was, then, that a clarification of this quality (a 
clarification of the epistemic impact of the concept-constitutors), is a necessary 
condition on an inference being blameless. 
Now consider the discussion in sub-section 2.3. The thought explored in that 
sub-section was that an inference’s being blind does not provide us with a notion of 
entitlement suitable for Boghossian’s aim. In particular, in that sub-section I tried to 
show two things.  
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The first is that, in the absence of a suitable story about the facts that determine 
whether a rule R is concept-constituting, we won’t be able to respond to what I called 
the quasi-contextualist challenge.  
The second is the following. In order to respond to the relativist challenge, we 
need grounds capable to support an objective claim that, from the fact that a rule R is 
concept-constituting, it follows that we are entitled to reason in accordance to it. 
Possession of these grounds, however, requires that we have a reflective stance towards 
R – hence the inferential circularity. In other words, to respond to the relativist we 
would need: 
 
• To entertain explicit beliefs about the relation between R and its instances; 
 
• Such beliefs to be grounded in an objective justification. 
   
If, following Boghossian, we maintain that entitlement should follow, via blameless 
in reasoning, from the concept-constituting status of a rule R, then we find ourselves 
in the following situation. In virtue of the first requirement, the account of concept-
constitution that Boghossian needs is one that articulates the epistemic impact of the 
constitution-conditions in terms of a reflective stance – contradicting the idea that our 
basic inferences are blind. In virtue of the second requirement, we end up being in the 
same boat as the internalist – and thus unable to counter the relativist challenge. 
 
 If this is the case, an anti-expressivist epistemology of basic logical rules such as 
Boghossian’s needs to either reformulate its target or abandon the idea that a sub-set 
of our inferential practices are blind. 
 
Both in the course of that discussion and in Section 1, I have referred to basic 
rules of inference as the kind of things that are concept-constituting. However, it is not 
clear whether, in Boghossian’s project, one should take the basic rules themselves or 
the inferences performed in accordance with such rules to be concept-constituting. The 
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option that is chosen will affect an inferentially-minded epistemology of basic logical 
principles, such as Boghossian’s, in at least the following respect. 
 
• If we say that basic rules, rather than inferential practices, are concept - 
constituting, then – as the Carrollian circularity problem discussed in sub-section 2.3 
highlighted – we need to spell out the relation between the idea that a rule R is 
concept-constituting and the idea that specific inferences licensed by that rule are 
(blameless and thus) entitling.  
 
• If, instead, we say that our inferential practices are concept- 
constituting, then we will have to clarify the status of the basic logical rules for which 
Boghossian seeks an objective justification, with reference to the relation that they 
enter into with those practices. Are the rules in question the result of a reconstruction of 
the practice? That is: are they to be regarded as a tool that we deploy in order to render 
the logical form of the inferences that we are disposed to perform? Do we take basic 
rules of inference to stand in a descriptive relation with our inferential practices? Or 
should this relation be, nevertheless, a normative one33?  
 
In this section, my aim is to sketch the options available in dealing with the 
general question of which kind of things an inferentialist account of concepts should 
take to be concept-constituting, and to highlight some of the difficulties which they 
incur. In the first section of Chapter II, I will defend one of these options.  
 
So, what are the inferential candidates for concept-constitution? We have two 
options in answering this question. 
 
• Option 1: What is concept-constituting for a logical concept C is a (set of) rule(s) 
of inference. In what follows, I will deploy the term ‘rule of inference’ as 
                                                
33  These are, of course, some of the key-questions in the long term philosophical debate 
concerning dispositions, rules and meaning, of which the primary representative is [Kripke 
2007]. This debate will constitute the background of the discussion in Chapter II. 
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denoting an inferential instruction. A rule, then, is an instruction to proceed from 
a given state of information to the next in a certain way. For example, one could 
say that the instruction to proceed from p and p→q to q is concept-constituting 
for the concept of the conditional. 
 
• Option 2: Inferential practices are concept-constituting, where by ‘inferential 
practice’ one can mean: actual or in some way idealized inferential practice. 
 
Main Difficulties of Option 1 
 
Option 1 is confronted by at least two difficulties. 
 
First Difficulty: The first difficulty consists in the fact that, if inference rules are the sort 
of things that constitute concepts, then the scope for substantive disagreement about 
what we should take our concepts to be is widely reduced, and this has the counter-
intuitive consequence of transforming cases of prima facie substantive disagreements 
about the correct definition of a concept into cases of mere talking past each other. 
Consider the following two examples.  
 
1) Susan takes very seriously the familiar objection presented by Van McGee against 
the validity of MP [McGee 1985]. Susan is convinced that McGee’s counterexample is 
indeed a counterexample to the validity of the rule. She is a rather sophisticated 
speaker, and has a theory of concepts according to which validity is a necessary 
condition for a rule of inference to be concept-constituting34. Susan thus does not 
believe that MP is concept-constituting for the concept of the conditional.  
One day, Susan meets Bob. Bob, who is also a rather sophisticated speaker, has 
no reason to doubt that MP is a valid rule of inference, but even if he did, he would 
                                                
34  The claim that validity should be seen as a necessary semantic constraint on concept-
constituting rules is usually argued for in the framework of a truth-theoretic approach to 
inferential role semantics – for example, in [Peacocke 1992; 1993] and [Boghossian 2002]. Proof-
theoretic approaches normally appeal to conservativeness as a syntactic requirement on such 
rules.  
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not care much – Bob has no strong views about whether validity is a necessary 
condition on concept-constitution. Furthermore, Bob believes that MP is one of the 
concept-constituting rules for the conditional, that there are no other rules, aside from 
MP and the introduction rule for the conditional, which define the concept, and that 
there is nothing about the concept that is not captured by these rules. The concept just 
IS these rules. Susan tells Bob about her belief that MP is not concept-constituting. 
What will Bob reply? Note that Bob knows that Susan is a sophisticated speaker, and 
has no reason to doubt that she possesses the concept of the conditional. 
 It seems to me that Bob’s obvious strategy, given his beliefs, will be to reply  
that, because the concept is uniquely defined by MP (and the standard introduction 
rule for the conditional), then him and Susan are simply speaking about different 
concepts: while MP is concept-constituting for Bob’s conditional, Susan’s conditional 
has, as it were, nothing more to do with MP. There is no real disagreement here, as 
there is no shared concept on which Bob and Susan can disagree.  
 
2) Consider the elimination rule for disjunction, a natural candidate for a concept-
constituting rule35. In quantum logic, the rule only holds in a restricted form: C can be 
inferred from A ∨ B only if it follows from each of A and B without any collateral 
premises or hypothesis. Therefore, the quantum logician will accept an inference of 
the form: 
 
D: A ∨ B A: C B: C 
    D: C 
 
But not one of the form: 
 
D: A ∨ B A, E: C   B, F: C 
         D, E, F: C 
                                                
35 This example is discussed in [Dummett 1991]: 205-206. Here I am following the sequent 
calculus notation that he uses as it naturally displays dependence on premises and hypotheses, 
which is what is at stake in the example. 
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Where the latter is an admissible instance of the full elimination rule for disjunction in 
a classical logical system. 
Now, if it is basic rules of inference that are concept-constituting, and if the 
elimination rule for disjunction is indeed one of such concept-constituting rules, then 
it seems that we are bound to say that the concept of disjunction for the quantum 
logician is simply a different concept from the one that the classical logician intends to 
capture via the relevant rules. But this blocks the possibility of a disagreement between 
the two logicians about how the concept should be defined in the first place.  
Although it seems that we can conceive of such a disagreement, if the rule itself 
is concept-constituting, we will simply have two different concepts here. The 
disagreement might then be represented as concerning which one we should introduce 
in a system, on the basis of pragmatic considerations about the system’s purpose and 
desired strength, but not as concerning which rules correctly captures the concept of 
disjunction. 
 
Second Difficulty: The second difficulty of option 1 is directly related to the first.  
Intuitively, we want to be able to say that one can be right or wrong in claiming 
that a certain rule is concept-constituting. In other words, we want a plausible error 
theory for concept-constitution: it should be possible for me to argue, and provide 
grounds for the claim, that someone is wrong when thinking that a given rule is 
concept-constituting for a concept C. It seems, however, that we can allow for such an 
error theory only if we allow that there is a gap between a rule of inference and the 
concept that the rule is meant to constitute. Consider the following example, inspired 
by [Wright 2001].  
 
Frege’s Basic Law V can be formulated as a pair of rules expressed in a natural 
deduction system for the inferential introduction and elimination of contexts 
containing a course-of-values operator36. Imagine that Bob, a mathematician, takes 
Basic Law V, formulated in this fashion, to be constitutive of the concept ‘course of 
                                                
36  The details of this possible formulation are given in [Wright 2001]: 63. 
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values’. Also, imagine that Russell never made his famous discovery, and the entire 
community of mathematicians is unaware of the invalidity of BLV37. Now, it seems 
perfectly plausible to conceive of another mathematician, Susan, who does not share 
Bob’s belief about the concept-constituting character of BLV – and it seems perfectly 
plausible to conceive of Susan as having some grounds to motivate her disagreement. 
For example, she might offer an argument to the conclusion that taking the concept to 
be constituted in this fashion will not allow us to capture its intuitively correct 
mathematical properties (whatever she takes them to be), or that the rules will have 
consequences that we are not willing to accept. We can also imagine Susan succeeding 
in her attempt to persuade Bob – in virtue of her arguments, Bob might come to realize 
that he was in fact wrong: the concept of a course of values is not captured by the rule. 
In other words, our intuitions suggest that it must make sense for Bob to say: ‘I was 
wrong, and here is why…’. 
But then it cannot be that the rule itself is concept-constituting: the rule will 
rather naturally be seen as the result of an attempt to capture, or reconstruct, what 
makes the relevant concept the concept that it is. 
 
Main Difficulties of Option 2: 
 
As already remarked, option 2 can consist in either of two ideas: 
 
• Certain idealized inferential practices are concept-constituting; 
 
• Certain of our actual inferential practices are concept-constituting. 
 
In what follows, I will consider what seems to me to be the main difficulty with which 
each of these ideas is confronted. 
 
 
                                                
37  This qualification simply serves the purpose of putting aside the issue of validity, which 
would distract attention from what I am trying to show by means of the example. 
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Idealized practices: a problem 
 
If we take an idealization of our basic inferential practices to be concept-
constituting, then we immediately run into the following difficulty. By ‘idealized 
inferential practices’, here, we must mean something like: our basic inferential 
practices not as they actually are, but as they should be. But what can this, in turn, 
possibly mean, aside from: basic inferential practices that are correct? And if this is 
what the project consists in, then what are the possible candidates for the required 
correctness criteria? Three immediately come to mind, none of which is satisfactory38. 
 
• Criterion 1: A basic inferential practice is correct iff it conforms to a basic rule of 
inference; 
 
• Criterion 2: A basic inferential practice is correct iff it conforms to a correct rule 
of inference; 
 
• Criterion 3: A basic inferential practice is correct iff the inferences in which it 
consists are the ones that a plausible theory of concept-constitution predicts to 
be concept-constituting. 
 
The problem with Criterion 1 is that the most natural way of spelling out what 
‘basic’ means is either by reference to the fact that the rule in question captures (or: 
displays the logical form of) concept-constituting inferences, or by simply taking it to 
mean ‘concept-constituting’. The first option is blatantly circular; the second option 
defeats the very assumption of the project. 
 
Now consider Criterion 2. The most natural candidate for the correctness of a rule 
is its validity. Under the assumption that we should go for this rendering of the 
                                                
38  In addition to the difficulties that I will sketch in a moment, all three criteria implicitly 
rely on the questionable assumption that we can spell out the notion of a basic inferential 
practice independently of the notion of a concept-constituting practice. 
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‘correctness’ of a rule, what the criterion says is: a necessary and sufficient condition 
for a basic inference to be concept-constituting is that it is an instance of a valid rule. 
The problems with this qualified version of the criterion are: 
 
• It is not clear that validity can plausibly be taken to be a sufficient and 
necessary condition on a basic inference being concept-constituting. In 
particular, there appear to be intuitive counterexamples to the claim that it 
can39; 
 
• The natural motivation for the idea that only valid rules can be taken to abstract 
from concept-constituting inferential practices is that we take the latter to be 
consistent practices. However, it is not clear that this assumption is a plausible 
one – arguments are needed to justify endorsing it40; 
 
• Validity is a semantic property, and in particular it is a model-theoretic property 
– in virtue of this, it is not clear whether a theory of our inferential practices 
that relies on this notion as a criterion for idealization is consistent with the 
main assumptions of an inferentialist account of the logical concepts. 
 
Finally, the problem with Criterion 3 is that it is blatantly circular: part of what 
makes a theory of concept-constitution plausible is that it makes the right predictions – 
that these predictions are in line with shared intuitions about which inferences are 
constitutive of a given concept. But if the intuitions themselves are constrained by 
what the theory allows (by the idealization that the theory has opted for), then we lack 
any independent ground for judging the plausibility of the theory. 
 
 
                                                
39  Cf, for example, the sufficiency and necessity objections in [Williamson 2003] – the 
objections apply to the validity of rules regarded as being concept-constituting, rather than to 
the validity of inferences, but can be straightforwardly reformulated with reference to the latter. 
40  A plausible account of inferential practices based on the converse assumption, that 
inconsistent practices (and languages) can be entirely meaningful, is offered, for example, by 
[Cozzo 1994]. 
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Actual Practices: A Problem 
 
If we take an actual inferential practice to be concept-constituting, then we run 
the risk of depriving our basic inference rules of normative force. The reasoning is as 
follows.  
 
Whether or not we take the ability to justify our basic logical principles to be 
the ultimate goal of an account of concept-constitution, the latter should still enable us 
to at least conceive of asking the following question:  
 
On which grounds do we take a basic rule of inference, for example MP, to be correct? 
 
The answer that a proponent of the actual practices option will naturally give is: 
 
On the basis of the fact that a basic rule of inference such as MP captures the concept-
constituting usage of a logical concept. 
 
The way in which we reason is, then, what ultimately makes our basic inference 
rules correct - under the assumption that they are legitimate reconstructions of what 
our reasoning practices consist in41. The normative question of the correctness of a 
rule thus becomes a question about whether the rule correctly abstracts from a 
practice.  
But, if this is the case, there is prima facie no logical space for questioning the 
practice itself: which grounds will we have left for claiming that a certain ‘basic’ 
reasoning practice is incorrect?  
 
However, matters are not so straightforward. For to say that, for certain basic rules 
of inference, our actual reasoning practices are the ultimate ground on which their 
                                                
41  How we should understand the notion of a ‘legitimate reconstruction’ of a concept-
constituting practice is an issue that I address in Chapter III, with reference to the concept of 
universal quantification. In general, the terminology that I have been adopting in this first 
Chapter will, I hope, become clearer and more precise as the Thesis progresses.  
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correctness is to be judged, is not yet to take a stand about a whole set of issues 
concerning such practices. These are: 
 
• Whether there are practice-independent parameters on the basis of which the 
correctness both of a reasoning practice and of the rule that abstracts from it, 
can be assessed; 
 
• Whether there is more than one candidate for a plausible notion of correctness; 
 
• Whether, if this is the case, at least some such candidates will be available, as it 
were, to the view that takes actual reasoning practices to be concept-
constituting. 
 
Part of the discussion in the next chapter will consist in an assessment of the 
options that are available to such a view in addressing these issues.  
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPT-CONSTITUTION, CONCEPT-POSSESSION AND COMMITMENT 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to argue for the plausibility of an inferentialist account of 
the logical concepts based on the following ideas: 
 
• That the logical concepts we deploy in our informal reasoning practices are the 
same concepts that we attempt to render precisely in our formal reasoning 
practices; 
 
• That logical concepts are constituted by actual inferential practices; 
 
• That an inferentialist theory of the logical concepts must offer a story both 
about which facts determine which inferential practices are concept-
constituting and about which facts are the source of the epistemic relation in 
which concept-possession consists; 
 
• That the notions of a canonical ground, of a canonical consequence, and of a 
canonical commitment should play a key-role in the reconstruction of that in 
which concept-constitution and concept-possession consist in; 
 
• That both concept-constitution and concept-possession are structurally related 
to our speech act practices, and in particular to the practice of assertion. 
 
Throughout the chapter, my aim is modest. What I want to offer is not a conclusive 
defense of the ideas just presented, but simply a ground for the following claim: that 
there are no conclusive objections against an account of the logical concepts based on 
the ideas sketched above, and that such an account has several theoretical advantages. 
 
Before we start, it is a good idea to remind ourselves of the terminology.  
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With the expression ‘concept-constitution’ I intend to capture the following 
intuitive relation: a fact x constitutes a concept C if and only if it is in virtue of the 
obtaining of that fact that C is what it is. More precisely, a fact x constitutes a concept 
C if and only if it is in virtue of the obtaining of x that C has the identity and 
application conditions that we intuitively ascribe to it. 
By the expression ‘concept-possession’ I mean to capture the epistemic relation 
that holds between a subject S and a logical concept C when S grasps C.  
This chapter presents and discusses candidates for both relations. 
 
1. INFERENTIAL PRACTICES 
 
Any inferentialist account of concept-constitution for the logical concepts faces two 
general tasks:  
 
• Developing the very idea that the logical concepts are to be seen as inferentially 
constituted. An important aspect of this issue, on which I will focus, consists in 
the way in which we choose to answer the following question: within the 
framework of the inferentialist account, what sort of thing, exactly, can be 
constitutive of a logical concept?  
• Spelling out the facts given which a rational subject may be ascribed possession 
of a logical concept. 
 
In this section and in Section 3 I will discuss the first task. While Section 2 is devoted 
to methodological considerations, Section 4 will tackle the second task. 
 
In addressing the first task, one has two options. That is, one can say that the sort of 
things that can be concept-constituting for a logical concept C are: 
 
• Basic rules of inference: That is, instructions to proceed in a certain way from 
given premises to a conclusion specified by the rules. A proponent of this 
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option might argue, for example, that Modus Ponens is C-constituting for the 
concept of the conditional; 
 
• Our inferential practices: It is, for example, (some feature of) our practice of 
inferring a sentence q from sentences of the form p and p→q that constitutes 
the concept ‘conditional’.  
 
In this section I want to defend the latter option from the following objections. 
 
Objection 1 – The idea that inferential practices (that is: the way in which we 
actually deploy a logical concept in reasoning) are the sort of things that can be 
concept-constituting has the consequence of making it impossible to judge such 
practices as correct or incorrect. This consequence is both counter-intuitive and 
undesirable, therefore the idea is flawed. 
 
Objection 2 – The idea that inferential practices are the sort of things that can 
be concept-constituting, plus the idea that a rule of inference is but an abstraction 
from these practices, has the consequence of making it impossible to judge rules of 
inference themselves as correct or incorrect. This consequence, once again, is both 
counter-intuitive and undesirable, therefore the idea is flawed. 
 
Objection 3 – Even if the idea that inferential practices are the sort of things 
that can be concept-constituting were immune from the two objections above, a 
proponent of the idea would then face the problem of explaining what the relation 
between a concept-constituting inferential practice (for example, the practice of 
inferring  q from p and p→q) and the relevant basic inferential rule (for example, Modus 
Ponens) consists in. Indeed, she would even face the problem of clarifying what 
‘relevant’ means in the sentence above. Until she gives an account of what this relation 
is, she is not in a position to claim that the idea under discussion is a plausible one. 
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1.1 The First Objection 
 
We need to reconstruct the objection a bit more in detail before we consider some 
possible replies.  
 
As noted in Chapter I, talk of inferential practices can either be rendered as 
talk of idealized practices or as talk of actual practices. In the first case, what we really 
mean to say when we claim that inferential practices can be concept-constituting is 
that certain normatively constrained practices can be concept-constituting – where the 
natural option is to take the source of the normative constraint as given by the rules or 
sets of rules of inference to which such practices conform. The relevant rules of 
inference will then tell us how we should use a logical concept. If this is the case, 
however, then there is no distinction between this option and the view that claims that 
the rules themselves are the kind of things that can be concept-constituting for logical 
concepts. Therefore, what we had better mean is that our actual inferential practices 
are the sort of things that can be concept-constituting. It is, simply put, the way in 
which we actually reason from a given set of premises to a certain conclusion, i.e. the 
inferential steps that we actually perform in reasoning thus, that is to count as being 
concept-constituting.  
Now, it seems plausible to suppose that, in principle, any reasoning process can 
be questioned for correctness – that, intuitively, there is no circumstance in which I 
should not able to ask the question: is this way of reasoning correct? Whether I am 
able to answer this question is, of course, a complicated matter – but one might have 
the strong intuition that it is always conceivable to at least ask the question. 
Take a basic inferential practice, for example the practice of inferring q from p 
and p→q. Among the questions that I can conceive of asking about its correctness is 
the question of whether the conclusion of the inference really follows from its 
premises. Under the assumption that the practice is constitutive of the concept of the 
conditional, a possible formulation of this question is: is this the correct way in which 
the concept ‘conditional’ should be deployed? In other words, is our use of ‘→’ correct 
in this instance? However, if the inference is constitutive of the concept of the 
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conditional, it doesn’t make sense to enquire about the correctness of the relevant use 
of the conditional. The inference constitutes the concept: the relation between the 
premises and the conclusion of the inference is then determined by the way in which 
we deploy ‘→’. If this is so, there is no point in asking whether the conclusion really 
follows / whether our usage of the conditional is correct. That such usage is what it is, 
is presupposed by any judgment about the correctness of (other, intuitively less basic) 
reasoning practices. Therefore there is at least a class of inferences for which it is not 
conceivable to ask a question about correctness, against our intuitions42. 
 
The objection can be addressed by means of three strategies.  
 
i) One can bite the bullet and acknowledge that indeed there is a special class of 
inferences, the concept-constituting ones, for which a question of correctness cannot 
be asked. After all, one thing is to say that it is conceivable to ask this question in all 
circumstances, and a different thing is to say that we should always in fact be able to 
ask such a question. If this goes against some shared intuitions, then those intuitions 
are wrong.  
 
ii) One can argue that even if an inferential practice is concept-constituting, a question 
about its correctness can still be asked, though only in a somewhat restricted form. 
More precisely, a question of correctness can still be asked about specific instances of 
the practice in question. The form that the question might take is: does the particular 
inference that we are judging conform to the inferential practices in which, within our 
epistemic and linguistic community, standard usages of a given logical concept consist? 
For to say that actual inferential practices are concept-constituting, is not to say that all 
such practices are. In fact, an intuitive constraint on a plausible account of concept-
                                                
42  The philosophical background for the objection considered here is, of course, given by 
the classical debate on rule-following and meaning that followed the publication of 
Wittgestein’s Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and in 
particular by Kripke’s discussion of a dispositional account of meaning and formulation of the 
skeptical problem, in [Kripke 2007]. A discussion of some aspects of the debate, which I am 
keeping in mind in my articulation and treatment of the objection, is the one offered by 
[Boghossian 1989].  
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constitution is precisely that it formulates a criterion by appeal to which one may 
isolate a class of relevant practices. The correctness of a specific inference will then be 
individuated in terms of its conforming to such practices.  
‘Conform’, in the reply above, can mean: ‘is relevantly similar’, ‘has the same logical 
form as’ or ‘can be reconstructed by means of an appeal to the same rule of inference’, 
depending on the view that we take on the relation between inferential practices and 
rules of inference – more on this in the context of the discussion of the third objection.  
 
iii) One can accept the intuition that it should always be possible to ask a question of 
correctness about inferential practices, but reject the idea (which is an implicit 
assumption of the objection) that an inferential practice’s being concept-constituting 
implies that it is not questionable for correctness under any definition of correctness to 
which we may attach a normative sense. This thought may be further articulated in 
various ways, which I will consider in a moment43. 
 
The first Two Strategies 
 
The first two strategies present some obvious difficulties. 
 
 
 
                                                
43  One might claim that a fourth available strategy consists in arguing that, even if we take 
actual inferential practices to be constitutive of the logical concepts, an independent criterion 
of correctness can still be given – for example as the semantic requirement that the inferences 
in question be valid inferences. My reply to this claim is the following. 
• To say that only the valid (basic) inferences are the ones that can be concept-
constituting is to give an account of concept-constitution in terms of idealized 
inferential practices, that is: practices that conform to a norm the correctness of which 
is assessed independently of the features of such practices. Such a norm can only be 
the rule, or set of rules, of inference of which the practices are instantiations. So the 
claim really concerns a way of articulating the distinct option that takes rules of 
inference, rather than practices, to be constitutive of the logical concepts.  
• Furthermore, it is not clear that adopting a semantic constraint as a criterion of 
correctness for our inferential practices is consistent with the basic inferentialist 
assumption that the logical concepts are constituted by their purely inferential role - I 
will discuss some aspects of this issue in the next chapter, with specific reference to the 
concept of universal quantification.  
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Ad i)  
 
Consider, in particular, the way in which (a version of) the first strategy is pursued in 
[Peacocke 1988: 158; 179-81], partly following [Wittgenstein 1978 I.8, VI.24].  
Although Peacocke speaks of rules of inference rather than of inferential 
practices, in the context of this discussion the view can be reformulated in terms of 
inferential practices, I hope, without being unjust to its original formulation. 
The idea, which Peacocke inherits from Wittgenstein, is that we have a class of 
inferences for the correctness of which an epistemic subject (Wittgenstein’s rule-
follower) can give no inferential or non-inferential reason. [Peacocke 1988: 76; 1992: 
Chapter I] develops this idea in terms of an account of what it is for an inference or a 
set of inferences to be concept-constituting. Our acceptance of the inferences that 
constitute the logical concepts ultimately relies on a psychological state: we find those 
inferences primitively compelling. That we find them primitively compelling means that 
we do not accept them in virtue of any belief or evidence that we might have 
concerning their correctness: it simply strikes us as obvious that the conclusion follows 
from the premise(s). It is, then, in virtue of a psychological fact that we accept them as 
the correct concept-constituting inferences for a given logical concept. 
 
Now, the difficulties encountered by the reduction of a question of correctness 
to a question about the obtaining of a psychological fact partly depend, of course, on 
what one expects of an account of correctness for inferential practices.  
If, for example, one endorses the project in [Boghossian 2000; 2003], and thus 
endorses the view that we should seek to ask (and answer) a question of objective 
correctness for our basic logical reasoning, then clearly Peacocke’s strategy is not 
viable. For, simply put, it is conceivable that what epistemic subjects will find 
primitively obvious will vary, both as a function of a subject’s cognitive abilities and as 
a function of the objective circumstances in which a subject reasons. 
However, even if we don’t explicitly formulate the issue of correctness as an 
issue of objective correctness, the reductive strategy endorsed by Peacocke appears to 
be subject to immediate difficulties. The first concerns the error theory that a 
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proponent of this strategy may adopt. Since it is plausible that, in principle, two 
rational subjects may disagree on which basic inferences involving a concept C they 
find primitively obvious, we need a criterion for determining which one is right – for 
in the absence of such a criterion we won’t be able to tell which of the two (sets of) 
inferences are constitutive of C. We need, in other words, to be able to appeal to some 
kind of idealization of the psychological state that distinguishes the C-constituting 
inferences from the non-constitutive ones. But even given a criterion of this sort, how 
will we be able to tell whether a subject is indeed in the required psychological state?  
The problem, it seems, is that psychological states are not the sort of thing that 
is easily manifestable – how do we access, and share, the phenomenological impact of 
a concept-constituting inference? The problem is, of course, a very general one – but 
the specific difficulty here consists in the fact that concept-constitution itself is 
affected by it. Furthermore, in the context of Peacocke’s account, it is aggravated by 
the fact that the account relies on a Fregean conception of concepts as public entities: 
they are supposed to be distinct from the subjective mental representations that 
individual speakers link with (the expressions associated with) them [Peacocke 1992: 2-
5]. 
Things don’t look better if we move from consideration of a particular 
epistemic subject to consideration of the inferential practices adopted by a wider 
epistemic community to which presumably the subject belongs. For suppose that we 
say that a manifested criterion for assessing competing, as it were, impressions of 
primitive obviousness is to be found in the conformity of the inferential dispositions to 
which they give rise to the community’s usage of the relevant logical concept. Still: this 
won’t allow us to assess what has gone wrong (indeed: what can go wrong) with a 
deviant impression of primitive obviousness. Suppose I don’t find a set X of basic 
inferences involving a logical concept C primitively obvious, and find instead another 
set Y primitively obvious. Even if standard usages suggest that it is X that is C-
constituting, once we choose to individuate the correct C-constituting inferences on 
the basis of a psychological state, it seems that there is no option left but to say that 
that X is simply not C-constituting for me. Intuitively, however, we want to leave open at 
least the possibility that I am making a mistake – that I should, indeed, accept X, in 
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virtue of the fact that, within my epistemic community, X determines how C should be 
deployed. 
 
Ad ii) 
 
The problem with the second strategy is that it does not address the objection. For the 
objection concerns the possibility of asking a question of correctness about a way of 
deploying a given logical concept (a way of reasoning with it), not about a specific 
instance of this usage / way of reasoning. In other words, the objection can be 
formulated as the claim that taking actual inferential practices to be concept-
constituting does not allow us to conceive of the question: 
 
• To which standards should a concept-constituting way of deploying the 
concept conform? 
 
as an appropriate question to ask. The proponent of the second strategy will, it seems, 
be unable to counter the objection when it is understood in its intended generality. 
 
The Third Strategy 
 
What about the third strategy? Well, we need to articulate it further before we 
can discuss it. There are in fact various options for articulating it, which correspond to 
different questions that we may ask about a concept-constituting inferential practice. 
These are the following: 
 
• First Option: We can ask whether the practice endangers the stability of other 
accepted inferential practices, that is: whether it has the consequence of 
making other concept-constituting inferences inconsistent; 
 
• Second Option: We can ask whether the practice is useful or interesting at all, 
where the criteria for judging its interest or usefulness will depend on its aims; 
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• Third Option: We can ask whether the practice complies with our views about 
independent facts (for example metaphysical or epistemological facts) that we 
believe should constrain our reasoning. 
 
The options above find their natural application in specific domains. My aim here 
is to offer some arguments in support of the intuitive plausibility of each (that is: in 
support of the idea that the question it raises is a plausible reformulation of the 
correctness question), with respect to its natural domain of application. My own 
strategy, which I will discuss in Sections 3 and 4, will incorporate aspects from each of 
these options, although in a wider framework than the one in which they are 
introduced here. 
 
The first option is viable if what we are considering is the introduction, via a 
logical rule, of new concept-constituting inferences in an existing logical language. It 
boils down to the requirement that the newly introduced inferences be conservative 
with respect to the inferences that we may already perform in the language. Strictly 
speaking, the requirement of conservativeness applies to rules of inference rather than 
specific inferences or sets of inferences, and thus we should reformulate the option as 
follows. A newly introduced concept-constituting set of inferences may be evaluated as 
correct or incorrect from the point of view of an existing inferential practice on the 
basis of this criterion: that the rules of inference that we use to codify the new practice 
are conservative with respect to already existing rules for concept-constituting 
inferences, i.e. that they don’t allow for new derivations of sentences not containing 
the newly introduced connective, which were previously unobtainable in the 
language44.  
                                                
44 When I say that a rule ‘codifies’ or ‘abstracts from’ an inferential practice, I mean: it 
displays the logical form of the inferences in which such practice consists. The issue of how we 
should understand this aspect of the relation between a rule of inference and the inferential 
practice from which it abstracts is tackled in Chapter III, with specific reference to the concept 
of universal quantification. 
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 According to this option, the requirement of correctness is both a requirement 
of stability and of consistency45.   
 The issue here is not to defend the requirement of conservativeness as a 
necessary condition for the correctness of a (newly introduced) inferential practice, nor 
to defend a notion of correctness based on this requirement from competing options. 
Rather, the point is the following: unless there are obvious reasons for which we 
should not think of such a requirement as (part of) what makes a concept-constituting 
inference correct, the objection that we cannot conceive of asking a question of 
correctness about a concept-constituting inference does not stand.  
 
The second option is viable, for example, when reasoning about the inferential 
practices that constitute the concepts of a theory46. The natural way to present this 
option is by appeal to the deductive strength that a given set of inferences allows a 
logical theory to achieve, and to the extent to which it allows the theory to receive its 
intended applications. The intuitive idea behind the option, however, can be 
                                                
45  Conservativeness generates stability in a language in the sense that it insures that no 
derivations are introduced which are not a consequence of the existing concept-constituting 
rules, and thus that the concepts used in the language, as it were, stay the same. 
Conservativeness also guarantees that a consistent language does not become inconsistent 
when new concepts are introduced. Consider the case in which we introduce Prior’s famous 
connective ‘tonk’ in an existing inferential practice. We will now allow for the derivation of A 
tonk B from A, and respectively of A and B from A tonk B (the concept-constituting inferences 
for ‘tonk’). The introduction of  ‘tonk’ will thus allow the following derivation:  
i) A    premise 
ii) A tonk B   tonk-I 
iii) B    tonk-E 
iv) A & B   &-I 
The conclusion is one that cannot be derived only given the standard introduction and 
elimination rules for ‘&’ already in the language. Therefore, the use of the concept ‘&’ allowed 
by the introduction of ‘tonk’ is one that cannot be derived in any way from the concept-
constituting inferences for ‘&’. But any use of a concept must be related to the way in which the 
concept is defined. Therefore the introduction of ‘tonk’ modifies the previously existing 
concept of conjunction. 
46  The discussion that follows must not be read as involving any commitment to the idea 
that either the assessment of a concept-constituting inferential practice, or the fact that the 
practice is concept-constituting, is theory-relative. I simply intend to motivate the plausibility of 
what I have labeled as the third strategy in a series of highly simplified settings – the 
simplification will be dropped when I come to discuss, in Sections 3 and 4, my own strategy, in 
terms of the aims of and constraints on our reasoning practices. 
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formulated also with respect to inductive theories. Consider one such theory. In it, 
concepts will plausibly be defined also on the ground of their heuristic usefulness – 
roughly, on the ground of whether they allow us to describe the world (or the portion 
of the world that constitutes the domain of the theory) in a way that facilitates 
progressing in our understanding of it, for example, by making new predictions, 
formulating new inferential connections among the concepts of the theory, etc. Not all 
the concepts that we might think of introducing in the theory will play this role – it 
may well be the case that some of the concepts that we introduce will turn out to be 
useless, or even damaging, for the explanatory purposes of the theory.  
 
Consider for example the concept ‘aqua’, discussed by [Boghossian 2003]. The 
concept is constituted by the inferences:  
 
• (Introduction rule for ‘aqua’) If x is water, then x is aqua;  
•  (Elimination rule for ‘aqua’) If x is aqua, then x is H20. 
 
Boghossian treats the introduction of the concept ‘aqua’ in an empirical theory as an 
act, as it were, of metaphysical arrogance – for: 
 
No-one could think that the mere act of introducing the concept aqua into one’s repertoire 
could give one a-priori entitlement to the inference from x’s being water to x’s being H2O. 
[Boghossian 2003: 243] 
 
In fact, there are two cases to consider. Assume that, in both cases, the theory in 
question already comprises the concept ‘water’. 
 
• Case 1: one doesn’t already hold the belief that the molecular composition of 
the substance to which we refer as ‘water’ is H2O; 
• Case 2: one already holds this belief. 
 
Now, in the first case, the introduction of the concept ‘aqua’ via the rules stated above 
is, indeed, an act of metaphysical arrogance. More specifically, the introduction rests 
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on a confusion of grounds (we establish what the molecular composition of water is by 
making it a conceptual truth that water is H2O) and thus produces, so to speak, the 
wrong kind of belief: the belief that it is a logical truth, given the definition of ‘aqua’, 
that water is H2O. 
In the second case, the introduction of the concept ‘aqua’ simply doesn’t make any 
contribution to the theory: for ‘aqua’ will simply be a different name for the substance 
to which we normally refer as ‘water’. 
In both cases, the move that consists in the introduction of the concept ‘aqua’ 
in the theory’s vocabulary will intuitively count as incorrect. In the first case, it will be 
methodologically incorrect, by the standards of our empirical theory. In the second 
case, it will violate the constraint of heuristic usefulness on the concepts introduced in 
the theory (along with, of course, an intuitive requirement of parsimony) – the concept 
denoted by the expression ‘aqua’ does not make any specific contribution to the 
heuristic resources of the theory, because the expression turns out not to individuate a 
concept that is distinct from one that already exists in the theory (namely: the concept 
denoted by the expression ‘water’)47.  
 
The third option may be illustrated by means of an example. Imagine that a 
group of logicians, belonging to a community somehow detached from our standard 
logical practices, defines a new logical concept, ‘Zac’. Some of the concept-
constituting inferences for Zac are captured by the following elimination rule (assume 
that Zac is a unary concept): 
 
Zac-Elimination    Zac x Fx 
     ---------- 
     ∃x¬Fx 
 
                                                
47  If the theory does not already comprise the concept picked out by the expression 
‘water’, then the inference cannot count as being concept-constituting for the concept denoted 
by ‘aqua’. For a concept-constituting inference should uniquely individuate a concept: how will 
the inference succeed in doing this if it comprises other concepts that are yet to be defined?   
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Given the appropriate introduction rule, Zac can be shown to be semantically and 
inferentially equivalent to ‘¬∀’ in classical logic48; suppose that the members of the 
imaginary community in question, when introduced to classical logic, recognize this 
equivalence. Note that I am not making any claim about whether it is legitimate to 
consider Zac a basic logical concept for us – indeed, I acknowledge that for us it 
probably won’t be – although this ultimately depends on whether we admit that the 
concept-constituting inferences for a logical concept can comprise other logical 
concepts. Rather, I am simply claiming that it is conceivable that a community of 
epistemic subjects may take Zac to be a legitimate concept, while remaining neutral on 
the issue above.  
Now suppose that in the imagined community there are two factions. One is the 
faction to which the introduction of Zac is due. For the members of this faction, a 
question about the correctness of the inference above will presumably not arise – for 
the correct use of the concept Zac is, for them, given by the inference itself. But 
matters are different for the other faction. When the members of this faction are 
introduced to classical logic, and recognize the equivalence between Zac and ‘¬∀’, 
they come to believe that the inference from the premise of the elimination rule for 
Zac to its conclusion may in some circumstances be incorrect. For they come to 
sympathize with at least some of the constructivist objections to classical logic, and 
now believe that we should only infer from the premise to the conclusion of the rule 
above if we have constructive means of establishing the existence of an x such that it is 
not the case that F holds for it. The grounds on which they will criticize the inference 
from the premise to the conclusion of Zac-elimination are epistemological and 
metaphysical. They hold that a certain relation holds between truth and verification, 
                                                
48  Here is a possible formulation of Zac-Introduction: 
 
      Γ  Δ ∀xFx 
             -------  ---------------- 
      B        ∼ B 
     --------------------------------------------------- 
       Γ, Δ 
                 --------- 
                Zac x Fx 
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and that in virtue of its incompatibility with this view Zac is not a concept that they 
would be disposed to deploy. 
 
If this scenario is at least conceivable, then we have another counterexample to the 
claim that concept-constituting inferential practices cannot be questioned for 
correctness. 
 
However, a prima facie difficulty with all these options (indeed, with the general 
strategy of which they are all instances) appears to be that the objection that they were 
meant to address is dealt with by appealing to a relativization of the correctness of an 
inference: what counts as being a correct rule of inference will now depend on our 
interests, epistemological and metaphysical requirements, and on what we choose to 
regard as plausible (or even necessary) syntactic constraints on a language. The idea 
that we should look at inferential practices to find, as it were, concept-constitutors 
thus comes, prima facie, with this price: that we loose not the normativity of the notion 
of correctness, but its objective quality.  
 This is, however, not necessarily the case. For we may still conceive of, and 
offer justifications for, these interests and requirements in objective terms. For 
example, in the last scenario the claim against the correctness of the concept-
constituting practices for Zac could in principle be rendered as a claim that ultimately 
concerns our objective cognitive abilities; the claim of the pro-Zac faction, on the other 
hand, could in principle be rendered as a claim motivated by the assumption that an 
objective, mind-independent world of abstract objects exists. Or when we impose the 
requirement of conservativeness on the introduction of a new concept in a logical 
language, we still have the option open of justifying such requirement by appeals to 
the facts, that we regard as objective, in virtue of which the lack of conservativeness 
would have a disruptive impact on our deductive practices. 
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 1.2 The Second Objection 
 
Objection 2 appears to presuppose Objection 1, for rules of inferences that are 
seen as merely an abstraction from actual inferential practices only lack normative 
force if these practices are such that they cannot normatively be questioned for 
correctness. If the practices can be subject to normative assessment, then so can the 
rules. The arguments presented in the previous paragraph thus apply also to this 
objection. Moreover, the objection can be further mitigated by the following 
considerations. 
 Given a basic inference rule (where basic here means: abstracted from a 
concept-constituting inferential practice), and whether or not the relevant practice can 
be questioned for correctness, it will always be possible to ask at least one question 
about its correctness, that is: is the rule faithful to the way in which we actually reason? 
If, for example, the codification of such inferences by means of the rule in question 
has, as a consequence, that some instances of the rule are inconsistent with our actual 
inferential practices, then it seems that we have at least the option of claiming that the 
rule is not correct – in the circumstances just sketched, this is a plausible option. 
 This argumentative strategy can be illustrated by means of an example. 
Consider Van McGee’s famous objection to the validity of Modus Ponens49, presented 
below. 
 
In the 1980 presidential election, Reagan was the front-runner both in the Republican 
party, and nationally. In the national polls, he was followed by the Democratic 
incumbent, Carter. Following them both in the polls was Anderson, also a Republican.  
 
McGee proposes that we consider the following inference, from the perspective of 1980 
just outlined:  
 
If a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan it will be Anderson.  
A Republican will win the election.  
                                                
49  [McGee 1985]. 
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So, if it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.  
 
From the viewpoint we are asked to imagine ourselves in, the premises seem 
acceptable, and indeed the first premise is true. But the conclusion seems 
unacceptable, since, if Reagan doesn’t win, then Carter will. McGee concludes that MP 
is invalid when applied to nested conditionals.  
 Now, MP is generally regarded as defining the concept of the conditional – an 
account for which it is inferential practices that are concept-constituting, will, I take it, 
consider it at least a plausible hypothesis that MP is the rule that correctly abstracts 
from the relevant concept-constituting inferences. Let us remain neutral on the issue 
of whether validity is a necessary condition on concept-constitution, and consider 
instead the following interpretation of McGee’s counterexample50.  
 Suppose that, when presented with the inference discussed by McGee, I 
acknowledge that: 
 
•  The inference is indeed an instance of MP; 
•  Intuitively, it is not an inference that we would accept. 
 
How can a proponent of the view that actual inferential practices are the sort of things 
that can be concept-constituting articulate the latter intuition? Well, it seems that he 
has the following argumentative strategy at his disposal. 
 The inference presented by McGee is not one that subjects whose usage of the 
conditional is non-deviant would be prepared to accept. In other words, he might 
claim, it is an inference that does not comply with our standard usage of the 
conditional. Assume that we have a way to render precisely what a standard usage of 
the conditional consists in, i.e., that we have independent means of isolating concept-
constituting inferential practices. Then we can make the intuition above more precise 
by arguing that the usage of the concept in which it consists is not a concept-
                                                
50  Once again, what I want to argue for is conceivability rather than conclusiveness:  if the 
reading proposed below is conceivable, then it is conceivable that there is at least one respect 
in which the correctness of a rule of inference can be questioned on the view that I am 
defending. 
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constituting usage – or even that it is incompatible with the concept-constituting 
usages of the conditional. Under the assumption that concept-constituting usages are 
questionable for correctness, we can for example try to show that the inference does 
not satisfy the chosen correctness criteria.  
 But then MP licenses an inference that: 
 
• Is not concept-constituting 
• Is incompatible with concept-constituting usages 
 
Thus, MP does not display the logical form of the concept-constituting usages, and it is 
not the rule that correctly abstracts from them51. 
 
1.3 The Third Objection 
  
The objection can be interpreted in different ways. Here I consider two. 
                                                
51  As already noted, by discussing this example I simply wanted to make a case for the 
conceivability of the interpretation suggested, as a plausible interpretation. Things become, 
however, much more complicated when one considers alternative interpretations. In particular, 
one may reason as follows.  
The difficulty highlighted by McGee’s inference is that we seem to have an internal 
incoherence – an incoherence, that is, within the formulation of a single rule (the elimination 
rule for the conditional). Note that the problem here is different from the one raised, for 
example, by the ‘tonk’ case, where it is the conjunction of the introduction and elimination 
rules that generates an inconsistency. In particular, atomic applications of MP appear to be, so 
to speak, at war with nested applications: our intuitions suggest that only the former inferences 
are (or should be taken to be) the ones ‘really’ licensed by the rule. But then the incoherence in 
question affects the very pattern of use abstracted in the rule: we are tempted to say, that is, 
that it affects the very way in which we use and grasp the concept of the conditional. Given this, 
the crucial issue raised by McGee’s inference becomes: what shall we make of incoherent 
patterns of use?  
Although I don’t have a conclusive answer for this question, it seems to me that the 
strategy that we should adopt in tackling it consists in trying to spell out the conditions given 
which a pattern of usage is coherent, and then formulate the coherence requirement as a 
requirement on correct rules of inference (that is: as an ingredient, as it were, of their 
correctness).  
Adopting this strategy requires, however, that we say a bit more about which relation, 
exactly, we want a rule of inference to stand in with the inferential practice abstracted by it. I 
tackle different aspects of this relation in Chapter III, with specific reference to the concept of 
universal quantification. I hope to devote future research both to the general problem and to its 
specific relevance for the case of the conditional. 
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i) It is not possible to state in an intuitively plausible way what the relation between a 
rule of inference and a concept-constituting inferential practice might consist in; 
 
ii) The plausibility of an account of concept-constitution that defends the idea that 
inferential practices are constitutive of the logical concepts, also depends on the way in 
which the relation between practices on the one hand, and basic rules of inference on 
the other, is articulated – any difficulty encountered in addressing this issue will 
impact on the plausibility of the account. 
 
Ad i) 
 
The claim is false. In fact, here is an intuitive candidate for the relation in 
question. A particular rule of inference is an instruction to proceed in a certain way 
from given premises to the conclusion of the rule. Given a set of inferences, if what 
they have in common (their logical form) once we have abstracted from the specific 
content of their premises and conclusion, is the fact that they conform to this 
instruction, then we say that those inferences are instances of the rule.  
Given this definition, of course, a number of questions arise, which have to do 
with how to further articulate the relation between a rule and the inferences from 
which the rule abstracts. These questions concern, for example, whether the 
suggestion that an inferential practice ‘conforms’ to an instruction should be intended 
normatively or descriptively, whether we possess an objective criterion for individuating 
the logical form of an inference, and what we should take such a criterion to consist in. 
But whether or not these questions are answered (indeed, whether or not they are even 
taken into account) has no bearing on the availability of an intuitive definition of the 
relation considered, either in general or specifically for the view that inferential 
practices, rather than rules, are concept-constituting. 
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Ad ii)  
 
If this is the objection, then: a) its claim is obvious; and b) it has no specific bearing on 
the view that certain inferential practices are concept-constituting per se. It is obvious: 
any account of logical concepts will have to say something about the relation between 
how these concepts are constituted and the rules which we take to display the logical 
form of the basic inferences that we perform with the concepts. It has no specific 
bearing on the view that certain inferences are concept-constituting: for how to 
articulate the relation between a rule and the practice that can be rendered as 
following that rule is an issue whose generality (and complexity) go well beyond the 
boundaries of an inferentialist account of concept-constituting practices. 
 
If the arguments that I have offered have any suasive force, then a case has been made 
for the idea that we should look at inferential practices as a possible candidate for 
concept-constitution.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, my aims are: 
 
• To clarify how the questions, which an account of the logical concepts based on 
the idea that inferential practices are concept-constituting needs to address, 
relate to each other; 
 
•  To formulate some basic constraints on the explanatory direction of the 
account. 
 
 The three key questions that such an account has to answer are: 
 
i) In virtue of which facts are certain inferential practices concept-constituting? That is: 
what distinguishes the class of concept-constituting inferences from other inferences? 
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ii) Given i), what is it for an epistemic subject to grasp, or possess, a logical concept? 
 
And: 
 
iii) What distinguishes our grasp of concept-constituting inferences from our 
understanding of any other inference? In other words: how does the answer that we 
choose to give to i) bear on the answer that we choose to give to ii)?  
 
In the literature, one may find two strategies for dealing for questions i)–iii) 
above. The first strategy is well represented, among others, by [Peacocke 1978, 1992]. 
The second strategy is the one adopted and developed by [Dummett 1975; 1976; 1991]. 
The first strategy roughly consists in answering question ii) first, formulating question 
iii) - the question about the specific epistemic quality of our grasp of the logical 
concepts – in terms that do not involve a reference to question i) and then answering 
question i) on the basis of the answers given to ii) and iii). 
In Peacocke’s account, question ii) receives the following answer. To grasp a 
logical concept is to find certain basic inferences primitively compelling. What 
distinguishes our grasp of the concept-constituting inferences from our grasp of other 
inferences (question iii)) is the specific epistemic quality of the relation that holds 
between a subject and the inferences that he finds primitively compelling: the subject 
will not take the correctness of these inferences to be answerable to anything else but 
to the form of the inferences themselves [Peacocke 1992: 6]. The concept-constituting 
inferences, then, are those with which a subject stands in the relation just presented: 
in Peacocke’s account, these coincide with the canonical inferences that we may draw 
from and to statements containing the relevant concept. Any other semantic or 
epistemic property of these inferences (e.g. the property of being valid inferences) can 
be rendered in terms of the fact that we accept them in a way that does not admit of 
any independent warrant – it is this kind of ‘blind’ (but psychologically grounded) 
acceptance that gives us a criterion for answering question i). 
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The strategy then amounts to rendering concept-constitution in terms of the 
relation in which concept-possession consists – the ‘special’ epistemic quality of the 
latter is also the distinguishing feature of the inferences that we take to be concept-
constituting. 
 
The second strategy consists in giving independent answers to questions i)–iii), 
and then clarifying the relation between these answers in terms of what a theory of the 
logical concepts (in Dummett’s work: a theory of meaning in general) should be 
expected to do. 
Dummett, for example, answers i)–iii) in the following manner. Certain 
inferences are concept-constituting for a logical concept C in virtue of being canonical 
derivations of a sentence S containing C as the main concept ingredient (answer to 
question i). Therefore, to grasp, or possess, C is to know what counts as a canonical 
derivation of S (answer to question ii). A canonical derivation constitutes a privileged 
epistemic route to the verification conditions of S – since the inferential role of C can 
be rendered in terms of its contribution to the verification conditions of S, then a 
canonical derivation constitutes a privileged epistemic route to grasping the inferential 
role of C. That is: on the one hand the concept-constituting inferences capture, as it 
were, a usage of C from which all other usages can be derived, and it is in virtue of this 
fact that they are concept-constituting. On the other hand, what we grasp when we 
grasp the concept-constituting inferences is precisely this privileged inferential status: 
we acknowledge that the warrants they display, for sentences containing C as their 
main concept ingredient, are canonical warrants. In virtue of this, then, our 
understanding of the C-constituting inferences is an understanding from which grasp 
of all (non-canonical) usages of C can itself be derived. This allows us to answer 
question iii) in the following way: the facts that determine that a certain inference is 
concept-constituting (its being a canonical derivation) are also the facts that determine 
the ‘special’ epistemic quality of our grasp of that inference (as a grasp in virtue of 
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which, if Dummett’s ‘Fundamental Assumption’ is correct, we understand further, 
derived usages of the concept)52. 
 
The strategy that I intend to adopt is the second one. The structure of the account 
that will be defended in the next sections, then, is similar to Dummett’s account – 
except that the answers to i)–iii) will be given in terms of canonical consequences and 
canonical commitments (as opposed to canonical derivations and canonical warrants). 
More precisely, the discussion in the next sections aims at defending the plausibility of 
the following claims: 
 
• Both canonical derivations and inferences to canonical consequences should be 
taken to be concept-constituting for a logical concept; 
 
• However, we should render possession / grasp of a logical concept in terms of 
canonical commitments – i.e., in terms of commitments to the canonical 
consequences of sentences in which the concept figures as the main conceptual 
ingredient53; 
 
• The canonical consequences of our logical concepts provide us with a 
privileged epistemic route to understanding the concept’s inferential role; 
 
Before we move on to discuss the claims above, we need to clarify at least some of 
the reasons for preferring the second strategy to the first. I would like to do this, here, 
by pointing to a crucial difficulty encountered by the first strategy – in virtue of the fact 
that the difficulty only depends on the structure of the account, it will apply to any 
account that chooses to articulate the facts in virtue of which an inference or set of 
                                                
52  As it is well known, Dummett’s Fundamental Assumption states that ‘whenever we are 
entitled to assert a complex statement, we could have arrived at it by means of an argument 
terminating with at least one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’ – that is, 
by means of a canonical derivation [Dummett 1991: 257]. 
53  Henceforth, for convenience, I will refer to the canonical consequences of a sentence in 
which a concept C figures as the main conceptual ingredient, simply as the canonical 
consequences of C. 
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inferences is concept-constituting purely as a function of the epistemic quality of our 
grasp of such inferences54.  
 
These difficulties may be presented with reference to a specific class of objections 
prominent, in recent discussions of inferentialism about the logical concepts, against 
the idea that we may hope to render a subject’s grasp of a logical concept in terms of 
acceptance of the relevant inferential practices. The idea behind the objections is that, if 
we articulate the conditions given which a subject may be ascribed possession of a 
logical concept in terms of an epistemic relation with (concept-constituting) inferential 
practices, then we will often end up making the wrong predictions about whether a 
subject grasps a concept or not. 
 In particular, the objections counter the necessity of any condition that we 
choose to give as a condition for concept-possession. Representatives are, for example, 
the criticisms discussed in [Williamson 2003; 2006]. What the necessity objections 
seem to show is that we need to characterize the conditions in which we take concept-
possession to consist as defeasible. In Boghossian’s project, for example, this amounts 
to conceding that our dispositions to infer in a way that is concept-constituting are in 
certain cases defeasible; in the case of Peacocke’s rendering of the relevant conditions, 
the conceivability of a substantive disagreement among epistemic subjects who may 
find different inferences primitively compelling is sufficient to show, I believe, that we 
should at least consider the possibility of characterizing the psychological state of 
finding something primitively obvious as a defeasible state. 
 If, however, we render the facts in virtue of which an inferential practice is 
concept-constituting in terms of such defeasible conditions (as the first strategy 
                                                
54  Dummett’s account, of course, is itself based on very strong epistemic assumptions – in 
particular, it relies on the general idea that a theory of meaning for any fragment of the 
language (and thus also for the expressions which we take to denote the logical concepts) 
should be primarily a theory of speakers’ grasp of meaning.  
 Applying this general idea to an inferentialist account of the logical concepts, however, 
does not commit us to a definition of the concept-constituting inference directly in terms of the 
epistemic quality of the relation in which grasp or possession of a concept consists. The facts in 
virtue of which a certain inference or set of inferences is concept-constituting will partly be 
facts about speaker’s grasps of the concepts, and partly facts about how and why those 
inferences display the inferential role of the relevant logical concept.  
77 
discussed above does) then we allow, as it were, the necessity objections to have an 
impact on concept-constitution itself. For if a given condition for concept-possession is 
defeasible, and if which inferences are concept-constituting is determined by the 
obtaining of this condition, then doesn’t the defeasibility of the condition also directly 
bear on the issue of whether a certain inferential practice is indeed concept-
constituting? Doesn’t the property that a basic inference of a certain special kind has of 
being concept-constituting also become defeasible?  
 
The difficulty, then, may be summarized as follows: the first strategy allows 
objections and problems prima facie pertaining only to the conditions given which 
possession of a logical concept may be ascribed to a subject, to also endanger the 
stability of the conditions for concept-constitution – i.e. the stability of those very 
inferential roles in which the logical concepts were taken to consist. 
If this is the case, then a satisfactory reply to the necessity objections requires that 
the story we choose to provide about the relation between concept-constitution and 
concept-possession also clarifies which kind of facts, not entirely reducible to the 
epistemic qualities of the concept-possession relation, make certain inferential 
practices concept-constituting. 
 
3. CANONICAL GROUNDS, CANONICAL CONSEQUENCES AND CONCEPT-
CONSTITUTION 
  
In this section, my aim is to present three claims about concept-possession and 
concept-constitution that I want to endorse, and to start discussing the key notions 
that they involve. These are the notion of a canonical consequence of a concept and 
the notion of canonical commitment. The first claim is discussed in this section, the 
second and the third are discussed in Section 4. Once again, the aim of the discussion 
is modest: I want to argue for the plausibility of the claims below, rather than to 
conclusively establish their truth. 
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3.1 Claims 
 
A) Canonical inferences are concept-constituting for the logical concepts. 
 
B) To possess a logical concept C is to undertake certain commitments to the 
canonical consequences of C when deploying the concept – call these canonical 
commitments. 
 
C) Possession of a logical concept can be identified in terms of the commitments 
undertaken by the speakers, and the expectations that such commitments are 
fulfilled, in our speech act practices. These expectations concern the ability of 
such practices to aid rational deliberation and coordination in action. 
 
Claim B) can be further articulated as follows: 
 
B)’: Canonical commitments have a special epistemic quality, which distinguishes 
them from other inferential commitments, and makes them plausible candidates as 
conditions for concept-possession. 
 
In the light of B)’, Claim C can in turn be made more precise as follows. 
 
C)’: Certain pragmatic expectations, constitutive of our speech-act practices, can be 
taken as the indicators of (the epistemic role of) the canonical commitments in 
which possession of a logical concept consists.  
 
3.2 Canonical Grounds and Canonical Consequences 
 
Claim A) above states that an inference or set of inferences should be taken to be 
concept-constituting if it is canonical. The claim immediately raises two questions, 
namely: 
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α) What is it for an inference or a set of inferences to be canonical? 
β) Why should we take canonical inferences to be concept-constituting55?  
 
Ad α ):  
 
An intuitive definition of a canonical inference is the following: an inference from 
or to a statement containing a logical concept C as its main concept ingredient is 
canonical iff it is: 
 
• A derivation of such statement from its canonical grounds; or 
• A derivation of a canonical consequence from the statement. 
 
Discussions of the notions of canonical ground and canonical consequence, such 
as [Gentzen 1934; Martin-Löf 1985; Dummett 1991; Prawitz 2006] usually make the 
following assumption: 
 
 The canonical grounds for (a statement containing as its principal logical 
concept) a concept C, and the canonical conclusions of (an inference from a 
statement containing as its principal logical concept) C, are displayed 
respectively by the introduction and elimination rules for C56. 
                                                
55  The obvious assumption here is that we can provide a definition of a canonical 
inference that is independent from its being regarded as concept-constituting.  
α) and β) can also be formulated in the following way: 
α) Which are the properties, relevant to the question of concept-constitution, that the 
inferences to which we commonly refer as canonical instantiate? 
β) What makes inferences that instantiate such properties plausible candidates for 
concept-constitution? 
56  In Dummett’s project, this is however not presented as an assumption, but – in his own 
words –as  a ‘hope’. Cf for example [Dummett 1991: 217]: ‘…we have to find a means to 
specifying what, in general, is to constitute a canonical means of verifying (i.e. a canonical 
means for inferring from its canonical grounds – CT) a statement made by uttering a sentence 
of the form ^A (   ) B^ given how A and B are to be verified. The hope is that this can be done 
by appeal to the introduction rule or rules for the connective (   ) in a natural deduction 
formalization of logic’.  
In [Gentzen 1934] and [Prawitz 2006] among others, the idea seems to be, rather, that 
introduction and elimination rules for a logical concept in a natural deduction system are to be 
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and, therefore: 
 
 By displaying the canonical grounds for a statement containing C as its 
principal logical concept, the introduction rules for C display the canonical 
means of verifying the statement. By displaying the canonical consequences of a 
statement containing C as its principal logical concept, the elimination rules for 
C display the canonical means of drawing consequences from the statement. 
 
In what follows, I shall not explicitly discuss either of these assumptions; I will simply 
accept both with the two provisos that: 
 
o It is a condition on the correctness of the introduction and elimination rules for 
a concept C that they display the canonical means of verifying and drawing 
(canonical) consequences from statements containing C;  
 
o Saying that the introduction rules for C display the canonical means of 
verifying a statement containing C as the principal logical concept does not, per 
se, commit us to any further qualification of such means (for example, as 
effective means of verification)57. Similarly, saying that the elimination rule for C 
displays the canonical means of drawing consequences form a sentence 
containing C does not per se commit us to any further qualification of such 
means. 
 
The acceptance of the two assumptions above, with the provisos just spelt out, thus 
yields the following, more precise, definition of a canonical derivation: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
seen as the definition of what counts as a canonical means of verifying / drawing canonical 
consequences from (a statement containing) the logical concept in question. 
57  This is of course what [Prawitz 2006]: 519 ff, instead, commits himself to with his 
definition of a canonical argument skeleton. 
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A canonical derivation of a statement containing C as the main logical concept is one 
consisting in an application of the introduction rules for C. 
 
A canonical derivation of the consequences of a statement containing C as the main 
logical concept is one consisting in an applications of the elimination rule for C. 
 
The notion of a canonical derivation is often considered either in the framework of 
a discussion of verificationist or pragmatist accounts of the logical concepts, or in 
relation to the project of justifying the validity of derived (non canonical) logical 
inferences by reducing them to canonical arguments.  
The focus of the latter discussions is the relation between the correctness 
conditions of derived inferences and the correctness conditions of canonical 
inferences - where the crucial idea is, of course, that the validity of derived inferences 
can be accounted for in terms of the validity of the canonical arguments to which they 
can be reduced.  
The focus of the former discussions, of which the one that follows is a 
representative, is, instead, given by the question of which canonical inferences a theory 
of concepts should take to be concept-constituting, and to play a role in the ascription 
of concept possession to a subject – the inferences that consist in applications of the 
introduction rules for a given logical concept or those that consist in applications of 
the elimination rules. The first view constitutes the core of a verificationist account of 
the logical concepts. The second view is the one held by proponents of a pragmatist 
account. The two views rely on different assumptions about what determines, in 
general, the content of our statements,  because they ultimately rely on different 
assumptions about the aims of our reasoning practices and of the language that we use 
to express them. Such aims are taken to be: 
 
• Establishing and sharing truths; or 
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• Drawing and sharing consequences in view of rational deliberation, agreement 
and action58. 
 
Before one takes a stand in this debate, the idea that it is indeed canonical 
inferences (rather than any other inferences) that are concept-constituting needs to be 
spelt out, and its plausibility defended. In other words, we need to spell out the 
intuitive reasons why it is indeed what is displayed by either the introduction or the 
elimination rules for a logical concept that constitutes the concept, rather than any 
other aspect of our inferential practices. 
 
Ad β):  
 
The logical concepts should be defined by appeal to the way in which we use the 
concepts in reasoning. Our reasoning practices consist in giving justifications for the 
statements that we make, and in drawing consequences from those statements.  
That the logical concepts should be defined in terms of the way in which we reason 
then has to mean that they should be defined in terms of the general contribution that 
they make to the verification conditions, and to the conditions on what should count 
as consequences, of the statements that we hold as true. Call these two ways in which a 
logical concept C can contribute to the statements in which it figures the inferential role 
of C. It is reasonable to assume that such contribution can be isolated in some way59. 
                                                
58  I don’t mean to imply, of course, that either one of the assumptions above necessitates 
the structure or the content of a specific account of the constitution conditions for a logical 
concept. It is, however, natural for a verificationist theory of meaning to render the aim of our 
inferential practices primarily in terms of their epistemic impact (i.e. of their contribution to 
our general understanding of the world), and for a pragmatist theory of meaning to render it in 
terms of the consequences that such an impact has on our ability to make decisions and take 
actions. 
59  For suppose it couldn’t. Then we would not be in a position to claim that, indeed, a 
concept is to be defined in terms of its contribution to our reasoning practices (and the whole 
project is defeated). For such claim is empty if some means are not given for defining, for a 
given concept C, the respects in which its contribution to the inferential role of a statement in 
which it figures is distinct from the contribution that any other concept makes. That is: if 
precise identity conditions are not given for C. In an inferentialist account, the natural (if not 
the only consistent) way to specify such conditions is in terms of (a subset of) the correct 
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That is: it is reasonable to suppose that we can, in principle, point to a sub-set of the 
inferences that we perform and say: this sub-set displays the way in which a given 
concept C contributes to determining what counts as a justification, and what counts 
as a consequence, of the statements in which it figures. The relevant sub-set of 
inferences will have to be such that every use of C in our reasoning practices can be 
accounted for by reference to them – this is the very idea that they display the 
contribution of C to the way in which we reason. So we have a first constraint on the 
set of inferences that we decide to choose as the concept-constituting ones for C: that 
they display C’s inferential role in full generality. Intuitively, this means: 
 
a) That they display this role without reference to other logical concepts; 
 
b) That they display it in such a way that our grasp of other, derived usages can be 
achieved, and explained, by reference to the epistemically primary usage in 
which the canonical inferences consist. 
 
If we take the introduction and elimination rules for C to capture the canonical 
inferences that can be performed with C, then it is easy to see how the latter allow us 
to meet constraint a). What about constraint b)? 
Constraint b) is, in fact, two-fold.  
On the one hand, it consists in the idea that all inferential usages of C can be 
derived from canonical usages. The fact that in a given logical system any valid 
inference can be put in canonical form (and its validity justified on the basis of the 
validity of the canonical inferences) gives us a guarantee that this first aspect of the 
constraint is respected.  
On the other hand, it is the distinctively epistemic constraint, which states that a 
subject’s grasp of the direct grounds and consequences of a statement containing C as 
the main concept ingredient will allow him (indeed: will provide him with a primary 
                                                                                                                                            
inferences that we may perform with C – that we may perform, that is, in virtue of the fact that 
C appears in the statements to and from which we infer. 
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means) to achieve a grasp of other, derived usages of C. This is, in fact, the idea behind 
Dummett’s Fundamental Assumption [Dummett 1991: 257].  
In what follows I would like to offer an indirect defense of the plausibility of the 
Fundamental Assumption, based on considerations about the options left to someone 
who denied the canonical inferences view for concept-constitution (cf, in particular, 
the discussion of option i) below). In the next section I will offer further considerations 
in support of (a pragmatist version of) the Fundamental Assumption. 
 
3.3. Canonical Inferences and Concept-Constitution - Objections 
 
It is, in fact, hard to imagine which options would be left to somebody who denied, 
within the framework of an inferentialist account of logical concepts, that it is the 
canonical inferences that we should take to be concept-constituting (under the 
assumption that concept-constituting inferences can in principle be isolated). Such a 
person could, it seems to me, adopt one of the following views: 
 
i) That the proponent of the canonical inferences view can offer no persuasive 
argument in support of the claim that canonical inferences have a special epistemic 
status over derived ones, and for this reason it may well be that it is derived inferences, 
rather than canonical ones, that should be taken to be concept-constituting. 
 
ii) That although canonical inferences may be seen as concept-constituting for 
logical concepts in the framework of the logical system in which the concepts are 
defined, we have no grounds for claiming that they should also be seen as concept-
constituting for logical concepts in general. That is: canonical inferences are a way to 
define a logical concept when introducing it in a logical language – but there is no 
reason to think that their role can be generalized beyond the practice of introducing 
concepts in such a language. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that the way 
in which we use the logical concepts in existing, and informal, languages can be 
captured by means of such inferences. 
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Consider i) first. 
The natural way to justify this claim is by questioning the epistemic status that 
Dummett’s Fundamental Assumption ascribes to canonical inferences. 
The idea would, then, be that the generality displayed by the canonical inferences 
is of a purely syntactic nature – it doesn’t, as it were, necessarily ‘double up’ as a 
generality of a distinctively epistemic kind. There is a gap, in other words, between:  
 
• The fact that non-canonical usages can be inferentially reduced to canonical 
ones; and  
• The fact that non-canonical usages are or can be normally grasped by a subject 
on the basis only of the canonical ones. 
 
If this gap isn’t filled, then we seem to have no guarantee that canonical inferences will 
be of any special epistemic relevance. Intuitively, however, we do want concept-
constituting inferences to have such a relevance: in virtue of their very concept-
constituting character, we want them to be the inferences that a subject needs to grasp 
if he is to grasp the inferential role of the relevant logical concept in its full generality. 
 
 One may reply to this view as follows. Even if we accept that the definition of a 
canonical inference does not per se necessitate the idea that canonical inferences have  
a special epistemic status that makes them, as it were, ideal candidates for concept-
constitution, an account of concepts that does take them to be concept-constituting 
will have at least one distinctive advantage. For simplicity, I will spell this out only with 
reference to canonical means of verification. By individuating a concept in terms of its 
direct means of verification, the account will be able to reconstruct its contribution to 
our reasoning practices in the most general form: that is, abstracting from the 
inferential behavior of any other logical concepts, and from any background belief 
about what should count as the canonical means of verifying statements containing 
those. Such an account will then be able to explain our ability to grasp a logical 
concept, without any assumption concerning our background knowledge: the account 
will have no trouble, for example, in explaining how someone who is introduced to a 
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natural deduction system for the first time, may grasp the concept of conjunction by 
being presented with the introduction rule for it, before she is presented with the 
introduction rules for any other logical concept in the system. If the account takes 
canonical inferences to be concept-constituting for logical concepts in general (i.e. as 
they are deployed both in a formal language and in natural languages), then it will be 
able to explain how this can happen in all contexts: how it is, for example, that a child 
who reasons correctly when using the concept of conjunction may still not possess the 
concept of universal quantification.  
In other words, individuating a logical concept by appeal to direct means of 
verification will plausibly make life easier for the theorist of concepts when it comes to 
explaining how the concepts that she individuates by reference to canonical 
derivations can be grasped. 
If we assume that it is derived inferences that should be treated as concept-
constituting, this advantage will be lost.  
Although this is obviously not a conclusive reply to the objection, it has at least the 
effect of weakening its plausibility. 
 
Consider, now, ii). This view implicitly denies what has been an implicit 
assumption throughout this chapter: that logical concepts should be individuated as 
the same concepts both in the framework of (their definition in) a formal language and 
in the framework of (their use in) our informal reasoning practices.  
The view should then be broken down into two claims, which consist, respectively, in 
giving a negative answer to the two following questions: 
 
ii)* Should we assume that a logical concept, as it were, stays the same across logic and 
informal reasoning practices60? 
                                                
60  I am using this distinction to capture the standard distinction, explicitly made in the 
formulation of the view in (ii), between: 
 
• the definition or introduction of a new logical concept C in the framework of a specific 
logical system; and 
• existing usages of C in a given language 
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ii)** Is the plausibility of the claim that a logical concept is individuated by the relevant 
canonical inferences maintained if we answer yes to the first question? 
 
Consider ii)* first. It seems to me that someone who denied, for example, that 
we have one concept of conjunction, and that we deploy it both in formal and in 
informal reasoning, could appeal, in the attempt to justify her claim, to the view that 
the expression ‘conjunction’ can take different meanings, because, for example, it is 
ambiguous among them, or because it is semantically context-sensitive. We happen to 
use the same expression in different reasoning practices, but the expression picks a 
different concept in each practice.  
The immediate reply to this strategy consists in saying that, unless some 
linguistic evidence can be provided for the claim that an expression is ambiguous, or 
semantically context-sensitive, we have no reason to think that it is. This reply thus 
simply consists in saying that the burden of the proof is on who denies sameness of 
concepts across reasoning practices. 
 But suppose that some evidence could indeed be provided to support the claim. 
What would it consist in? A direct ground for the claim against sameness of concepts 
would be given by the observation that we have a conflict in the usages of the concept: 
for example, the way in which we deploy the concept of conjunction in the context of 
formal reasoning is (sometimes, or often) different or even inconsistent with the way in 
which we deploy it in the context of informal reasoning. In other words: we don’t 
perform and evaluate as correct the same inferences in the two cases.  
 My reply to this strengthened claim goes as follows (here I shall focus on the 
case of inconsistency). First of all, the relevant linguistic evidence needs to be 
provided. Until this is done, the claim can at most be that a conflict in usages is 
conceivable. Second, even if we are presented with the required evidence, a conflict in 
the usage of, for example, the concept of conjunction does not per se provide 
conclusive evidence for the claim that two different concepts of conjunction are at 
stake. In fact, it can be interpreted in at least four ways: 
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a) The concept of conjunction is the same, and only one inferential practice 
(namely, the formal practice) is correct, while the other one isn’t. That is: only 
those who reason according to the formal definition of the concept can be said 
to really possess it. So, an epistemic subject who uses the concept of 
conjunction in the course of informal reasoning in a way that conflicts with the 
logician, might be told by the latter that she should in fact perform different 
inferences with the concept. This view is available to someone who holds that 
the relation between logic and informal reasoning is a normative one. 
 
b) The concept of conjunction is the same, and only one inferential practice 
(namely, the informal one) is correct. The logician should adopt different 
introduction and elimination rules for the concept. This view is available to 
someone who holds that the relation between logic and informal reasoning is a 
descriptive one, aiming at capturing and clarifying the inferences that we are 
naturally disposed to make in our informal reasoning practices. 
 
c) The concept of conjunction is the same, and the conflicting usages are not 
concept-constituting. If we thought that those usages were indeed concept-
constituting, then we were wrong: we should reformulate our reconstruction of 
what constitutes the concept of conjunction. 
 
d) There are indeed two different concepts of conjunction deployed in the two 
reasoning practices. 
 
Unless persuasive reasons are given to choose the fourth interpretation over the first 
three, the claim that we have different concepts of conjunction (or, in general, that our 
logical concepts differ) in logic and in informal reasoning is inconclusive. 
 
Furthermore, the claim for a difference in concepts can be weakened by appeal 
to the following considerations, which are suggested by a) and b) above. 
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There are two general ways in which one can think of the relation between logic and 
informal reasoning.  
The first assigns a normative status to logic: logic is the science of correct 
reasoning, which, among other things, defines what counts as a correct reasoning 
practice, and teaches us the correct usages of the logical concepts. 
The second sees logic as having a mainly descriptive purpose: logic is an 
attempt to clarify what (a sub-set of) the concepts that we use in informal reasoning 
consist in, by giving precise definitions in terms of rules of inference. Logic thus 
reconstructs the way in which we find it natural to reason, renders our intuitive 
notions more precise, and investigates the consequences of such notions. 
 
If, however, we claim that the logical concepts that we deploy in our formal 
reasoning practices are not the same concepts that we deploy in informal reasoning, 
neither of the options above is available. For how can logic rectify the way in which I 
reason with the concept of conjunction, by presenting rules that constitute a different 
concept? And how can a logician claim to be reconstructing, and making more precise, 
our logical concepts if the ones that she defines are simply different concepts? 
It seems, then, that the opponent of the sameness of concepts view will have to 
commit herself to the view that the relation between logic and (a subset of) our 
informal reasoning practices is neither normative nor descriptive – in other words: 
there is simply no relation between the two domains. This claim, however, is 
implausible both for historical reasons (the founding fathers of modern logic 
understood themselves as providing an analysis of correct reasoning) and for 
theoretical ones - if there is no relation between the way we find it natural to reason 
and the way we reason formally by means of precise definitions, what is the ultimate 
source of both such definitions and our ability to provide them61? 
                                                
61  Of course another conflict in usages to which one might point prima facie takes place 
within logic. For two systems that adopt different introduction and elimination rules for, e.g., 
disjunction may then be regarded as defining different concepts, picked by the same expression 
‘∨’. A reply to this way of articulating the objection can go as follows. That we may choose 
different introduction and elimination rules to define, e.g., disjunction in different logical 
systems does not per se reveal that we have different concepts. Consider Dummett’s discussion 
of the meaning of ‘∨’ for the classical logician and for the quantum logician, in [Dummett 1991: 
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Now consider ii)**. The plausibility of the idea that canonical inferences are 
concept-constituting for logical concepts has already been argued for. The further 
question that an opponent of the sameness of concepts view might raise concerns the 
means that we have to identify concept-constituting inferences in our informal 
reasoning practices. I will discuss this issue in the next section. 
 
4. COMMITMENT AND CONCEPT-POSSESSION 
 
4.1 Verificationist and Pragmatist Approaches to Concept-Constitution 
 
The idea that logical concepts are constituted by canonical inferences can 
receive three formulations. That is, it may be further articulated as:  
 
i) The idea that it is the inferences from the canonical grounds for a statement 
containing a logical concept C as its main concept ingredient to the statement itself 
that are concept-constituting for C; 
 
ii) The idea that it is the inferences from a statement containing C as its main concept 
ingredient to its canonical consequences that are concept-constituting for C; 
 
                                                                                                                                            
205-2007]. With reference to that discussion, we have the option of articulating the 
disagreement between the two logicians in any of the following ways: 
 
• The two logicians disagree about which rules capture the canonical grounds and 
canonical conclusions for the concept of disjunction, rather than about which concept 
of disjunction is the correct one; 
 
• The two logicians disagree what the canonical grounds and the canonical consequences 
for disjunction are, and think that there is a fact of the matter as to which ones, in fact, 
they are; 
 
• The two logicians agree on one concept of disjunction, but do not intend their use of ‘v’ 
to capture the concept – they are simply, as it were, playing a game, and introducing 
logical concepts in the language on the basis of considerations about their inferential 
strength, their possible applications, etc. – in other words: considerations about the 
specific aims of the game. 
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iii) The idea that both sets of inferences are concept-constituting. 
 
As already noted, the idea in i) is at the core of a verificationist account of the 
meaning of the logical constants, based on the general assumption that the meaning of 
a statement is given by what counts as a verification of it. The contribution that a 
logical concept C makes to the meaning of a statement should thus be spelt out in 
terms of the way in which it affects what it is to verify the statements in which it 
appears. A qualification is necessary here. When we say that the meaning of a 
statement S is what counts as a verification of S, we shouldn’t, of course, commit 
ourselves to the idea that, in a canonical proof, the premises of an introduction step 
will generally be verifiable, in the sense that there will be some verification procedure 
available to the subject who grasps such premises as the direct grounds for S. In 
general, as [Dummett 1991: 178-9] is careful to note, a theoretically plausible 
formulation of the verificationist approach shouldn’t render inferential roles, or our 
grasp of them, in terms of the availability or grasp of a verification procedure. Rather, 
the relation between the premises and the conclusions of an introduction step in a 
canonical proof of S is better understood as the relation between the truth-makers for 
S and S itself (and our grasp of the inference as a grasp of the kind of facts that, if 
established, would allow us to claim that S has been established). 
The idea in ii) is at the core of a pragmatist account of the meaning of the 
logical constants, based on the general assumption that the meaning of a statement is 
given, roughly, by what we can do with it. The contribution that a logical concept C 
makes to the meaning of a statement should thus be spelt out in terms of the way in 
which it affects what counts as a direct consequence of that statement. A constructivist 
formulation of this account has been presented, among others, by [Martin-Löf 1985; 
1995]. 
The idea in iii) may be articulated as follows62. Both sets of canonical inferences 
(from the canonical grounds and to the canonical conclusions of statements containing 
a logical concept C) are concept-constituting, because they display related (but distinct) 
                                                
62 For a canonical discussion of the idea, cf [Dummett 1991]: Chapter 8-11, 13, and 
[Dummett 1973]: 453 ff. 
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contributions that C makes to our reasoning practices. Their reconstruction by means 
of introduction and elimination rules should capture two related aspects of what we do 
when we reason from given premises to a certain conclusion: we take certain grounds 
to be sufficient for establishing a statement as true, and we take the statement thus 
established to imply (to constitute grounds for) certain consequences. More precisely, 
the relation between these two aspects of our reasoning practices is the following: what 
we take to be a direct consequence of a statement will also depend on the grounds that 
we have for that statement63. In turn, the consequences that we regard as direct 
consequences of a statement will contribute to determine what we should take to be a 
direct ground for that statement. The two aspects of our reasoning complement each 
other, and neither should be privileged by the theorist of concepts. 
 
The third idea has a distinctive advantage over the other two. 
The suggestion that providing grounds and drawing consequences are inter-dependent 
aspects of our reasoning practices, and that they are captured by a concept’s inferential 
role, provides a natural justification for independently desirable constraints on the 
introduction and elimination rules for the logical concepts. A chief example of such 
constraints is harmony. We have good independent reasons for wanting the 
introduction and elimination rules for a logical concept C to be in harmony – for 
example, the reason that harmony guarantees consistency. But if we endorse the idea 
above, we can now provide a general explanation of why introduction and elimination 
rules should be in harmony, an explanation that has to do with what the rules 
themselves are meant to display. That is: we are able to justify a crucial syntactic 
constraint on a language not simply by appeal to independent considerations about the 
desirability of such constraint, but also by appeal to some intuitive features of the 
structure of the inferential practices that the language allows us to express.  
 For consider inferential practice in general. It consists in providing grounds for 
the statements that we assert, and drawing consequences from those statements. This 
                                                
63  Throughout this section I am leaving it open whether we should take grounds and 
consequences to be grounds and consequences of our assertions, of the sentences that we 
assert, or of the propositional content of such sentences.  The use of the term ‘statement’ 
should thus be understood as being neutral among these options. 
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is what the inferential role of our logical concepts is meant to capture. An intuitive, 
and crucial, feature of this role is that it is stable in the overall practice. Such feature 
should be regarded as a normative constraint internal to the practice itself: it 
corresponds to the intuitive idea that we shouldn’t change what we take to be a 
warrant for a given statement S, or what we take to follow from an acceptance of S, in 
the course of the practice. The constraint is important in two respects. From a 
distinctively epistemic point of view, it provides us with a guarantee of internal 
coherence for our knowledge (for knowledge, that is, inferentially acquired). From a 
pragmatic point of view, it guarantees the possibility of coordination in view of rational 
deliberation and action – it guarantees, in other words, that variations in the expressive 
resources of the language do not generate variations in what we are disposed to do 
(and we understand each other as being disposed to do) given our acceptance of a 
statement in the language.  
But now suppose that the introduction and elimination rules for a given logical 
concept C denoted by an expression E are not in harmony. Suppose, in particular, that 
the elimination rule allows us to draw consequences from statements containing the 
expression E that the introduction rule does not warrant. Now take a statement S 
containing E. Acceptance of S might issue directly in actions, or in acceptance of 
further statements not containing E, not warranted by the grounds on which S has 
originally been made. That these actions or statements are ‘not warranted’ means this: 
that we only undertake or accept them in virtue of the introduction of S (i.e., in virtue 
of the introduction of E in the language). Had we not had E in the language, we would 
not have undertaken or accepted them. Thus, by deploying E in the language we end 
up changing the means that we already had for justifying a statement, or an action 
consequent upon the acceptance of such a statement. We are, as it were, changing the 
rules of the game while playing – against the idea, sketched above, that stability should 
be regarded as an epistemically and pragmatically crucial aspect of our inferential 
practices64. 
                                                
64  The considerations presented in this paragraph rely on a somewhat relaxed formulation 
of the notion of a conservative extension of a language, which allowed me to avoid restricting 
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4.2 Concept-Possession 
 
Acceptance of iii), however, does not conclusively commit us to the idea that 
the epistemic status of canonical grounds and of canonical consequences should be 
regarded as being the same.  
For remember that there are two distinct questions that we may ask about inferences 
from canonical grounds and inferences to canonical consequences: 
 
• Which usages of a logical concept are inferentially primary, in the sense that all 
other inferential usages can be derived from, and their correctness justified on 
the basis of, them? 
 
• Which usages are epistemically primary, in the sense that they provide a 
subject with a privileged route to grasping the concept? 
 
Even if our answer to the first question above is that the inferentially primary 
usages of a logical concept are jointly displayed by inferences from canonical grounds 
and to canonical conclusions, we still have the option of regarding either of these two 
kinds of inference as epistemically primary. Our choice of one over the other as 
epistemically primary will determine which one we deploy in our account of concept-
possession.  
This choice will depend on two kinds of facts.  
The first kind is given by the linguistic and pragmatic evidence (and on the 
theoretical interpretations of such evidence) that we can appeal to when determining 
what should count as possession of a logical concept on the part of a subject – that is: 
what does a subject’s deployment of a logical concept in formal and informal linguistic 
practice suggest about what grasp of a concept consists in?  
                                                                                                                                            
the discussion to formal languages only. For a discussion of the possibility and terms of such an 
adaptation, cf [Dummett 1991: 217-19]. 
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For example, one might argue that the assertoric behavior of a competent 
speaker shows that she undertakes certain commitments to the canonical 
consequences of C in virtue of her belief that statements containing C are directly 
verifiable in a given way. Or, symmetrically, that she will be disposed to assert a 
statement containing C, in the presence of its canonical grounds, in virtue of her belief 
that holding the statement to be true commits her to certain consequences.  
We may even have independent theoretical reasons for characterizing her behavior in 
one or the other way: given that we take a logical concept C to be constituted both by 
inferences from canonical grounds and inferences to canonical consequences, we may 
regard either the undertaking of certain commitments to the canonical consequences 
of C, or the disposition to infer a statement containing C from its canonical grounds, as 
(a) a sufficient indicator of concept-possession; and (b) a better indicator. 
The second kind of fact has to do with the views that we hold about the aims of 
our linguistic practices: what, in other words, do we ultimately use our language for? 
In particular, what do we use our logical concepts for65? 
 
In what follows, I want to argue for the plausibility of the claim that 
commitment to the canonical consequences of a concept should be regarded as the 
main indicator of concept possession, by appeal to the first kind of facts mentioned 
above. I will thus focus on the theoretical and methodological reasons that motivate 
such a claim, and refer to linguistic and pragmatic evidence that suggests that 
canonical consequences (and thus our commitments to them) do play an epistemically 
primary role ((i) and (ii) below).  
                                                
65  Since I have, thus far, referred to reasoning practices, and am now switching to talk of 
linguistic practices, a brief clarification is necessary here. Following Frege, I endorse the view 
that the logical concepts (indeed, concepts in general) are not purely linguistic entities: they are 
ingredients of thought. However, we grasp them, share them, and reason with them, always in a 
language. We use them (more precisely: the expressions that we take to denote them) to convey 
information in the context of our linguistic practices – so our understanding of their inferential 
role always has the form of an understanding of their contribution to the sense of the sentences 
in which they figure. Because of this, which inferential usage we choose to regard as 
epistemically primary for a logical concept will also depend on which usages of our language we 
choose to regard as primary. 
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The assumption of the entire discussion is a pragmatist one, and it consists in 
the idea that we use our language primarily with a view to coordination, rational 
deliberation and action.  
In this framework, some of the advantages of the commitment-based 
identification strategy for concept-possession can be rendered as follows. 
 
i) The strategy provides a natural link between reasoning practices on the one hand 
and deliberation and action on the other. 
 
By focusing on speakers’ commitments to the canonical consequences of C, the 
theory focuses on what speakers can do with a complex statement containing C once 
they have established it. It ultimately focuses, therefore, on the atomic consequences 
of our statements. By doing so, it exhibits the link between our reasoning practices and 
the two other practices that consist in rational deliberation and in acting on the basis of 
what the deliberation has established. The idea here is, roughly, that one of the aspects 
of the way in which we use our logical concepts – i.e., the commitments that we 
undertake if we possess such concepts – can be directly related not only to one of the 
aims of our reasoning (for the same could be said of a view that privileged canonical 
grounds), but also to a purpose (establishing that certain atomic consequences are the 
case) by reference to which we can then contribute to an explanation of how the 
practices of deliberating and acting relate to our grasp of the concepts that we deploy 
in reasoning. 
The claim that the commitment-based strategy provides a natural link between 
reasoning and deliberation / action can be articulated in two ways. On the one hand, it 
may be rendered as the general claim that deliberation and action are facilitated by our 
ability to access the non-complex consequences of the complex statements that we 
make. On the other hand, one may render it as the stronger, and more precise, claim 
that the undertaking of a commitment to the canonical consequences of the concepts 
that we deploy in our linguistic practices is a necessary condition for these practices to 
generate the coordination required for rational deliberation and action. 
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The first, general claim is intuitively plausible. Imagine someone, say, a child, 
who does not yet possess a logical concept C, for example the concept of universal 
quantification. Her parents have decided to clean up her room, and want to involve 
her in the operation of putting away all the toys that are on the floor. For each toy on 
the floor, they tell her that it should be put back in the closet. The child, who 
possesses the concepts of toy, closet and ‘putting back’ (and perhaps a whole set of 
other concepts involved in her belief that if she doesn’t do as she is told she will be in 
trouble), will understand what action needs to be taken. But now suppose they tell her, 
instead, that ‘all’ the toys on the floor need to be put back in the closet. Because she 
doesn’t know what ‘all’ means, she will not be able to act on the basis of information 
that is given to her. The idea here is that the atomic statement which replaces the 
complex one (for each toy) makes it easier to act because it allows a piece of 
information to be presented in a cognitively simplified way66. The example can be re-
formulated by appealing to other ways in which such a cognitive simplification can be 
achieved via replacing complex statements with atomic ones – one can for example 
imagine a rational (and competent) speaker who has a memory impairment, and can 
only memorize utterances that last no more than five seconds: for such a speaker, 
information that takes the form of an (utterance of an) atomic statement ‘A is the case’, 
followed by the information that ‘B is the case’, and by one of the form ‘C is the case’, 
will presumably be a cognitive simplification of the information that ‘A & B & C are 
the case’ – and one that will facilitate taking action on the basis of what has been 
established.  
 
 The plausibility of the stronger claim, that the undertaking of canonical 
commitments is a necessary condition for the ability of our linguistic practices to 
                                                
66  The point of the example is not to justify the obvious claim that if one does not grasp a 
concept, then one can’t act on the basis of a statement containing that concept. The point is 
rather that an atomic statement is a cognitive simplification (and not only a syntactic one) of a 
complex one, and thus that understanding it, and acting on the basis of its having been 
established, requires less of us than grasping the grounds from which it may have been derived. 
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generate coordination among speakers, in view of rational deliberation and action, can 
also be motivated by means of an intuitive example67.  
Imagine an assertoric context in which two speakers S and A are deliberating 
about whether they should leave the house and finish off their weekly food shopping. 
Among the factors that will play a role in making the decision is, of course, which 
items have already been purchased. In this scenario, S utters68: 
 
1) We already have milk and juice. 
 
In reply to this, A utters: 
 
2) Oh good – actually, I hadn’t realized that we already had milk. 
 
In turn, S utters: 
 
3) I never meant to say / imply that we have milk. 
 
Intuitively, something here has gone wrong. We can imagine A looking puzzled and 
pausing before making the next assertoric move. We feel that something in the 
practice has broken down and needs to be repaired before the conversation can go on. 
But what has happened, exactly? 
We seem to have various options for answering this question – each such option 
corresponds to a level at which, in this scenario, A may attempt to re-instate the 
normal practice. 
 
a) A misheard S – as a result of this, he misunderstood some grammatical features 
of the sentence uttered by A or simply some phonetic features of the utterance itself. 
 
                                                
67  I will come back to (a variant of) the claim in question in Chapter IV.  
68  1) to 3) are sentence-tokens uttered by A and B.  
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b) A misunderstood S – more precisely, A misunderstood the illocutionary force of 
S’ utterance. What he took to be an assertion was in fact something else (a question, 
the expression of a hope, etc). 
 
c) S misled A – she pretended to assert (the propositional content of) 1), but in fact 
she did not really intend to do so – her intention was to mislead by making her 
utterance of 1) sound like an assertion, while in fact it wasn’t intended to be one. 
 
Suppose that A’s attempts to repair the assertoric practice at levels a)-c) reveal that 
nothing, in fact, has gone wrong at those levels – that is, we may imagine S confirming 
that A has not misunderstood her, that she indeed intended to assert both 1) and 3), 
and that she is not trying to mislead S. There is a further level at which A may still 
attempt to repair the practice – we may imagine that, at this level, A’s attempt will 
consist in asking the question: 
 
4) What, then, did you mean when you said that we have milk and juice? 
 
This is the level of the inferential usage of the concept of conjunction. Suppose, then, 
that A’s questioning reveals that S’s usage of the concept is a deviant usage – one, in 
particular, in virtue of which what she denies by 3) does not follow from 1). Thus, S 
does not undertake the standard commitments when deploying the expression ‘and’ – 
she may undertake different commitments, but she does not acknowledge that by 
asserting 1) she has incurred the obligation to be in the same epistemic relation in 
which she is with 1) to: 
 
5) We have milk69. 
 
                                                
69  For example, in the relation that consists in believing v) if she believes i), or in holding 
v) as true if she holds i) as true, etc. How one chooses to spell out what this relation is will 
depend, of course, on one’s views on the correctness conditions of assertions.  
The idea that our speech acts generate certain (objective) obligations to the 
consequences of what we utter is endorsed and developed in different ways by [Kot’àtko 1988], 
[Alston 1991], [Pollock 1992], [Green 2000], [Watson 2004]. 
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Intuitively, here, the lack of the relevant commitments on the part of S makes it 
impossible for A and S:  
 
• To understand each other (as S’s utterance of 4) reveals); 
 
• To deliberate on the basis of this understanding (to decide whether they should 
go out and get milk); 
 
• To take action (go out and get milk, or stay in). 
 
What the example intuitively shows is, then, the following: 
 
• If a speaker fails to undertake the relevant canonical commitments while 
deploying a logical concept in a speech act context, some kind of repair is then 
needed before any deliberation or action can take place – such a repair will plausibly 
consist in an attempt, on the part of A, to clarify which commitments S 
acknowledges as the ones associated with a usage of ‘and’, and to agree on a 
shared usage. That is: the commitments in question are a necessary condition 
on the possibility of (collective) deliberation and action; 
 
• There is, in a normal assertoric context such as the one above, a pragmatic 
expectation, on the part of competent speakers, that the relevant commitments 
are undertaken – in the scenario described, A can individuate the source of 
communication failure in S’s deviant usage of ‘and’ in virtue of holding such 
expectation. 
 
How the status and role of such expectations can be further articulated will partly 
depend on one’s views about the structure of our speech-act practices. I will discuss 
this issue in Chapter IV – the aim of the example above was simply to lend some 
plausibility to the strong rendering of the claim in i). 
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ii) We have adequate cognitive and linguistic evidence in support of the claim that 
inferences to the canonical consequences of a logical concept C are epistemically 
primary with respect to the corresponding derived inferences. 
 
The claim can be rendered as the pragmatist formulation of Dummett’s Fundamental 
Assumption: inferences to the canonical consequences of (a statement containing) C 
(as the main concept ingredient) provide a subject with a privileged epistemic route to 
grasping C. That is: a subject can grasp the derived consequences of C by only grasping 
the canonical ones.  
Rather than offering a case-by-case discussion of the evidence that we have for this 
claim, here I will limit the discussion to two intuitive examples.  
 
a) Learning how to use C in the context of a logical practice: in normal circumstances a 
subject S is introduced to the contribution that C makes to what counts as a 
consequence of a statement containing C by being presented with the 
elimination rule for C. Under the assumption that the rule captures the 
canonical consequences of the concept, the ability, on the part of S, to perform 
derived inferences with C, within the system in question, will depend on her 
grasp of the relevant elimination rule. 
 
b) Understanding the commitments undertaken in derived usages of C in the context of 
natural language practices:  in normal linguistic practices, speakers tend to 
assume that failure to grasp the derived consequences of a statement containing 
C as its main concept ingredient depends on failure to grasp what counts as a 
canonical consequence of C. Consider the following example. 
I am playing with a group of little girls, and I assert:  
 
Everyone who is pretty can have a candy. Oh, look, everyone is pretty here!70 
 
                                                
70  The sentence is meant to be regimented as an instance of Universal Modus Ponens. 
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Assume that the range of the quantifier in my utterance is clear to the audience, and 
that all the girls possess the non-logical concepts deployed in the utterance above. 
Suppose that all the girls but one, call her Judith, grasp that, in virtue of what I have 
uttered, each of them can have a  candy. Suppose also that I have good reasons to 
think that Judith grasps most of the logical concepts, including the conditional. 
Intuitively, what I will infer from Judith’s failure to grasp, for example, that she herself 
can have a candy, is that she doesn’t grasp the usage displayed by the rule of universal 
instantiation for the quantifier in my utterance. That is, I will assume that her failure 
to grasp the derived usage of the quantifier in the utterance depends on her failure to 
grasp what is to count as the quantifier’s canonical consequence. 
 
iii) The strategy is consistent with, and facilitates the fulfillment of, the manifestability 
requirement on a theory of meaning. 
 
A plausible constraint on the individuation conditions for concept-possession 
is that whatever we take these conditions to consist in, they should be manifestable. A 
wealth of arguments for the plausibility of such a constraint has been presented and 
discussed in the literature, where the chief example is of course [Dummett 1973; 1976; 
1991]. 
The claim that I want to make here is this: that it will be easier for an account 
of concept-possession that focuses on the speakers’ commitments to the canonical 
consequences of a concept to keep track of the manifestable aspects of concept 
possession. That is: with respect to the manifestability requirement, we will be better 
off if we say that concept possession can be ascribed primarily on the basis that a 
competent speaker undertakes certain commitments to the canonical consequences of 
a logical concept C, rather than on the basis of her epistemic relation to the concept’s 
canonical grounds.  
For consider the following. A natural way to articulate such a relation is in 
terms of a disposition to infer a statement containing C from its canonical grounds, a 
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disposition that may be further qualified in various ways71. There are however many 
reasons for which a speaker who possesses C may not be disposed to infer to the 
appropriate statement containing C in the presence of the concept’s canonical 
grounds72.  
For example, consider a very long and complicated inference, in the course of 
which, at some point, A is established. After many other inferential steps, B is also 
established. I may at this point have forgotten that I had (long ago) established that A 
held – and simply in virtue of this fact not be disposed to infer A & B at any further 
stage. But this has, intuitively, nothing to do with whether I possess or not the concept 
of conjunction.  
Or consider a context in which I am reasoning with some children; more 
specifically, I am trying to teach them the meaning of some logical constants, by using 
them in very simple inferences. At time t, I haven’t yet said anything about the concept 
of disjunction – I am still trying to show them how we use the concept of conjunction. 
At this time, I make a certain statement A. I have therefore laid down a canonical 
ground for the statement A or B. But it seems plausible that I will not be disposed, or 
willing to, explicitly infer A or B: my audience hasn’t yet been trained to use the 
concept of disjunction in reasoning, and I don’t want to confuse matters for them.  
In other words: because of the presence of a variety of sources of defeasibility, 
in a number of cases my disposition to infer a statement containing C from its 
canonical consequences will not manifest itself in the actual performance of such an 
inference.  
A clarification is important here. To argue in this way is not to confuse 
manifestability with the actual manifestation of a disposition. It is simply to say: 
because it appears that a disposition to infer in a certain way is easily defeated by 
independent factors, it may prove hard even to define how such a disposition should 
be individuated in the first place. For the problem is: granted that we can characterize 
a disposition as a defeasible disposition, there must be a fact of the matter – if we want 
                                                
71  E.g. [Peacocke 1987; Boghossian 2003]. 
72  Some of these reasons motivate the objections to Peacocke’s and Boghossian’s accounts 
that draw on the defeasibility of the conditions for individuating concept possession – cf for 
example [Williamson 2003]. These are not the ones I want to focus on here. 
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it to be an indicator of concept-possession –  as to whether a speaker who does not 
infer in the concept-constituting way is simply not disposed to infer in such a way (i.e. 
does not possess the concept) or has, as it were, hit against a legitimate source of 
defeasibility. How will the theory distinguish between the two cases? In other words: 
which are the circumstances in which the disposition has to be manifested in order for 
it to be an indicator of concept-possession? 
 
On the other hand, it seems that there is an intuitive respect in which our 
commitments to the canonical consequences of a concept are less easily defeated. More 
precisely, it seems that there is at least one linguistic practice in which this is the case – 
in which, that is, the undertaking or not of certain commitments is likely to result in 
explicit questioning of the speaker’s speech act behavior.  
Consider an instance of our standard assertoric practices. Once I explicitly 
introduce the concept by asserting a statement containing it, if the theory is right I 
commit myself (granted that I possess the concept) to its canonical consequences. In 
virtue of this, I become obliged to fulfill the assertoric expectations that an audience of 
competent speakers, who share the same language, will form as a result of the 
introduction of the concept. Of course it may be the case that I never come to assert 
the canonical consequences of the complex statement in question – however, it seems 
plausible to claim that my explicit introduction of the concept will at least generate the 
expectation that, as it were, whatever happens afterwards is consistent with the 
concept’s canonical consequences.  
In fact, there are two cases to consider here.  
The first is the case in which my audience does not possess the concept that I 
am introducing. In this case I will be subject to explicit questioning – consider, for 
example, the scenario previously discussed where I am training some children to 
reasoning with the logical concepts. Suppose that, in this scenario, at time t I assert A 
or B – it is plausible to imagine that my assertion will immediately be questioned – 
what do I mean, now, by A or B? 
The second case is the normal case of an audience of competent speakers. In 
this case, even if I never happen to infer to the canonical consequences of the concept 
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that I have introduced, and from these to further atomic consequences, the 
introduction of the concept in the assertoric practice (the fact that it was explicitly 
used) will institute a further evaluation criterion for the assertions that follow. And I 
will be subject to questioning, or reproach of some sort, if I don’t fulfill the relevant 
obligation. 
  
4.3 A problem 
 
There appear to be, however, intuitive counterexamples to the idea that 
undertaking a commitment, on the part of a subject S, to the canonical consequences 
of a logical concept C is reliable evidence for ascribing grasp of C to S. 
Consider the following scenario.  
 
Whenever she uses the concept of conjunction, Anna appears to commit 
herself to each of the conjuncts. That is (simplifying things): every time she makes a 
claim of the form A and B, she will either continue reasoning in a way that is consistent 
with having established that each conjunct holds, or she will also make claims of the 
form ‘A is the case’ and ‘B is the case’. If what I have labeled as the commitment-based 
strategy is correct, this should at least give us good reasons to think that Anna 
possesses the concept of conjunction. But now suppose that one day, after having 
claimed that A holds, and also that B holds, Anna is confronted by a speaker, Paul, 
who says: ‘Oh, so ‘A and B’’ is the case. It seems to me that in such a scenario one may 
conceive (even if as an extremely unlikely event) that Anna might reply: ‘no, I didn’t 
say that!’. When questioned by her puzzled interlocutor, who asks her what, then, she 
means by ‘and’, Anna replies that she simply can’t see how her use of the concept of 
conjunction has anything to do with the belief that having established both A and B 
should make her disposed to claim that A and B holds. Whatever Anna means by ‘and’, 
this does not make her disposed to infer a statement containing the concept in the 
presence of is canonical grounds. It may be, for example, that she holds peculiar views 
about what should count as a canonical ground for a conjunctive statement, perhaps in 
virtue of other, non-standard views about the relation between grounds and 
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consequences in a deductive inference, or simply that she cannot see that having 
established both conjuncts provides her with a canonical ground for asserting the 
conjunctive statement. But if such a scenario is possible, then commitment to the 
canonical consequences of a logical concept is not a reliable indicator of concept-
possession: we do not want to say that Anna grasps the concept of conjunction73. 
 
Now, there are two sets of reasons to which one may appeal to explain why 
commitments are prima facie not sufficient indicators of concept-possession -two 
places, as it were, where one can look for an explanation of the apparent insufficiency, 
to which the example above points, of canonical commitments as indicators of concept 
possession. That is, one may claim that: 
 
i) A commitment to the canonical consequences of C is not sufficient as an indicator of 
concept possession because, in virtue of how concept constitution has been defined, 
such a commitment is only one aspect of the way in which we use our logical concepts. 
One should also add, as a further requirement on a competent speaker, that she is 
disposed to infer a complex statement containing C from its canonical grounds. 
 
                                                
73  A qualification is necessary here. When I say that, in the presence of the scenario 
discussed, we intuitively don’t want to ascribe possession of the concept of conjunction to 
Anna, I do not mean to say that a correct understanding of the scenario necessitates the 
interpretation that I am providing. For one may imagine various ways to further qualify Anna’s 
intentional states so as to make her response to Paul compatible with the idea that she does 
grasp the concept. For example, Anna might have the strange belief that every time that a 
speaker S presents her with the canonical grounds for a conjunctive statement, S intends to 
mislead her in some way (to get her to assent to the statement in order to draw further 
unwanted consequences from her assent). Then she will typically not assent to such a statement 
– but her manifested behavior will have nothing to do with whether she grasps the concept of 
conjunction.  
In general, it seems that it is possible to reconcile any manifested behavior with the 
claim that a certain intentional state (for example, that of grasping a concept) holds, by playing 
on, as it were, speakers’ intentions, beliefs and desires. This is, I believe, a general  problem for 
the manifestability requirement: there is a tension between the idea that we are in principle 
able to access manifested and reliable indicators of an intentional state, on the one hand, and 
the fact that manifested behavior seems to be largely underdetermined by speakers’ intentional 
states on the other. I hope to devote future work to the investigation of this tension; in the 
context of the current discussion, however, I am simply assuming that all the further 
parameters which may affect our understanding of the scenario are fixed in a way compatible 
with its intended interpretation. 
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ii)  A commitment to the canonical consequences of C is not, per se, a sufficient 
indicator of concept possession because something more is required for concept 
possession. This additional requirement has to do with the epistemic quality of our 
commitments. More precisely, this must be further qualified in at least one respect: it 
must be made clear how the epistemic relation in which a commitment consists 
reflects the relation between canonical grounds and canonical consequences in whose 
terms concept-constitution is articulated. 
 
If we endorse i), we defeat the point of characterizing concept-possession in terms 
of canonical commitments. On the other hand, the idea behind ii) does deserve some 
consideration. The idea amounts to this: that it is by appeal to the epistemic quality of 
our commitments that the relation between a speaker who grasps C on the one hand, 
and the canonical grounds for C on the other hand, should be accounted for as a 
manifestable aspect of concept possession. 
What are the options for reformulating the claim that concept-possession should 
be rendered in terms of canonical commitments so as to take into account what ii) 
says? 
 
4.4 Reformulations of Claim B) 
 
Recall that the original formulation of the claim, given at the beginning of Section 3, 
stated that: 
 
Claim B) To possess a logical concept C is to undertake a commitment to the canonical 
consequences of C when deploying the concept. 
 
Here is a first attempt to reformulate Claim B) on the basis of the requirement in ii). 
 
Claim B*) A speaker possesses a concept C if she undertakes a commitment to the 
canonical consequences of C when deploying the concept, and she is also disposed to 
infer a statement containing C when presented with the canonical grounds for C. 
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This reformulation immediately encounters at least two difficulties.  
The first concerns the way in which inferential dispositions are appealed to in 
the claim: nothing is said about the impact that a speaker’s recognition of her 
commitments has on her disposition to perform the relevant inference. But this clearly 
leaves open the possibility that, in the presence of the canonical grounds for C, a 
speaker might have reasons for inferring (or being willing to do so) a statement 
containing C that have nothing to do with how those grounds relate to her commitments. 
That is: it leaves open the possibility that the availability of canonical grounds for C 
generates a disposition that has nothing to do with the epistemic quality of a speaker’s 
commitments. Remember our speaker Anna, who committed herself to the canonical 
consequences of conjunction but was not disposed to infer a conjunctive statement 
when both conjuncts had been established. Imagine that, after her conversation with 
Paul,  perhaps out of tiredness and disinterest for what constitutes a canonical ground 
for what, she simply starts conforming to the usage of conjunction spelt out by Paul – 
every time A and B have been established, she is now disposed to infer (or assent to an 
inference of) A and B. She still has no understanding of the way in which such a 
disposition relates to the commitments that she is genuinely undertaking when 
asserting a conjunctive statement, and she still believes that inferring to A and B in the 
way specified by Paul has nothing to do with the concept of conjunction. But she has 
other preoccupations, and does not want to engage in any discussion about the way in 
which she uses ‘and’. It seems to me that, intuitively, we will still want to say that Anna 
does not possess the (or, at least, our) concept of conjunction.  
The second difficulty concerns the exact meaning of the expression ‘when 
presented with the canonical grounds for C’: does a speaker have to recognize that 
certain grounds are indeed canonical, in the sense that we need to ascribe her a theory 
of what constitutes a canonical inference, in order to possess C? Even if we formulate it 
as a sufficiency condition, this is clearly too strong.  
 
One could try to fix both problems by reformulating the claim as follows:  
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Claim B**) A speaker possesses a concept C if she undertakes a commitment to the 
canonical consequences of C when deploying the concept, and, in virtue of doing so, she 
is also disposed to infer to a statement containing C when the canonical grounds for C 
have been established. 
 
 The ‘in virtue of’ clause in the claim above is crucial in the following respect: 
that it points to the epistemic relation that also has to hold between a speaker and the 
canonical grounds of C if her commitment to C’s canonical consequences is to function 
as evidence of her grasp of C74.  
But how, exactly, should ‘in virtue of’ be intended? What is it for a speaker to 
be disposed to infer in a certain way ‘in virtue of’ the commitments that she 
undertakes when deploying a logical concept?  
Here is a third reformulation of Claim B that tries to clarify this. 
 
Claim B ***): A speaker possesses a concept C if she undertakes a commitment to the 
canonical consequences of C when deploying the concept, recognizes in the relevant 
circumstances that this commitment generates an obligation to regard a statement 
containing C as having been established when its canonical grounds have, and is thus 
disposed to infer from those grounds in the appropriate way. 
 
A speaker’s recognition of the obligation generated by her commitment is 
intended to be the simple acknowledgement of the fact that, for example, if A and B 
have been established, then A and B has also been established. The idea that a 
commitment generates, or should generate, such a recognition, on the part of the 
speaker, may be spelt out in two different ways. It is either the idea that all that is 
required of a speaker is that she recognizes an obligation of the right sort as generated 
                                                
74  Note that this reformulation, or indeed any of the ones discussed here, will not preserve 
us from a general problem affecting inferential dispositions: the presence of a variety of sources 
of defeasibility for the willingness to perform a certain inference intuitively makes the claims 
too strong. As already discussed, it is possible to imagine scenarios where whether one is 
disposed to infer in the appropriate way or not does not constitute evidence one way or another 
for concept possession.  
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by her commitment, without further qualifications about her beliefs on the source of 
this obligation, or it is the idea that her recognition of such an obligation somehow 
involves explicitly being able to reason on what should count as a canonical ground for 
C.  
We don’t want to go for the second rendering of the idea. This is because we 
don’t want the strength of our indicator of concept-possession to depend on whether a 
speaker has access to the theoretical resources that she would need to explicitly 
represent to herself the relation between canonical consequences and canonical 
grounds. Thus, a speaker’s ‘recognition’ of the obligations which she incurs will have 
to spelt out in a way that does not make any reference to such resources, or to any 
belief whose formulation depends on them – that is simply accountable for in terms of 
the manifestable aspects of a speaker’s linguistic and inferential behavior. We need, in 
other words, a way to represent the impact of the relation between canonical 
commitments and canonical warrants on a competent speaker’s cognitive architecture, 
without requiring of a speaker that she is able to explicitly represent this relation 
herself.  
 Whether and how this can be done will here be left as a (crucial) topic for 
further investigation. The conclusion of this section is, then, a modest one: the last 
reformulation of Claim B offered above is, I believe, a (relatively) plausible one, 
provided that we do not intend it as implying that competent speakers should have the 
intellectual and expressive resources to explicitly represent the status of their 
inferential commitments.  
 
4.5 Sufficiency  
 
The arguments presented in the previous paragraph were intended to motivate 
the plausibility of Claim B***) in the face of some alternatives. But how strong do we 
want the claim to be? In other words: should Claim B***) be intended simply as the 
formulation of a general correlation between concept-possession and the undertaking 
of certain commitments, or should it be intended as stating the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for (a correct ascription of) concept-possession? 
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 It seems that we do want at least sufficiency. For if the claim is to serve as a 
criterion for ascription of concept-possession on the part of the theorist, we will want 
to argue that a crucial (and intuitive) reason for its plausibility is that, as it were, it gets 
things right – that the theorist will make the right predictions when ascribing 
possession of a concept on the basis of what the claim states. But then any 
counterexample to the sufficiency of the claim will weaken its plausibility – more 
specifically, it will make it unclear, to say the least, why we should even think of it as a 
criterion at all. 
 Is the claim, then, open to intuitive objections to the sufficiency of the 
conditions that it formulates? I can see one, which may be articulated as follows. Claim 
B***) may not spell out the correct sufficiency conditions for concept-possession 
because it ultimately relies only on the manifestable aspects of concept-possession. It is 
a claim about the commitments that speakers undertake in the context of manifested 
inferential and linguistic practices, and which defines the relation between a 
competent speaker and the canonical grounds of a concept solely in virtue of a 
recognition that is intended to be manifested in a speaker’s response to an explicit 
challenge (or: questioning) of her use of the concept. However, there is ultimately a 
gap between what is manifestable and the phenomenological aspects of concept-
possession: whatever goes on, as it were, in this limbo, the theory which endorses 
Claim B***) will not be able to capture. And it may well be that what goes on in this 
limbo is such that it generates counterexamples to the sufficiency claim. One may, for 
example, conceive of a speaker who commits herself to the canonical consequences of 
a concept C every time she uses the concept, and who also publicly acknowledges that 
certain grounds are canonical for C, but whose commitments and acknowledgment do 
not reflect a genuine possession of the concept – she may infer certain consequences 
simply to conform to a practice, and her acknowledgment may also be a matter of 
superficial compliance with what is expected of her. She may, in other words, have 
learnt that associating a tokening of ‘and’ with certain commitments and with a certain 
response to a challenge will preserve her from being considered an incompetent 
speaker. And the sense that she does attribute to the concept of conjunction may not 
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be manifestable in a shared linguistic practice. Would we still say that she possesses 
the concept? 
 My reply to this objection goes as follows. This is not an objection to Claim 
B***) per se, but to the manifestability requirement that constitutes (part of) the 
rationale for the claim. Any account of concept-possession for logical concepts, 
indeed: any account of what it is to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression, 
which endorses the manifestability requirement, is subject to this objection. If Claim 
B***) is intended to be a criterion of individuation restricted to the manifestable 
aspects of concept-possession (that is: if the account which endorses the claim only 
aims at capturing these aspects), then the objection is irrelevant: whatever lies beyond 
manifestable aspects of concept-possession will simply not be part of the subject 
matter of the theory. 
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PART II 
 
CHAPTER III 
COMMITMENT, QUANTIFICATION AND ABSOLUTE GENERALITY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to outline an account of what the concept of 
universal quantification consists in. The account relies on the general idea that (a sub-
set of) our actual inferential practices are constitutive of the logical concepts that we 
use, in the sense that they determine their inferential role and, thus, what should 
counts as their correct semantics. 
The presentation has the following structure. 
 
In Section 1 I formulate three basic constraints that a reconstruction of the 
concept-constituting usages of the concept of universal quantification has to obey. 
In Section 2 I present three options for a reconstruction of what the concept 
consists in.  
In Section 3 I discuss these three options in the light of the three constraints 
and defend my own variant of one of them as the most plausible. 
Throughout the chapter, I will focus exclusively on first-order quantification, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
1. UNIVERSAL QUANTIFICATION: THREE CONSTRAINTS 
 
In Chapter II, I defended the plausibility of two ideas, namely: 
 
• The idea that a logical concept is constituted by certain ‘basic’ inferential 
practices, which consist in inferences from its canonical grounds and to its 
canonical consequences; 
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• The idea that to possess a logical concept is to use it correctly. Correct usage of 
a concept C is defined in terms of a subject’s undertaking an inferential 
commitment to the canonical consequences of C when uttering (propositional 
contents containing) C.  
 
Both ideas are very general ones, in the sense that subscribing to them leaves open a 
whole set of questions about our grasp of a logical concept C75.  
Here I would like to restrict the scope of the discussion and focus on the 
concept of universal quantification. Within this restricted framework, my primary aim 
is to answer the following two questions: 
 
i) What are the basic constraints on a reconstruction of the concept-constituting usage 
of universal quantification? 
 
And: 
 
ii) What are the options for the reconstruction? 
 
1.1 Preliminary Discussion 
 
Preliminary Discussion of i) 
 
 By the expression ‘basic constraints’ I mean to refer to the intuitive correctness 
conditions on the way in which one chooses to render the concept-constituting usages 
of the concept of universal quantification, given the assumption that such usages 
consist in the canonical inferences that we perform with the concept, that is: in 
inferences from the canonical grounds and to the canonical conclusions of statements 
in which the concept figures as the main logical operator. 
                                                
75  For example, neither view commits us to any particular account of how we learn the 
logical concepts: by participating in an inferential practice? By understanding how to apply 
rules of inference that correctly reconstruct concept-constituting practices? 
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A natural assumption in any attempt to reconstruct our basic inferential 
practices involving a logical concept C is that the reconstruction should proceed by 
individuating the rules of inference that correctly abstract the practices in question. 
That is: a natural way to go is by considering the (sub-set of concept-constituting) 
inferences that we perform with C, and individuating the rules that display the logical 
form of these inferences. Under the supposition that concept-constituting usages are 
the canonical ones, then the aim of the theorist of concepts will be to individuate the 
rules of inference that correctly display the canonical grounds and the canonical 
consequences of (statements containing) C.  
The project defined by this aim is, then, a reconstructive project: it looks at basic 
rules of inference as the means via which we reconstruct and express the logical 
concepts’ inferential roles, given the way in which we deploy the concepts in our 
reasoning practices. 
 
In fact, it is natural, in this framework, to regard basic rules of inference as 
performing a two-fold task.  
On the one hand, rules can be the sort of thing via which subjects can learn 
(how to use) a logical concept.  
This is not to say that subjects normally learn the logical concepts in this way. One may 
argue, for example, that while it is standard practice to become acquainted with the 
inferential role that the universal quantifier plays in a given logical system by being 
presented with its introduction and elimination rules, this is not typically the way in 
which we learn to quantify in the context of a natural language. In one case, we are 
presented with a precise definition of the concept’s inferential role; in the other case, 
we presumably learn to infer in a certain way, when using the concept, by being 
exposed to and participating in the practice of deploying the concept in inferences76.   
                                                
76  The crucial assumption in this paragraph is, of course, that we have one concept of 
universal quantification, which we deploy both in natural languages and in formal reasoning. 
Chapter II was partly devoted to a discussion of  (a general version of) this assumption, on 
which, then, I will say no more in the present discussion. 
 Throughout the chapter, the reader thus has to keep in mind that: 
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However, in virtue of the fact that one can learn the concept by appeal to the rules, the 
latter should be regarded as providing a definition of what we take the correct 
inferential usages of the universal quantifier to be – one, in particular, that is within 
the epistemic grasp of a cognitive subject. 
On the other hand, as already remarked, the rules in question should display 
the logical form of our concept-constituting inferences. They should thus, intuitively, 
display the concept’s inferential role in its most general form. But what, exactly, is the 
generality of a rule supposed to render?  
The simple answer is: both a set of linguistic and cognitive data, and its 
theoretical counterpart. 
The data can be rendered in the following way. Our concept-constituting inferential 
commitments appear to survive the language in which they may be expressed. In 
particular, they survive the specific interpretations that, within any given language, 
occurrences of the relevant logical concepts receive. 
Consider, in particular, our usages of the universal quantifier in natural 
languages. These are normally restricted, that is: we normally deploy restricted 
instances of the concept. If one endorses a contextualist view about quantification, one 
will say that the usages in question are restricted by the linguistic context in which we 
utter propositional contents containing the concept [e.g. Glanzberg 2000, 2006; Stanley 
& Szabò 2000]. Yet, in the different contexts, we intuitively regard inferences of the 
same form as being correct or incorrect, irrespective of the way in which context 
contributes to fix the semantic (or pragmatic) features of our quantified utterances.  
The upshot of this observation is, prima facie, that if we take a logical concept to 
be constituted by its inferential role, then the concept is not reducible to its 
                                                                                                                                            
 
• Talk of the concept of universal quantification is intended as talk of a concept that we 
deploy both in formal and in informal reasoning practices; 
 
• Talk of the basic rules of inference that correctly abstract from concept-constituting 
usages is likewise intended not to be restricted to logical practices. 
 
The idea behind the qualifications above is, then, that a correct formulation of those rules 
should allows us to capture the concept’s inferential role in fully general terms. This leaves it 
open, of course, how exactly we should articulate the relation between formal and informal 
reasoning practice – a problem to which I pointed in Chapter II. 
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interpreted usage in context; and that talk of our general usage of the concept is not 
reducible to talk of contextually interpreted usages77. 
The theoretical counterpart of the data that the considerations above intend to 
individuate is the following. If the reconstructive project aims at rendering what the 
concept of universal quantification consists in by means of an appeal to rules of 
inference, then it should regard the latter as consisting in an inferential instruction 
that is fully general with respect to specific interpretative contexts, and that should be 
understood by the subjects who are presented with the rules in such general terms78. 
 As we shall see in a moment, these observations suggest some natural 
constraints on an account of the concept of universal quantification. 
 
Preliminary Discussion of ii) 
 
Call a rule, or a set of rules, that correctly abstracts from the constitutive 
practices for a logical concept C, a concept-defining rule for C.  
A widely accepted, although by no means obvious, view is that we should take 
the concept-defining rules for the universal quantifier to be its standard introduction 
and elimination rules. To say that the view is by no means obvious is to say the 
following: that two inferentialist accounts of the logical concepts may agree on what 
kind of things constitute the concept, on what it is to possess it, and still substantively 
disagree on which rules correctly display the form of the relevant concept-constituting 
practice. 
Here, however, I want to grant that the accepted view is the most plausible one, 
at least for the concept of universal quantification. So, the idea that we start with is 
that the standard introduction and elimination rules for the universal quantifier 
correctly abstract from the relevant concept-constituting practices.  
The first issue that we need to tackle is the following.  
                                                
77  To say that this is the upshot prima facie is to say that some argumentative and 
interpretative work is required to establish that this is really what the data show. A discussion 
of this point will be presented in Chapter IV. 
78  In virtue of this, talk of rules in the present discussion has to be understood as talk of 
inferential instructions, rather than as talk of statements or formulations of the rules in a 
specific language. 
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Introduction and elimination rules for a logical concept are normally viewed as the 
meta-linguistic means to define the correct inferential usage of the concept in the 
relevant object language.  
Consider the standard formulation of ∀-introduction and of ∀-elimination (for 
a first order universal quantifier): 
 
∀-introduction:  Given a deduction of A from some premises, one may deduce ∀vA(v/t) 
from the same premises, where A(v/t) is the result of replacing all occurrences of the 
individual constant t in the formula A by the individual variable v, provided that no 
such occurrences of v is bound in A(v/t) and that t occurs in none of the premises. 
 
∀-elimination: From ∀vA one may deduce A(t/v), where A(t/v) is the result of replacing 
all free occurrences of the individual variable v in the formula A by the individual 
constant t79. 
 
Given a formulation such as the one above, one will then provide a semantics in the 
meta-language. Among the questions that the meta-linguistic interpretation of the rules 
will try to answer are the following: 
 
a) Should we take A and t in the statements of the rules above to be schematic 
letters? 
b) Should we assume that there are non-trivial semantic constraints on any of the 
expressions that appear in the rules? 
c) In particular, as an example of a semantic constraint, should we make the 
assumption that the universal quantifier that figures in the statement of the 
rules ranges over a domain of discourse, and that what is named by t is an 
object in such a domain? 
Etc. 
 
                                                
79  The wording and the notation are from [Williamson 2006: 380]. 
120 
These questions are, then, normally regarded as simply concerning what should be the 
correct interpretation of the rules in a meta-language, where the correctness of the 
interpretation will be assessed partly against the purposes and structure of the object 
language and partly against one’s semantic views and available resources. 
The project that constitutes the framework of the present discussion, however, 
is not simply to determine which interpretation of a rule-based definition of a logical 
concept will best serve the purposes of an object-language, relative to which the rules 
are given, or which one will best implement one’s model-theoretic views. In virtue of 
the status of concept-defining rules in the project that I have labeled as reconstructive, 
the rule-based definition of the concept of universal quantification has to respond, for 
its correctness, to the actual features of our concept-constituting practices. More 
specifically, in the light of the discussion in Chapter II, it has to respond to these 
practices’ intuitive epistemic features.  
The significance, for this project, of questions such as a) to c) above, then, has 
to be understood in terms of the project’s more ambitious perspective – the answers 
that one chooses to give to the questions will concern what we take to be the relevant 
features of our concept-constituting practices. In particular, these will intuitively have 
to do with what we take to be the scope and epistemic quality of the inferential 
commitments that we undertake when we use the concept of universal quantification. 
To this re-interpretation of questions such as a)-c) I will simply refer, for to ease the 
exposition, as to what we should take a concept-defining rule (or set of rules) to display.  
In the rest of the chapter, talk of the options that we have for rendering what a 
rule displays, or for how we should understand a rule, is thus to be understood within 
the framework of such a re-interpretation. 
 
1.2 The Three Constraints 
 
Two questions that immediately arise are: 
 
• Which feature or features of our concept-constituting usages of the universal 
quantifier do we want the concept-defining rules to display?  
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• Which intuitive constraints should the reconstruction obey? 
 
The two questions partly overlap, as the most intuitive constraint on the 
reconstruction is, naturally, that it should render precisely what we take to be relevant 
features of our concept-constituting practices. 
In what follows, I will spell out one such feature, while attempting to provide an 
answer to the second question. 
 
The following seem to me to be plausible constraints on a reconstruction of the 
concept-constituting usage of Universal Quantification that takes the quantifier’s 
introduction and elimination rules as concept-defining80. 
 
The Semantic Contraint: The rules should be understood in such a way as to allow 
for a semantic treatment of the universal quantifier consistent with the basic 
inferentialist assumption that what counts as the correct semantics for a concept 
should be determined by its inferential use. 
 
The Epistemic Constraint (open-endedness): the rules should be understood as 
displaying the fact that our inferential commitments to the canonical consequences 
of the concept are open-ended. 
 
The Anti-Relativist Constraint: The way in which the rules are understood should 
not make the reconstruction, or the very inferential practices that are its subject 
matter, obviously open to relativist threats81.  
                                                
80  The constraints have different statuses. The first constraint is motivated by the general 
assumptions of an inferentialist account of the logical concepts, and ultimately bears on the 
account’s internal coherence. The second has to do with the features of our usages of universal 
quantification that we want the account to render, that is: with the object of the account. The 
third is a methodological constraint on which I will say more in a moment. 
81  The suggestion that we should formulate the ability to counter relativism about the 
logical concepts as a constraint on the account may raise a suspicion of ad-hocness. I have, 
however, a good reason for formulating this constraint. 
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The Semantic Constraint 
 
I take it that the semantic constraint is plausible and basic enough not to need 
much discussion. It can be expressed in different ways, for example in terms of the 
idea that a concept’s inferential usage contributes to determine, but is not determined 
by, the concept’s semantic properties. A way to make this requirement more precise is 
the following.  
On the basis of the assumption that what the logical concepts are constituted by 
their inferential role, and given that a concept-defining rule of inference displays what 
such a role consists in in its most general form (that is: independently of any reference 
to specific interpretations of the concept in a given language), then our understanding 
of the rule must be consistent with the idea that the semantics of its instances is to be 
constrained by the commitments that the rule displays82.  
It is useful, in this framework, to think of a concept-defining rule of inference as 
capturing the assertibility conditions of statements in which the relevant logical 
concept figures as the main logical operator. Concept-defining rules, then, tell us what 
counts as a ground for asserting such a statement, and what is the form of the 
consequences to which we commit ourselves when asserting the premises of the rule.  
                                                                                                                                            
 The reason is this. Recent philosophical discussions [e.g. McGee 2000; Lavine 2006; 
Rayo & Uzquiano 2006] have renewed our attention to the fact that the case of the universal 
quantifier is somewhat special among the logical concepts. This is because standard semantic 
treatments of the concept seem to generate: 
 
• The well-known semantic and mathematical paradoxes; 
 
• A special case of semantic and epistemic indeterminacy for at least a sub-class of 
interpreted usages of the concept. 
 
The concern with relativism, in this framework, arises from the second difficulty above – 
from the recognition, that is, that the threat of relativism appears to affect the concept of 
universal quantification in a way that is more radical, and potentially more interesting, than for 
the other logical concepts. This, I hope, will be clearer from the discussion of the constraint 
itself. 
82  The constraint concerns the relation of determination between (the epistemic features 
of) our inferential commitments and the semantic value of an instance of the concept as this is 
(contextually) determined in an interpreted language. The idea is then that of a consistency 
between what we take the rules to display and the direction of the determination. 
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Because concept-defining rules capture assertibility conditions, they provide us 
with a criterion for assessing the correctness of the semantics that the relevant 
statements (that is: interpreted usages of the concepts that the rules define) receive. 
Simply put, the ascription of truth-conditions (and thus of a truth-value) to such 
statements must be consistent with our grasp of the circumstances in which they count 
as established, and of the circumstances in which their consequences do. To say that a 
concept-defining rule captures the assertibility conditions for a class of statements (i.e. 
the statements in which the concept defined figures as the main logical operator) is to 
say that it displays what the general form of these circumstances is. 
In what follows, talk of a rule ‘determining’ the semantics of a statement, or of an 
interpreted instance of the concept that the rule defines, must thus be understood in 
this sense. 
 
The Epistemic Constraint: Open-Endedness 
 
The implicit idea behind the epistemic constraint is that there should be a match 
between the epistemic properties of our concept-constituting practices on the one 
hand, and what we should take the rules of ∀-introduction and ∀-elimination to 
display. 
The explicit suggestion is that one such epistemic property consists in the open-
endedness of our inferential commitments. Intuitively, when we say that a subject’s 
commitments to inferring X from Y are open-ended, we intend to express the 
independence of such commitments from actual and potential variations in the 
linguistic and semantic circumstances in which her commitments are undertaken. 
For the sake of simplicity, in the exposition that follows we may replace talk of 
concept-constituting commitments with talk of commitments to the concept-defining 
rules of inference – with the proviso that the object of the commitments in question is 
given by the inferences whose form is displayed by the rules, rather than by the rules 
themselves. With this simplification in mind, we can informally express the idea that a 
commitment to a rule of inference is open-ended as the idea of its independence from: 
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• The possible or actual expansion of the language via the introduction of non-
logical vocabulary; 
 
• Any change in the meaning of the non-logical vocabulary of the language; 
 
• The acquisition of new theories, or the fact that existing ones are subject to 
change. 
 
This idea has often been suggested as a way to characterize our general attitude to 
(basic) logical principles [Williamson 2003, 2006: 377; McGee 2006: 187; Lavine 2006: 
113 ff]. In all the relevant accounts, however, the notion of open-endedness deployed 
is intended: 
 
• To be an intuitive notion; 
 
•  To capture the epistemic quality of a subject’s acceptance of basic logical rules, 
rather than of her inferential commitments.  
 
What we need is, then, a clarification of what we want the notion to capture, and a 
more precise rendering the role that it is supposed to play within the theoretical 
framework of the current discussion. We need, in other words, the following two 
things.  
 
1. A clarification of the notion of ‘accepting a rule’. When we say that a subject accepts 
a basic rule of inference we can mean any of the following: 
 
i)   That she believes the rule to be valid (or: understands the rule as a valid rule of 
inference), that is: truth-preserving under any interpretation of the non-logical 
vocabulary; 
 
ii)   That she is generally disposed to infer in a way licensed by the rule; 
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iii)  That she explicitly regards the rule as defining a logical concept, and that, as a 
result of becoming acquainted with the rule, she thereby infers in the way licensed 
by it (i.e. her inferential usage of the concept consists in performing inferences that 
are licensed by the rules, in virtue of the fact that she takes the rules to be concept-
defining); 
 
iv)  That the rule is concept-defining, in the sense that it is the correct 
reconstruction of a subject’s inferential commitments, so that it displays the (form 
of) the subject’s inferential usage of the concept. 
 
In the light of what I take the status of a concept-defining rule to be, in the 
framework of this discussion the natural option is the last one. The idea of a subject’s 
accepting a rule then simply becomes the idea of a match between the commitments 
that she undertakes when using the concept, on the one hand, and the instruction, in 
which the rule consists, to infer in a certain way. Simply put: in this view, accepting a 
rule simply means undertaking, in the relevant circumstances, the inferential 
commitments of which the rule displays the general form.  
This way of rendering the notion has the independent advantage of not requiring 
or presupposing any theoretical beliefs or vocabulary on the part of a subject who 
accepts the rule. Indeed, this seems to match our intuitions about a natural use of the 
expression ‘subject S accepts rule R’: when S infers, says, that a particular dog barks 
from the premise that all dogs do, and her usage of the concept ‘all’ suggests that she 
normally infers to conclusions of the same form from premises of the same form as the 
ones displayed by the rule, we are naturally disposed to attribute acceptance of the rule 
to her irrespective of any other consideration about her skills, beliefs or knowledge.  
 
2) A clarification of the view that our commitments to a rule of inference are open-
ended, that is: a refinement of our grasp of the notion of ‘any expansion of a language’. 
What is it, exactly, that we mean when we say that it should display the fact that our 
commitments will continue to hold in any expansion of the language? 
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The current philosophical debate on this issue, it seems to me, can be framed in terms 
of two main theoretical alternatives and one general strategy that underlies them both. 
The two alternatives consist in saying, respectively: 
 
i)  That the concept of ‘any’ is best rendered in terms of non-quantificational 
generality, and that the concepts denoted by the two expressions ‘any’ and ‘all’ are 
not reducible to each other; 
 
ii)  That the concept denoted by the expression ‘any’ can, with certain provisos, 
ultimately be rendered in terms of the concept denoted by ‘all’; in particular, that 
the semantics for a usage of ‘any’ in the object-language can be given, in a meta-
language, in terms of quantificational generality. 
 
Proponents of both alternatives normally appeal to notions such as the ones of 
schematicity or of systematic ambiguity, and use the notions to establish a distinction, 
between ‘any’ and ‘all’, typically based on the presence or absence of semantic 
constraints on the commitments that we undertake when deploying the concepts 
denoted by the two expressions83. 
Proponents of the second alternative do not normally argue for an explicit 
reduction of one concept to the other; rather, in the attempt to formulate a plausible 
semantics for the concept of ‘any’, they end up committing themselves to the idea that 
the concept should ultimately be interpreted in terms that are very similar to, or 
presuppose, our understanding of the generality expressed by the universal 
quantifier84. It is this commitment that proponents of the first alternative, such as 
[Glanzberg 2000; Lavine 2006] do not share. 
 
                                                
83  Examples include: [Glanzberg 2006], [Lavine 2006], [Williamson 2003, 2006], [McGee 
2006, 2006], [Parsons 2006]. 
84  E.g. [McGee 2000, 2006]. I know of no analysis of the notion of ‘any’ that explicitly 
attempts to reduce it to quantificational generality, in the sense of claiming that what is denoted 
by ‘any’ should be understood as the same concept as the one denoted by the expression ‘for 
all’. As mentioned, the reduction is usually restricted to the meta-language in which the 
schematicity of the rules is interpreted, and is purely semantic in nature.  
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The general strategy that underlies the exposition and defense of these two 
alternatives consists in the following. One starts with the idea that our understanding 
of the two concepts prima facie involves different kinds of commitments. One kind of 
commitment is regarded as being semantically constrained, and the other one is 
regarded as not being so: typically, while our understanding of the concept of 
quantificational generality is taken to be dependent on the notion of a domain on 
which the quantifier ranges, no such notion is involved in our intuitive grasp of the 
concept ‘any’. On the basis of this consideration, proponents of both alternatives then 
tend to agree on the fact that this supposedly intuitive difference should be taken at 
face value, and that the two expressions ‘any’ and ‘all’ pick out distinct concepts. The 
difference between the two alternatives then consists in the options that one still takes 
to be open at this point. Proponents of the first alternative will argue that the standard 
model-theoretic treatment of quantificational generality should not be applied, at any 
level of analysis, to the concept denoted by ‘any’, precisely in virtue of the fact that we 
have two different concepts of generality in play [e.g. Lavine 2006: 112 ff]. Proponents 
of the second approach will instead take the acknowledgement of a distinction 
between the two concepts, and even of the fact that the open-endedness of our 
commitments to a logical rule of inference should be rendered in terms of the notion 
of ‘any’ extension of the language, to be consistent with a model-theoretic treatment of 
the relevant rules [e.g. MgGee 2000: 62, 66-71].  
 
This strategy relies on a basic assumption, one that is hardly ever questioned in 
the context of the debate on schematicity and quantificational generality.  This 
amounts to the idea mentioned in the previous paragraph: that in order to understand 
the concept of universal quantification, we need to somehow associate it with the 
notion of a domain, or more generally of a range specified for the quantifier85. More 
                                                
85  Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, talk of a domain is not to be 
understood necessarily as talk of a set, or of a set-like object; in this respect I am following 
[Cartwright 1994] and [Lavine 2006]. My reason for this proviso is, however, different from 
Cartwright’s – while Cartwright deploys the term as neutral between the standard model 
theoretic treatment of the quantifiers (which gives little alternative to characterizing their range 
in set-theoretic terms) and the option of plural quantification, here I simply want to avoid 
tackling the issue of which of these two semantic options is the most plausible, and focus 
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precisely, the assumption is that the specification of a domain for the quantifier is not 
required merely to determine the truth-conditions of an application of ∀-introduction 
and of ∀-elimination in an interpreted object-language, but even to characterize our 
understanding of the concept itself as defined by the relevant rules of inference. This 
assumption is, for example, explicit in McGee’s account of how we learn first-order 
(unrestricted) quantification. The account relies on the idea that, since the semantic 
value of a logical concept is to be thought of as fixed by the concept-defining rules of 
inference, then – in the case of the universal quantifier – such rules should be 
assigned, as it were, the task of fixing a universe of discourse for the quantifier [McGee 
2006: 191].  
 
 My strategy will consist in adopting, to start with, a neutral attitude about the 
assumption sketched above. Rather than trying to make the idea of open-endedness 
more precise before looking at the options that we have for rendering what ∀-
introduction and ∀-elimination should display, I will look at the implications that the 
presence of the assumption above has on the plausibility of such options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
instead on the more basic problem of whether understanding the very concept of quantification 
requires the specification of any semantics for its instances. 
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Relativism and the Third Constraint86 
 
The relativist threat that I have in mind here can take two forms. One comes 
from what I shall call a Geach-style relativism about the concept of quantification87. 
The problem raised by this kind of relativism is the following.  
Suppose that I ask the general question: in virtue of what does a speaker of a 
language mean what she does when using a certain expression of the language – for 
example, when using the identity predicate, or the expression ‘for all’. The intuitive 
(and general) answer will be: partly in virtue of her intention to do so, partly in virtue 
of the expressive resources of her language, and partly in virtue of the semantics that, 
in her language and in the context of her usage, the expression receives. Intuitively, 
then, if some relevant conditions obtain at each of these three levels, then her attempt 
to mean what she does by using the expression will be successful, in the sense that (a 
tokening of the) expression will pin down the concept that she intends to express 
uniquely and completely – what these conditions amount to will depend on the 
pragmatic, semantic and grammatical account that we choose to give of our 
communication processes. In an inferentialist framework, we can think of at least some 
of the success conditions on a speaker’s ability to determinately realize her intention 
(to express a given concept) as rendered in terms of her objective inferential 
commitments, and the semantic value of her (interpreted) usage of the expression in 
                                                
86  Neither the formulation nor the discussion of this ‘anti-relativist’ constraint should be 
taken as related to the preoccupations, discussed in the first chapter of this Thesis, of an anti-
relativist epistemology of basic logical principles such as Boghossian’s. 
 In particular: 
 
• The thought behind this constraint is that we should be able to support (and express) 
the claim that our inferential commitments, and the logical concepts that we deploy, 
are independent of the language in which they are formulated – this is, of course, a 
distinct problem from Boghossian’s; 
 
•  As already remarked previously in the Thesis, I am skeptical about the possibility that 
an inferentialist account of our logical concepts can serve as a basis for Boghossian’s 
project. 
87  [Geach 1967; 1972; 1980; 1991], where the view, however, specifically concerns the 
concept of Identity. Here I am following [Williamson 2006: 380 ff] in assuming that a parallel 
can be drawn between this kind of relativism about identity and what Williamson (and I) take to 
be the corresponding view about universal quantification. 
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context will be determined by these very commitments, in the sense that we have 
briefly explored in the formulation of the Semantic Constraint. 
What I have labeled as Geach-style relativism threatens the idea that there is a 
fact of the matter as to whether the relevant conditions for the successful usage of a 
concept obtain at the level of the expressive resources of a language. More precisely, 
the claim is that, given that the other conditions obtain, the expressive resources of a 
language L will typically leave it under-determined whether, when we interpret in L 
what a speaker of a different language L* intended to mean by a certain expression 
tokened in L*, the concept denoted by the expression of L* is the same as the concept 
denoted by the homophonic expression of L. 
Suppose, for example, that we define the rules that govern the usage of a 
certain concept C in L by means of formulas α and β of L88. Then the idea is that there 
may be equivalent formulas in L* such that the same sentences containing C are true 
when interpreted in the two languages, and yet (the expression that is supposed to 
denote) C (in the two languages) may not receive the same interpretation in L and L*. 
In particular, (the expression for) C may receive in L* an interpretation that is 
unintended in L. It may be the case that a semantic stipulation in L guarantees that C 
is indeed the concept denoted by the relevant expression in L – for example, if we take 
C to be the concept of Identity, and L is first order logic with identity, then the 
stipulation is that the predicate denoting the Identity relation is to be treated as a 
logical constant – it receives the same interpretation in all models, and this 
interpretation is the standard Identity relation. But how do we know that unintended 
models can be ruled out in L* as well? Not by looking at the semantics of sentences 
containing the expression (supposedly) denoting the concept – for it is possible to 
construe a model relative to which the same sentences come true but the concept is 
interpreted in a non-standard way. Not by looking at the rules – for these may hold in 
L* in virtue of the non-standard interpretation of α and β in L*. The expressive 
resources of L thus leave it underdetermined whether the concept C picked out by the 
                                                
88  If we follow the relativist, the rules will govern not the usage of the concept, but the 
usage of the expression that denotes the concept in L. As I am trying to articulate the reasoning 
behind the relativist’s claim, I don’t want to give in to this claim yet. 
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relevant expression in L is the same concept as the one picked out by a homophonic 
expression in L*. 
 
The concern is, then, the following.  
As [Williamson 2006] shows, it is possible to provide a version of the argument 
above that specifically concerns the universal quantifier.  
When we take the introduction and elimination rules for the universal 
quantifier to define the concept (with the provisos already indicated), we would like 
them to do so in an absolute way. In the reconstructive project that constitutes the 
framework of this discussion, this means that we would like them to uniquely 
characterize one concept (the concept denoted by the expression ‘for all’), and that we 
would like them to do this by displaying the commitments that we undertake when 
using the universal quantifier, independently of the language in which such commitments 
may be expressed89.  
 
Why do we want (what is displayed by) ∀-introduction and ∀-elimination to 
define the concept in an absolute sense? Well, for the intuitive reasons that: 
 
• The ability of the rules to do this is crucial for the generality of our 
reconstruction – if such generality is not achieved, the reconstruction will not 
be a reconstruction of the way in which we use the concept of universal 
quantification, but, rather, merely of the linguistic rules that govern the use of 
the expression ‘for all’ in a given language; 
 
• We have plenty of pragmatic evidence that our communicative practices 
involving the concept of universal quantification are successful across 
languages. We seem to understand each other when making universally 
quantified statements, to draw the same consequences when deploying the 
                                                
89  This is the theoretical counterpart of the open-endedness requirement. But of course 
the relativist threat concerns the theory (i.e. the reconstruction of our concept-constituting 
inferential practices by means of the rules) primarily in virtue of the fact that it concerns the 
practices themselves. 
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concept, and to take such consequences to be determined by what ‘for all’ 
means. In other words, our communicative practices seem to point both to a 
semantic uniformity in the usage of the concept (we generally agree on the 
truth-conditions of statements in which the concept figures) and to an 
epistemic uniformity (since we tend to agree on the direct consequences of a 
usage of the concept, it is plausible to assume that we undertake the same 
commitments in this usage); 
 
• Even our theoretical disputes about how the concept denoted by the expression 
‘for all’ should be defined, intuitively presuppose that we have one concept in 
mind. 
 
Rules of inference, however, are always formulated in a language L – what 
guarantee do we have that they pin down the same concept independently of L’s 
expressive resources? In the context of the present discussion, the concern is that the 
lack of such a guarantee will endanger the ability of the reconstruction to meet the 
Epistemic Constraint – for how can we talk of open-ended commitments to the 
canonical consequences of a concept C (i.e. commitments that will hold for any 
expansion of the language), if there is no fact of the matter as to whether C will remain 
the same concept in such expansions, and, thus, as to whether our commitments will 
be the same in terms of their object90? 
 
The relativist threat can also take another form in the case of universal quantification, 
one that concerns our ability to capture the concept’s intended usage even within a 
given language. The threat is well known, and has been widely discussed in the 
literature on quantification; it amounts to the indeterminacy and inexpressibility 
                                                
90  The relativity advocated by Geach-style relativism is thus relativity of a concept to the 
medium in which it is expressed. The claim in this form of relativism is then the ‘standard’ 
relativist claim, as it were, that since expression of content always requires a linguistic medium, 
we never have a guarantee that content will survive variations in the medium. The relativist 
claim that I am about to discuss, on the other hand, must be carefully distinguished from the 
one just considered, in a way that will be clearer towards the end of the discussion. 
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claims that result from Putnam’s generalization of Skolem’s pessimism about 
quantification over the set-theoretic universe91.  
Let us first see what these claims are, and then discuss them in the light of the project 
with which we are concerned here. 
 
The claims ultimately feed from Skolem’s technical results in set theory, namely 
from the fact that for every structure of a formal language (and thus for every 
interpreted formal language) with an uncountably infinite domain, there is a small 
(countable) infinite sub-structure in which exactly the same sentences are true. Since 
nothing in the axiomatization of set theory prevents it from having a small model in 
which all the ‘large’ infinite sizes are, in fact, small, and that nothing in our set-
theoretic practices allows us to pin down the ‘large’ universe (i.e. the universe of all 
sets) as the intended model for the theory, one is tempted to conclude that it is simply 
indeterminate whether, when quantifying over the set-theoretic universe, we are 
quantifying over the intended model or the ‘small’ unintended one. Indeed, the 
problem is not just that neither the theory nor the practice pin down the distinction 
between quantification over the intended model and quantification over the 
unintended one. The problem is rather than, in virtue of such indeterminacy, it is not 
even clear whether we can as much as form the intention of quantifying over the ‘large’ 
domain: for how will this intention be distinguishable from the intention of 
quantifying over the relevant sub-domain? What is it, about the intention of using the 
quantifier in a certain way (namely: of using it to express a claim about the entire set-
theoretic universe), that allows us to recognize it as that intention? 
Note that the problem doesn’t concern simply the extensional equivalence between 
the set of quantified claims that would have the intended domain as their range and 
the set of quantified claims in which the quantifiers range over the unintended 
domain. It generalizes to the truth-conditions of such claims, as [Lavine 2006: 107-8; 
McGee 2006: 185] have shown92. 
                                                
91  [Skolem 1920; Putnam 1980]. 
92  As it is well known, the problem doesn’t go away if one moves from 1st order set-theory 
to a stronger language. 
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The generalization of Skolem’s construction to our total language, in [Putnam 
1980: 423] results in a countable subset S of our universe of discourse such that if we 
bound all the quantifiers in everything we say to S, the same sentences would come 
true as if we were quantifying over the intended domain – once again, the problem is 
not mere extensional equivalence, but the fact that, as nothing in our practices and 
language and (that is: nothing in the way in which we use and interpret the quantifiers) 
allows us to distinguish between intended and unintended usages, then we seem to 
lack any criterion whatsoever to either determine or express within the language which 
usage is intended.  
 
 The form that this threat takes requires two immediate qualifications.  
The first has to do with its strength: the threat is best understood as a form of 
skepticism proper – skepticism, that is, about the determinacy of a sub-class of our 
quantified claims, and about the expressibility of our intention to use the quantifier in 
a way compatible with that those claims are meant to express.  
The second qualification has to do with its object: the skepticism prima facie 
concerns not the concept of universal quantification itself, but rather the idea that a 
usage of the quantifier can be determinately unrestricted, and that the quantifier can 
be understood as ranging over the entire set-theoretic universe (Skolem’s skepticism) 
or over the domain of absolutely everything (Putnam’s generalization of Skolem’s 
skepticism).  
The latter qualification naturally raises the following question. If our aim is to 
reconstruct what the very concept of universal quantification consists in, rather than to 
take a stand in the debate about the semantic and epistemic possibility of (absolutely) 
unrestricted quantification, why should we be concerned by the threat in the first 
place? 
The answer is that there are, in fact, at least three levels at which this threat may affect 
the project.  
 
 The first is the level of the semantic resources used by the reconstruction; in 
particular, the threat concerns the semantic resources that the reconstruction 
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potentially relies upon in rendering commitments to the concept-defining rules as fully 
general (open-ended) commitments. The specific formulation of the Epistemic 
Constraint with respect to this level is, then, the following: that such resources should 
not make the concept-defining rules (or, more precisely, the commitments that they 
are meant to display) open to an allegation of indeterminacy or inexpressibility. 
 At a second level, the threat concerns the scope of our inferential commitments. 
The problem may be rendered as follows. The assumption that our usage of the 
universal quantifier may be either restricted or unrestricted, without any further 
qualification about the semantic means that we have to characterize an unrestricted 
usage, is an intuitively plausible one. It is also intuitively plausible to regard restricted 
usages as usages that are typically restricted either by the context of utterance of (the 
propositional content of) a statement containing the universal quantifier, or, if one 
wants to avoid a commitment to the idea that context contributes to fix the semantic 
value of what we say, by the specific interpretation that we give to specific instances of 
the concept. If we want the reconstruction to render what the concept of universal 
quantification is, independently of any such specific restriction (if we want it to render 
the concept, as it were, in full generality), then we must admit that there is at least one 
case in which we may achieve an a-contextual understanding of the concept – one 
according to which ‘for all’ is unrestricted. Given this, we have two options for 
rendering the circumstances of such an understanding. If we take contexts (or, 
generally, interpretations) to always restrict our usage of universal quantification, then 
the understanding in question will only be relevant in the circumstances in which a 
subject grasps the concept-defining rules. If, on the other hand, we admit the 
possibility of contextual, or interpreted, usages of the concept in which there is no 
restriction on the concept’s generality, then the unconstrained understanding will also 
be what is at stake in a sub-class of usages of (instances of) the concept.  
 
Given these two levels, then, in the best case scenario the skeptical threat will bear 
(only) on a subject’s understanding of a rule as defining the universal quantifier in a-
contextual terms. 
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At this point, one might of course reply that the best way to avoid confronting the 
skeptical threat for the concept of universal quantification is to drop the idea that a 
usage of the universal quantifier can indeed be unrestricted. In fact, this strategy is the 
obvious alternative to the one just presented – if we deny the possibility of unrestricted 
usages of the concept in the first place, we won’t even need to formulate an anti-
relativist constraint – or at least won’t need to take into account, in its formulation, the 
indeterminacy and inexpressibility objections. 
One problem with this reply is that we have plenty of intuitive evidence that 
suggests that we can use the quantifier unrestrictedly. Indeed, the initial strength that 
the arguments in favor of unrestricted generality appear to have, as [Rayo & Uzquiano 
2006: 3] note, may be taken as an example of such evidence: all the problems that the 
proponent of the absolute generality view encounters have to do with further 
assumptions, made in order to articulate the claim that ‘for all’ can, in some 
circumstances, really mean ‘for all’93.  
If this is the case, then rather than rejecting without a fight our intuitions about 
what we may take the expression ∀ to denote, it is on these further assumptions that 
we should focus. Among these, the one that will play a crucial role in the next two 
sections is the idea that our understanding of universal quantification always requires 
the specification of a domain of discourse on which the quantifier ranges. 
 
Before we move on to this, however, we should briefly pause on a third level at 
which the threat may be understood. At this level, we need to consider carefully what, 
                                                
93  By the expression ‘initial strength’ here I mean to point to the following facts. 
 
• The very occurrence of a substantive debate about absolutely unrestricted 
quantification appears to presuppose that proponents of the two contrasting views (let 
us call them the generality-absolutist and the generality-relativist) understand each other 
when discussing the targets of their arguments – in particular, then, when discussing 
whether absolutely unrestricted quantification is determinate or conceivable; 
 
• To counter her opponent’s view, the generality-relativist seems to have to make use of 
the very concept of absolutely unrestricted quantification, generating a kind of 
pragmatic inconsistency. 
 
For a discussion of these issue, cf [Rayo & Uzquiano 2006] and [Fine 2006]. 
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in Skolem’s construction, the source of the relativity affecting the relevant usages of 
the universal quantifier is.  
The construction tells us that, within a given first-order language, we can’t hope to 
characterize certain concepts in absolute terms – namely, the concept of an 
uncountable set, and, in Putnam’s generalization, the concept of absolutely everything. 
Why not? That is: what exactly is the obstacle to absoluteness? Well, it is the fact 
that, by varying the range of the quantifiers, we end up with an instability in the 
characterization of the relevant concepts. To see this, forget, for the moment, that the 
specification of such a range, in virtue of Skolem’s construction, cannot be 
determinately given, and consider the following.   
In the scenario under discussion, quantification over an uncountably infinite 
domain, or over the domain of absolutely everything, would allow us to characterize 
one (intended) concept of uncountability, or of absolute generality. Quantification over 
a sub-domain of the original collection would, in both cases, result in the 
characterization of a different concept (one that is however indistinguishable from the 
intended one within the given language – hence the paradox). The difference is, 
intuitively, one in the sense that would be received by the statements in which the 
relevant concepts appear. A source of relativity (the range of the quantifiers) that prima 
facie only has to do with Bedeutung would thus affect the Sinn (of the statements in 
which the relevant concepts occur). The indeterminacy and inexpressibility problems 
only arise, if we follow this line of reasoning, when we ask the further question: can 
we, then, stabilize, as it were, sense, by determinately fixing the value of the parameter 
to which sense now appears to be relative? The answer is, of course, that we can’t – 
precisely because we cannot get a determinate grasp, within the language, of what 
distinguishes an uncountable domain from a countable one (in general: what 
distinguishes the intended model from the unintended one). That is: because any 
attempt of specifying this value will reveal that it is indeterminate and inexpressible 
what the value actually is. We have, then, that the source of relativity for the concepts 
that we are trying to define is itself relative: to the resources of a stronger language in 
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which we will be able to characterize the distinction between intended and unintended 
model for the original language94.  
A careful consideration of the construction thus reveals that there are in fact two 
difficulties: one is captured by the label ‘indeterminacy and inexpressibility problem’, 
the other one is more basic, and concerns the very idea that the range of quantification 
is a source of relativity for some of the concepts that we deploy. It is because the 
specification of a range plays such a role that, ultimately, it generates the (relative) 
indeterminacy and inexpressibility of the concepts of everything and of uncountability. 
At this third level, then, the threat directly bears on the methodological 
assumption that the range of quantification is a parameter which we need to fix in 
order to understand what ‘everything’ means – the very idea that we encountered at 
the end of the discussion of the Epistemic Constraint, and on which I shall now focus. 
 
2. RULES, SCHEMAS AND CANONICAL COMMITMENTS 
 
2.1 ∀-Introduction and ∀-Elimination: Three Options 
 
In attempting to characterize what the concept-defining rules for the universal 
quantifier should display, we have three main options. Under the assumption that such 
rules are the standard introduction and elimination rules for the quantifier, these 
options are: 
 
Option 1: The introduction and elimination rules are best understood as expressing 
our general commitments to (the canonical grounds and the canonical consequences 
of) restricted instances of the universal quantifier, that is: instances in which the 
universal quantifier ranges over a restricted domain; 
 
Option 2: The introduction and elimination rules are best understood as expressing 
our general commitments to an interpretation of the universal quantifier in virtue of 
                                                
94  But not, of course, for the stronger language itself. 
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which the quantifier is absolutely unrestricted; namely, the quantifier that appears in the 
statement of the rules should be read as ranging over an absolutely general domain; 
 
Option 3: The introduction and elimination rules are best understood as expressing 
our fully general commitments to the (canonical grounds and canonical consequences 
of) the concept in a way that is independent of any semantic assumption or constraint 
that we may formulate about the concept; in particular, the rules should be given a full 
schematic reading, and should be taken as silent about what the universe of discourse 
over which the quantifier ranges is. 
 
Option 1 
 
According to Option 1, the inferential instruction in which ∀-introduction and ∀-
elimination consist should be read as presupposing the specification of a range for the 
quantifier. The option relies on the general assumption that what the rule should 
display is the logical form of the inferences that we perform (from and to statements in 
which the universal quantifier appears as the main logical operator) in an interpreted 
language.  
Consider for example, ∀-elimination, or the rule of Universal Specification, 
given in a meta-language in which the interpretation of the turnstile assigns to it the 
standard deducibility relation: 
 
a) ∀(x) φ(x) |- φ(c) 
 
The quantifier occurring in a) should always be understood, the idea is, as ranging 
over a domain D, the range of the individual variable x is given by the objects in D, 
and the constant c is the name of an object in D. Making the notation explicit, we can 
then render this reading of the rule as: 
 
b) ∀(x ∈ D) φ(x) |- φ(c∈D) 
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Where the subscript in the conclusion of the rule is meant to capture the semantic 
constraint on the object denoted by the constant c. 
What about the status of D and φ? Under the assumption that the distinction between 
the notion of schematic generality and the notion of quantificational generality is a 
plausible one (an assumption that I shall investigate in the next section) we have two 
options to characterize these.  
We can take them to be schematic letters, subject only to the following 
syntactic constraints: D is a schematic letter for a domain, and φ is a schematic letter 
for formulas95. 
Or we can instead choose to treat them as potentially quantifiable variables 
themselves; if, plausibly, we want the rule to be understood as a fully general 
instruction to infer from given premises to its conclusion, then we will render it as: 
 
c) ∀(D)∀(φ)∀(x ∈ D) φ(x) |- φ(c∈D) 
 
The key idea of this option, in both its formulations, is that a semantic qualification 
should be built into our understanding of the inferential instruction in which the rule 
consists (that is: in our understanding of the quantifier’s inferential role). 
If we take D and φ to be schematic letters, then the semantic qualification only 
concerns the relation between the range of the universal quantifier and the individual 
constant c: the qualification consists in a limitation of our choices for selecting the 
object denoted by c, which has to be a member of the domain over which the 
                                                
95   It is difficult to even individuate a possible notation for the reading of Universal 
Specification as a restricted schema within the framework of the option considered. A possible 
rendering, which does not make use of the symbol for set-theoretic membership, is: 
 
b*) ∀(x) (D(x)→φ(x)) |- D(c) →φ(c) 
 
b*), however, obviously does not render the idea that the restriction is on the domain of ∀. If, 
on the other hand, we choose the formulation: 
 
b**) (D(x)→φ(x)) |- D(c) →φ(c) 
 
we give up the idea that Universal Specification is the elimination rule for ∀. 
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quantifier ranges. Under this interpretation of Universal Specification, the generality 
of the rule itself is meant to be rendered in non-quantificational term: D and φ do not 
take a value among a range of specified objects (domains, formulas), as their 
schematicity implies precisely the absence of such a range. In other words, we 
understand the rule as saying: pick any domain D and any formula φ; then, if φ(x) holds 
for an x in the domain, you may infer φ(c) for an arbitrary (object named by) c. 
If we take D and φ to be quantifiable variables, and thus render our 
understanding of Universal Specification as c) does, then we have an additional 
semantic qualification. This will bear on the generality of the rule: for c) tells us that 
such generality has to be understood itself in quantificational terms. That is: the 
formulation in c) makes it explicit that the deducibility relation between the premises 
and the conclusion of Universal Specification must be regarded as holding for all 
domains and formulas that we may introduce as the values taken by D and φ respectively. 
 
 These two formulations of Option 1 rely, of course, on various different 
assumptions. There are however two very general assumptions that they share, purely 
in virtue of the fact that, in the attempt to articulate what it is that we understand when 
we understand Universal Specification, both allow a semantic constraint to qualify the 
concept of universal quantification. The two assumptions are the following: 
 
• The specification of a domain for the universal quantifier is required not only 
for instances of its inferential usage in an interpreted language, and for our 
grasp of such interpreted instances, but for a characterization of the concept itself 
and on our grasp of it; 
 
• Our understanding of the inferential commitments displayed by a rule is not a 
purely syntactic matter: it has to do also with what counts as the correct 
semantics for the concept that the rule is taken to define.  
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Option 2 
 
I take Option 2, or at least one of its possible formulations, to be the one defended by 
[McGee 2000: 62, 66-8, 69-71; 2006: 194-199] and [Williamson 2003: 439-40, 444]. The 
main idea behind the option is the following.  
 
The key-feature of our intuitive understanding of a rule of inference is the fact 
that our commitments to it are open-ended, in the intuitive sense already discussed. 
What we take the rule to display should thus be, primarily, this open-endedness. 
Intuitively, a way to render the open-endedness of our inferential commitments is by 
giving a reading of the rule that allows us to make sense of the fact that, when asserting 
the premise of the rule, or when presented with such an assertion, we become 
committed to (upholding as correct an assertion of) its conclusion independently of 
any considerations about the language in which the content of the assertion is 
expressed or the specific interpretation assigned, in such a language, to instances of 
the rule in question96. The best way to render this fact is by understanding the rules to 
have a schematic generality [e.g. McGee 2006: 66].    
 
What the schematicity of the concept-defining rules for the universal quantifier 
consists in according to this option is, in turn, rendered by means of what we may 
regard as a vacuous semantic restriction of the range of the quantifier97. 
Consider, once again, Universal Specification. We can express the generality of 
our commitments to the rule by rendering the instruction in which it consists in the 
following terms. 
 
Given any object a, let c be a constant symbol referring to it, and then infer: 
                                                
96  I am here interpreting McGee’s talk of “upholding” a rule in terms of specifically 
assertoric commitments because I believe that this best renders what he has in mind. The 
relation between assertoric commitments and the inferential commitments undertaken by 
speakers in non-assertoric usages of the quantifier, is an issue that I discuss in Chapter IV. 
97  In the sense of [Rayo 2003]. 
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d) ∀(x) P(x) |- P(c) 
 
where P is a schematic letter for predicates98. What about c?  
Well, the intuitive idea of an open-ended commitment to the conclusion of the 
rule seems to require that the choice of c be itself semantically unconstrained: we want 
to say that whether the rule holds or not does not depend on any particular domain of 
discourse to which the object denoted by c may belong and on which the universal 
quantifier may range.  
On the other hand, the assumption that the quantifier is to be understood as 
always ranging over a domain of discourse (an assumption shared both by McGee and 
by Williamson), prevents us from simply taking c to be a schematic letter: in virtue of 
the domain assumption, we first need, as it were, a guarantee that what c may denote is 
in the range of the quantifier.  
 This guarantee, according to the option under consideration, is to be found in 
the fact that we can choose P to be both such that it applies to all and only the things 
in the domain of the quantifier, so that the object a denoted by c is bound to be in the 
domain, and that it still allows us to say that the choice of c is fully general (‘open-
ended’). The predicate in question is defined, following [Quine 1969: 94] as: 
 
e) P(x) =def (∃y) y=x 
 
That is, informally, as ‘being identical to something’. 
 
From the assumption that the extension of P is absolutely unrestricted (an assumption 
to which I shall come back in a moment), so that the unrestricted claim: 
 
f) ∀(x) (∃y) y=x 
 
                                                
98  Alternatively, in this framework one can express Universal Specification as ∀(x) ϕ (x) |- ϕ 
(c) where ϕ is a schematic letter for formulae. 
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holds, we can then derive 
 
g) (∃y) y=c 
 
And express the open-ended character of the choice of c in d) by giving the proof 
schematically, with conclusion [Lavine 2006: 125]: 
 
h) (∃y) y=s 
 
where s is a full schematic letter. The statement above is what McGee refers to as the 
Everything Axiom. The axiom tells us how to understand the commitments that we 
undertake when upholding Universal Specification, under the assumption that the 
concept defined by the rule, i.e. the universal quantifier appearing in the statement of 
its premise, ranges over a domain of discourse. The conjunction between this 
assumption and the fact that the Everything Axiom supposedly allows us to render the 
open-endedness of our inferential commitments is taken by McGee to imply that the 
natural interpretation of the concept-defining rules for the Universal Quantifier is one 
according to which the domain is absolutely unrestricted99. 
 
Let us take stock, then, of what Option 2 amounts to. The option assumes that 
our understanding of universal quantification requires that we provide a semantic 
qualification for the concept – consisting in the specification of the domain over which 
the quantifier ranges100.  The option also takes (an intuitive notion of) open-endedness 
to be the key-feature of our inferential commitments. The appeal to a semantically 
                                                
99  [Williamson 2006: 377] seems to imply that this is our ‘default’ understanding of the 
universal quantifier. Defending the plausibility (indeed, the naturalness) of absolutely 
unrestricted quantification is of course the main item in McGee’s and Williamson’s agenda in 
the works discussed. It should be clear, at this point, that my agenda is different: I want to 
explore which understanding of the rules best renders the intuitive features of the 
commitments that we undertake when using the universal quantifier. It is in virtue of the fact 
that one of these features is open-endedness that the problem of absolutely unrestricted 
quantification comes into the picture. 
100  McGee would probably not agree with this rendering of the option, as he takes the 
rules to fix the semantic value of the quantifier. But the assumption is made, when he takes the 
quantifier in a concept-defining rule to range over the domain of everything. 
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vacuous predicate such as the one that figures in the formulation and in the proof of 
the Everything Axiom supposedly allows to express such open-endedness while 
maintaining the semantic assumption about the range of the quantifier. The upshot of 
the option is that the rules that define the concept of universal quantification should 
be understood as defining absolutely unrestricted quantification. That is: at the level of 
the definition of its inferential role, the concept of universal quantification is that of  
absolutely unrestricted quantification. 
 
Note that the relation between the Everything Axiom and the concept-defining 
rules of inference (in particular, Universal Specification) is rendered in model-
theoretic terms, in the sense that the relation holds given certain model-theoretic 
assumptions about how both the axiom and the rules should be understood. 
 
In [McGee: 2000: 62, 66-8], the idea is that to satisfy the Everything Axiom is to 
satisfy all its potential instances. The claim that the axiom holds is thus the claim that 
all its instances are satisfied (in virtue how P has been chosen). Because all the 
instances of the axiom are satisfied, then we have a guarantee that everything P’s. But 
this guarantee is, in turn, a guarantee that the universal quantifier in the rule of 
Universal Specification always ranges on the domain in which what is named by c is 
chosen – that is: it is a guarantee that however we choose what is named by c, φ(c) will 
hold. It is in virtue of this guarantee that we may replace c with the schematic letter s in 
the formulation of Universal Specification: the semantic constraint on the relation 
between the domain over which the universal quantifier ranges and the choice of c is 
already built, as it were, into the definition of the domain as absolutely unrestricted.  
The schematicity of the elimination rule for the universal quantifier is thus, ultimately, 
rendered in terms of quantificational generality, interpreted model-theoretically, via 
quantification over all instances of the Everything Axiom101.  
                                                
101  In fact, [MgGee 2006: 195-6] explicitly gives a model-theoretic formulation of the open-
endedness of an inference rule, in the context of a discussion of the introduction and 
elimination rules for the binary connective ‘&’. More generally, the idea that what a concept-
defining rule of inference displays should be rendered by appeal to a semantic interpretation of 
the rules, seems to be a consequence of McGee’s view that rules of inference (rather than their 
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Option 3)102 
 
Option 3 amounts to the idea that the open-endedness of our commitments to 
the concept-defining rules for the universal quantifier should be rendered in terms of 
a fully schematic reading of a rule [Lavine 2006]. 
The crucial difference between this option and Option 2 is in the way in which 
full schematicity is understood – in particular, in the way in which the notion of a 
schematic letter relates to the notion of a quantifiable variable. 
In fact, [Lavine 2006] presents the option in direct contrast to McGee’s rendering of 
open-endedness in terms of quantificational generality, and of the latter in standard 
model-theoretic terms.  The key-thought behind the option then consists in providing 
an account of open-endedness that is not model-theoretic in nature. 
Lavine’s formulation of full schematicity, however, is given mainly in negative 
terms, that is: by saying what schematic letters are not.  
Take, for example, the rule of ex falso quodlibet: 
 
i) φ, ∼ φ(x) |- ψ 
 
Where the turnstile is given the standard interpretation of a derivability relation. In i), 
φ and ψ, according to Lavine, should not be understood as a quantifiable variable 
[Lavine 2006: 115-6]; we don’t want to take what the rule displays to be something of 
the form: 
 
j) ∀(φ) ∀(ψ) (φ, ∼ φ(x) |- ψ) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
instances in an interpreted language) are things to which we can ascribe semantic properties, 
such as truth-preservation and satisfaction-preservation. Cf, for example, [McGee 2006: 194], in 
the context of a discussion of the notion of logical consequence for atomic and complex 
formulas. 
102  In this section, I will present Option 3 as it is defended by [Lavine 2006].When turning 
to a discussion of the option’s plausibility, I shall complicate the discussion by proposing my 
own variant. 
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Not only because j) is obviously not well-formed – what do the quantifiers range on? – 
but because of the two following considerations, concerning respectively 1) our 
intuitive understanding of a rule of inference and 2) the distinction between the 
general form of an inference and the semantics of its instances. 
 
1) Our intuitive understanding of the instruction that i) expresses is independent of 
any consideration about how we specify the range of the quantifiers appearing in the 
statement of the rule: we understand the rule as concerning what we may infer given 
the particular formulas φ and  ∼ φ, not as regarding a relation between all formulas that 
we may take as the values of the variable φ and all formulas that we may take as the 
value of the variable ψ. That is, our intuitive understanding of i) is only dependent 
upon is the specification of a purely syntactic constraint on φ and ψ: namely, the 
constraint that we should take instances of φ and ψ to be formulas.  
 
The idea is then that a rule of inference consists in an instruction to infer in a 
certain way independently of any semantic constraint that we may place on the 
instances of the schematic letters appearing in its statement. Because, Lavine claims, 
quantificational generality always involves providing such constraints, then the 
generality of the rule (the extent of our commitments to it) cannot be rendered by any 
use of the quantifier.  
 
According to Lavine, the appeal to our intuitive understanding of i) can be 
strengthened both by a general argument about the assertibility conditions of a schema 
and by a specific argument about the learnability of inference rules for the universal 
quantifier that are given in non-schematic form. 
The first argument amounts to noting that the assertibility conditions of (claims 
about) i) and j), and – in general - of (claims about) schematic and quantificational 
formulations of the generality of an inference rule, are prima facie different. Why?  
Well, the view is, in virtue of the fact that the assertibility conditions of a 
quantified claim will presumably also depend on how the domain of the quantifiers is 
specified: the claim concerns objects in the domain, and will be assertible if and only if 
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what is being claimed of those objects holds – where the interpretation that we choose 
to give of ‘holds’, here, will depend on the specific terms in which the assertibility 
conditions of a claim are formulated. But in the case of a schema, such conditions 
seem to have nothing to do with our understanding of what belongs to a domain. 
When we assert a schema, we make a claim about particular instances of the letters 
occurring in it, ‘without any need to have a notion in advance of all the suitable 
instances’ [Lavine 2006: 121]. 
The second argument goes as follows. Suppose we try to express the generality 
of (our commitment to) Universal Specification in quantificational terms. The analogue 
for the universal quantifier of the ill-formed rule of inference j) would then be: 
 
k) ∀(φ)∀(x)∀(τ) ((∀x)φ(x) |- φ(τ))103 
 
Where all the variables appearing in the statement of the rule are quantifiable 
variables. 
One of the problems of this formulation of Universal Specification is the 
epistemic circularity to which the formalism gives rise. Such circularity concerns both 
the verification conditions of Universal Specification (what we would have to prove in 
order to show that the inference from its premises to its conclusion is valid) and what 
would be required of an epistemic subject to understand the rule when she is first 
introduced to it. To show that Universal Specification is valid, we would have to apply 
Universal Specification to it in order to, as it were, knock off each quantifier in the first 
sequence. For a subject to understand Universal Specification as the instruction spelt 
out in k), she would already have to grasp (how to apply) Universal Specification in 
order to grasp the formalism by which the rule is normally introduced. Simply put: a 
                                                
103  This is what Lavine calls ‘Universal Universal Specification’ [Lavine 2006: 116]. In fact, 
if the idea is that the generality of the rule is to be rendered in quantificational terms, and 
quantification always requires the specification of a domain, to achieve the desired generality 
without making any assumption about the fact that the domain for the quantifiers appearing in 
the rule is absolutely unrestricted, we would have to state the rule as: 
 
(k*)  ∀(D)(∀(φ)∀(x)∀(τ) ((∀x)φ(x) |- φ(τ))) 
 
Where D is a first-order variable that ranges over domains of discourse. 
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rule that is meant to be concept-defining for the universal quantifier requires, both for 
the proof of its validity and for the definition of what counts as grasping it, using the 
universal quantifier in the way specified by the rule itself104. 
 
2) While Option 2) takes the concept-defining rules for the universal quantifier to 
specify a domain for the quantifier, according to Option 3) no such semantic task 
should be assigned to the rules. Independently of whether one shares the idea that 
quantificational generality and schematic generality are distinct kinds of generality, 
there are independent motivations for this choice. In particular, one can reason in the 
following terms.  
We need to distinguish between the status of a general rule of inference and 
the status of its instances. The general rule is typically formulated in a meta-language, 
as an instruction that tells us how to use the logical concepts that appear in the object-
language relative to which the rule is given. Usage in the object-language will be usage 
in an interpreted language: it is at this level that (instances of) the rules will be 
described as having certain semantic properties (for example, the property of being 
truth-preserving). Such properties concern fully interpreted formulas, rather than 
schematic formulations of inference rules [Williamson 2006: 382-3; Rayo & Williamson 
2003].  
Now, one may agree that part of what it is to interpret a universally quantified 
statement is to specify a domain of discourse for the quantifiers. However, on the basis 
of the considerations just sketched, one may also legitimately ask the question of why 
such specification should have anything to do either with the rule of inference itself or 
with our general understanding of what it instructs us to do. Fixing the semantic 
values of the quantifier is the primary task of a semantic theory of quantificational 
generality; the object of such theory will be the language in which we carry out the 
inferences that count as legitimate instances of the concept-defining rules that are 
                                                
104  A related point is in [Quine 1936: 351-2]. McGee’s understanding of Universal 
Specification also incurs in an indirect form of the same kind of circularity, as – in the 
framework of his model-theoretic account of (the semantics for) concept-defining rules - he 
employs unrestricted second order quantification over classes of structures [McGee 2000: 60, 
70].  
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given in the meta-language. But then, as [Lavine 2006: 117] puts it, “it is not the rules 
that do the fixing” (of the semantic values of quantified statements), it is rather “the 
meta-linguistic specification of the permissible instances of the open ended rules” that 
does105. 
 
3. SCHEMAS AND QUANTIFICATIONAL GENERALITY 
 
How do the three options presented in Section 2 fare with respect to the constraints 
sketched in Section 1? Recall that these were: 
 
• The Semantic Constraint: the concept-defining rules should be understood in a 
way consistent with the idea that what counts as the correct semantics for the 
universal quantifier is determined by our inferential usage of the concept; 
 
• The Epistemic Constraint, formulated in terms of the open-endedness of our 
commitments: the way in which we understand the concept-defining rules 
should render the open-endedness of the commitments that we undertake 
when using the concept of universal quantification; 
 
                                                
105  Italics mine. I will come back to this consideration in the discussion of the problems of 
Option 2 (sub-section 3.2).  
There is, however, an immediate objection that we should take care of. A rule that is 
taken to be concept-defining is, in the project that I am defending, a means for reconstructing 
the general conditions on the correct usage of a logical concept. That is: we look at how 
competent speakers use the concept, and try to reconstruct what the general form of the 
inferential commitments that they undertake in this usage is. If usage of a logical concept 
always takes place in an interpreted language, then intuitively we would like the reconstruction 
of the general form of such usage to take this into account. In other words, in virtue of the fact 
that we would like it to render the general features that can be ascribed to our concept-
constituting inferences, it seems natural to require that they also render (the general form of) 
whichever semantic qualifications characterize usage in an interpreted language. 
My simple reply to this objection is that it is based on a wrong assumption. The 
assumption is that all the aspects of a speaker’s usage of the concept can or should be captured 
in inferential terms. This is neither a claim to which the inferentialist would want to subscribe, 
nor a generally plausible one (what about, for example, the aspects of usage in context that bear 
on the speakers’ psychological or intentional states?). 
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• The Anti-relativist and Anti-skeptical Constraint: the reconstruction of our 
concept-constituting inferential practices should not be obviously open to the 
threat of relativism or skepticism. 
 
3.1 On the plausibility of Option 1 
 
Recall that Option 1 has two formulations. According to one formulation, the way in 
which we should understand Universal Specification is best rendered as the 
semantically constrained instruction: 
 
m) ∀(D)∀(φ)∀(x ∈ D) φ(x) |- φ(c∈D) 
 
Where all the variables are quantifiable variables. According to the other formulation, 
the correct understanding of the rule takes φ and, crucially, D, to be schematic letters, 
so that we should understand the rule as consisting in the instruction: 
 
n) ∀(x) (D(x)→φ(x)) |- D(c) →φ(c) 
 
Here I will only consider the former, and thus focus on m). The reason is the 
following.  
There are two main motivations for giving a schematic reading of the rule.  
The first is given by the idea that the schematic generality thus achieved is 
distinct from the quantificational generality expressed, for example, by m). That is: the 
idea, which we have already encountered, that the open-endedness of the 
commitments that we undertake when inferring with the universal quantifier shouldn’t 
be rendered in terms of the quantifier itself. But this is the very idea on which Option 
3 is also based. The difference between the way in which the schematic formulation of 
Option 1 and Option 3 render Universal Specification is in the status of the letter c – 
Option 3 replaces it with a schematic letter s. From the point of view of a proponent of 
Option 3, then, n) will simply be the result of replacing the schematic letter that 
should figure in the conclusion of the rule with one of its instances – it will be, that is, 
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the result of a partial interpretation of the schematic rule. On the other hand, from the 
point of view of a proponent of (the schematic version of) Option 1, taking the 
occurrence of the constant c in the rule to be the result of a partial interpretation is 
consistent with the general motivation for spelling out the reading of the letter for 
domains in Universal Specification as schematic: once the open-endedness of (our 
commitments to) the rule is rendered in this way, the choice of c becomes itself open-
ended. 
The problem that arises at this point is, then, whether or not the appeal to the 
notion of schematicity succeeds in capturing the intuitive idea of open-endedness, 
while respecting the three constraints formulated in sub-section 1.2. This issue will be 
tackled in the discussion of Option 3. 
 
The second motivation that one could have for choosing n) over m) is given by 
the consideration that quantification over all domains, unless suitably constrained or 
further qualified, is arguably the source of the set-theoretic paradoxes. The strategy 
that I have followed in this chapter consists in setting aside the issue of paradox, and 
focusing instead on the project of spelling out concept-defining rules of inference for 
the universal quantifier. I shall therefore stick to the chosen strategy, and not discuss 
this further motivation for a schematic reading of Universal Specification. 
 
The formulation of Universal Specification in (m) is subject to the following 
problems. 
 
The formulation does not allow us to respect the anti-relativist and anti-skeptical 
constraint. 
 
There are two ways in which the first-order quantifier in (m) ranging on 
domains can be interpreted. The first is by appeal to the standard model-theoretic 
definition of the range of a quantifier, according to which a domain is essentially a set 
[Cartwright 1994]. If we follow this route, then the range of the first quantifier in (m) is 
the set of all sets. The second consists in interpreting the quantifier plurally, so that 
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quantification over all domains needn’t require the specification of a set, or a ‘set-like’ 
object, as the range of the quantifier. To understand the quantifier, we need not 
undertake any commitment to the existence (or definability) of a set over which it 
ranges; the possible values of the quantified variables are plural entities [Boolos 1984; 
1985]. 
 
Consider the first alternative. According to it, quantification over all domains is 
quantification over the set of all sets. But quantification over the set of all sets is 
directly subject to Skolem’s skepticism. That is, it is open to the two-fold objection, 
which is an upshot of Skolem’s construction, of epistemic indeterminacy and of 
linguistic inexpressibility. If quantification over the domain of all sets is employed in 
the very formulation of the concept’s inferential role, the objections endanger, as it 
were, the determinacy and the expressibility of the concept itself.  
In particular, the indeterminacy objection endangers the rationale of the very 
option under consideration. For what is the point of providing concept-defining rules, 
which should serve as a suitable reconstruction of the commitments that we undertake 
in our inferential practices, if there is no determinate fact of the matter as to which 
concept we deploy in such practices? 
The inexpressibility objection endangers our ability to understand the linguistic 
formulation of the rule as a formulation intended to express its generality. For if such 
generality is to be understood in terms of quantification over all sets, and the latter is 
inexpressible as such, then no linguistic formulation of the rule will enable to express 
the open-endedness of our inferential commitments. 
 
The option is subject to Geach-style relativism. For a consequence of Skolem’s 
skepticism is that, within any given language, no matter how we strengthen and refine 
it, there is no fact of the matter as to whether a usage of the quantifiers is 
determinately unrestricted or not. As noted above, if this is the case, and if one 
employs unrestricted quantification over sets to express the concept-defining rule for 
the very concept of universal quantification, then the determinacy and the 
expressibility of the concept are endangered, even within a given language. But if what 
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the concept consists in is indeterminate and inexpressible within any given language, 
there will be no fact of the matter as to whether it will be the same concept across 
different languages.  
 
Now consider the second alternative, according to which the quantifier has to 
be interpreted plurally. The alternative is not subject to Skolem’s skepticism: for there 
is simply no set quantification over which would then be extensionally and 
intensionally equivalent to quantification over one of its countable sub-sets.  
Is it subject to Geach-style relativism? It seems that it is, for consider the 
following. 
Recall that a key-claim of Geach-style relativism is that we cannot hope to define a 
concept in absolute terms because we have no guarantee that speakers of different 
languages mean the same when using an expression that is supposed to denote the 
concept in question.  
Now, as [Williamson 2006: 381 ff] argues, a way in which one may start 
confronting this claim is by considering the concept-defining rules for a logical 
concept, and showing that they provide a unique characterization, in the sense that the 
parallel formulation of the rules with respect to two different languages will define two 
logically equivalent concepts106. 
Let us briefly rehearse Williamson’s argument for the unique characterization of the 
universal quantifier, before moving on to consider the implications of the argument for 
the plural reading of the quantifiers in (m). 
 
The argument’s structure is relatively simple. Take the universal quantifier ∀ as 
defined, relative to a language L, by the standard ∀-introduction and ∀-elimination 
rules (recall the formulation of the rules given in Section 1). Consider also the 
quantifier ∀*, defined with respect to a language L* by the parallel ∀*-introduction 
and ∀*-elimination rules. Assume that the logical vocabulary of the two languages 
                                                
106  It is not obvious that logical equivalence yields sameness of commitments – for the 
latter seems to require an additional epistemic component (i.e. our grasp of the logical 
equivalence). It is, however, certainly a necessary condition – hence the qualification at the 
beginning of the sentence. 
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coincides. Assume also that the logical commitments of a speaker S of language L and 
of a speaker S* of language L* are open-ended: that is, both speakers take the relevant 
concept-defining rules to hold independently of any expansion of the respective 
language (in Williamson’s terms, both speakers have a disposition to accept instances 
of the rules in any extension of the language). Now merge the two languages L and L*, 
to obtain a new language L+L* whose primitive vocabulary is the union of the primitive 
vocabularies of the two original languages. Given the pooled commitments of the two 
speakers, it is possible to show that ∀ and ∀* are logically equivalent. For consider a 
formula A of L+L* in which the constant letter t does not occur and no variable except 
v occurs free (once again, recall the role of t and v in the formulation of ∀-introduction 
and ∀-elimination in Section 1). Reasoning in L+L*, from ∀vA one can deduce A(t/v) 
by ∀-elimination. As t does not occur in the premise and no occurrence of v becomes 
bound in A as a result of replacing all occurrences of t in A(t/v) by v, from ∀vA on can 
deduce ∀*vA by ∀*-introduction. Conversely, one may deduce A(t/v) from ∀*vA by ∀*-
Elimination, and then ∀vA by ∀-Introduction. The two quantifiers are thus inter-
derivable in L+L*; but since the assumption about the open-endedness of speakers’ 
commitments was made with respect to the original languages as well, then the result 
concerns the concept denoted by ∀ and ∀* in the original contexts as well107. 
 
So here we have an argument for logical equivalence that we may use as the 
beginning of an answer to a Geach-style relativist.  A crucial assumption of the 
argument is that the commitments of S and S* are open-ended in the sense that they 
can be pooled in the original languages as well. That is, the fact that the two languages in 
which these commitments are expressed are merged together does not add anything to 
the scope or quality of the original commitments, in virtue of how the latter have been 
defined. It seems that this is the intuitive definition of an open-ended commitment 
                                                
107  The argument can be read as a variant, explicitly meant to tackle Geach-style relativism, 
of the one that can be derived directly from Harris’ theorem on the inter-derivability of two 
quantifiers which are both defined via Universal Specification and Universal Generalization. 
[Harris 1982]. For a discussion of the implications of the theorem with respect to the idea that 
the domain of the universal quantifier defined by such rules should be seen as unrestricted by 
default, cf [McGee 2006: 190-92]. 
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that we want: for it captures the idea that a logical commitment is epistemically 
independent of expansions of the language. 
Rendering our logical commitments in this way presupposes that, when we 
consider them as being undertaken in the context of an interpreted language such as 
L, we don’t view them as commitments involving a concept that is semantically 
restricted relative to L. In particular, in the case of an instance of the rules for ∀ in L, it 
presupposes that we don’t view ∀ as restricted to the domain D given for L. As 
Williamson notes, if this were the case then the commitments that a speaker 
undertakes in L would be potentially falsified as we move to L*. For consider ∀-
elimination. Even if the rule has no counter-instance in L, it has ‘the potential of a 
counter-instance with a new term t that denotes something outside D in a language 
such as L+L*’ [Williamson 2006: 381]108.  
 
A key-feature of the open-endedness of the commitments that we undertake 
when deploying ∀ is, then, that they are not restricted by the domain on which the 
universal quantifier ranges in an interpreted language. They are commitments to 
purely structural rules of inference, in the sense that they can be characterized not by 
appeal to the fact that they hold for each domain specified by the quantifier (for this 
isn’t enough to counter the possibility of their falsification if the language for which 
the domain is specified is expanded), but by appeal to the fact that they hold, as it 
were, beyond the (restricted) form that they take in each language / relative to each 
domain that one may consider109.  
                                                
108  Witnessing this, the obvious objection to the argument just presented is that, since the 
rules of ∀-introduction and ∀-elimination are standard rules given in standard 1st order logic, 
and since standard model theory for 1st order logic interprets the quantifiers as restricted to the 
domain of a model, then the rules will be valid if ∀ is interpreted over the domain D specified 
by the model-theory for L, but not for the distinct domain D* specified by the model-theory for 
L*. The idea is that the objection does not go through precisely in virtue of the fact that the 
commitments undertaken in L and L* have been defined in terms which are incompatible with 
the specification of a restriction on the range of the quantifiers. 
109  However, when one considers that Williamson’s argument relies on the assumption 
that the domain is unrestricted, one cannot help but feel, as it were, slightly cheated upon. The 
feeling doesn’t originate from the fact that the assumption is controversial per se, nor from the 
commitments that it generates with respect to the debate about absolute generality (Williamson 
offers independent arguments in favor of the latter idea, and –after all- if the model-theoretic 
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 Now consider an interpretation of (m) in terms of plural quantification – where 
the first quantifier ranges not over the domain of all domains, but over domains 
understood as plural entities. What the rule thus understood says is: in each domain of 
quantification that we may specify, we are committed to an instance of Universal 
Specification – that is, to an instance in which ∀ is restricted to the domain in 
question. How does this rendering of quantification over all domains allow us, as it 
were, to pool up our commitments? The simple answer is that it doesn’t: for thus 
formulated the rule does not capture the fact that in each language (using Williamson’s 
terminology: in each original context) in which we commit ourselves to (a set of 
instances of) the rule in question we will also commit ourselves to its instances in any 
expansion of the original context. In virtue of this, an argument such as the one 
discussed above against Geach-style relativism is blocked.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
rendering of absolute generality did allow us to counter Geach-style relativism, this would itself 
be a good argument for the rendering). Rather, the problem is with the relation between the 
main claim of Geach-style relativism and the response that the assumption allows us to give. 
For the claim ultimately boils down to the idea that the expressive resources of a language L do 
not allow us to pin down the semantic values of a concept in an absolute way – and 
Williamson’s response relies on the assumption that at least one of the factors that determine 
the semantics of the universal quantifier (the specification of a domain) is in fact fixed in 
absolute terms in the first place. 
 An alternative to Williamson’s response consists in biting the bullet shot by the 
relativist and arguing as follows. If a concept’s inferential role stays the same in any expansion 
of the language (where we may leave it open, for the moment, how ‘any’ is to be interpreted), 
then this is enough to determine the absoluteness of the concept – for there is nothing more to 
a concept than the way we infer with it. Whether or not we can count on independent means to 
pin down its interpretation absolutely doesn’t really matter – once the concept’s inferential role 
is uniquely characterized, we may simply assume – for the purpose of the reconstruction of the 
concept- that all its relevant semantic properties also are. 
The problem with this alternative is, however, that it also raises the suspicion of begging the 
question: for which semantic properties are relevant for the correct understanding of a concept 
should be established by the inferentialist independently of the claim that the definition of its 
inferential role captures all the relevant semantic properties.  
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The formulation does not allow us to render the open-endedness of our commitments, unless we 
make either controversial or implausible logical assumptions. 
 
That the plural reading of the quantifiers in (m) does not allow us to render the 
open-endedness of our commitments has just been argued for. What follows will thus 
only concern the standard reading of (m), where the quantifier ranges over the domain 
of all sets.  
 
In the case of a concept-defining rule, what we want the notion of open-
endedness to capture is not only the resistance, as it were, of our understanding and 
acceptance of the logical rules to variations in the language, but also, and primarily, 
the resistance of our (logical) concepts, and of the conditions given which we may be 
ascribed possession of a concept, to such variations. That is: we want the concept of 
universal quantification not to change if the language changes. Even if the class of its 
interpreted usages expands, what the concept consists in and what it is to possess it 
should stay the same110.  
Now, because we may think of a possible expansion of a language as taking 
place via the introduction of new vocabulary to name new objects introduced in the 
domain of discourse, then it is natural to think of a domain as expanding as the 
language does. The point is, then, that variations in the domain should not affect our 
understanding of the concept of universal quantification: for, in virtue of the 
considerations above, we will still want to say that ‘all’ means ‘all’, no matter what we 
take the domain to be.  
                                                
110  As already noted, rejecting this idea commits us to the view that a concept is a merely 
linguistic entity, and to the further conclusion that a theory of concepts should not be taken to 
be anything more than a theory of how expressions are used in a given language.  
Such a view would: 
 
• Be inconsistent with a key-assumption of the project that I am endorsing, namely: the 
(Fregean) assumption that concepts are ingredients of thought, rather than of language; 
 
• Partly defeat the purpose of the anti-relativist constraint (with respect to what I have 
labeled Geach-style relativism). 
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The formulation of Universal Specification as (m), under the standard reading 
of the quantifiers, ‘guarantees’ that this is the case only by quantifying over all 
domains. For in the absence of the generality thus achieved, the concept defined by 
the rule will vary when the domain varies: simply in virtue of the fact that the 
formulation of the rule embeds, as a semantic constraint on the relation between the 
range of the quantified variable x and range for our choice of c, an explicit reference to 
the domain of quantification. If the domain changes, what we commit ourselves to 
when inferring to the conclusion of the rule may well change, because what counts as 
an admissible choice of c does. Quantification over all domains is thus meant to play 
the following role: it renders the idea that the concept defined by the rule is resistant 
to changes in the commitments that we undertake when we accept specific instances of 
the rules, by attempting to rule out the possibility of a variation in our commitments at 
the level of the very definition of the concept. The rule then says: for all actual and 
possible changes in the specific commitments that we undertake when using the 
concept in an interpreted language, the general form of our commitments is such and 
such.  
But quantification over the domain of all domains gives us the guarantee of a 
resistance of the concept to linguistic change only at a high price: if we accept (m) as a 
legitimate formulation of the open-endedness of our commitments, we find ourselves 
facing the following two alternatives.  
Either we commit ourselves to the claim that the domain of all domains exists 
and is accessible to us (that is: we have the linguistic and semantic means for 
specifying it and talking about its properties), or we commit ourselves to the claim that, 
even if such domain is not accessible (even if we can’t talk about its properties) it 
should still play a role in the reconstruction of the concept of universal quantification 
by means of concept-defining rules.  
The first alternative is, to say the least, controversial – one who endorses it will 
expose the very concept of universal quantification to the threat of semantic paradox 
and to the indeterminacy objection. The second alternative is implausible, for the 
following reason. Even if taking (m) to be a concept-defining rule does not commit us 
to any claim about how an epistemic subject learns the concept of quantification 
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(indeed, this is the difference between a theory of concepts that aims at reconstructing 
inferential practices and a theory of concepts that aims at explaining how we learn the 
concepts that we deploy in our inferential practices), the rule should display what it is 
that we understand when we grasp the concept’s inferential role. Indeed the rule is to 
be seen as a means for reconstructing what this grasp consists in – talk of 
commitments to the rule (more precisely, to the canonical consequences and grounds 
of the concept as they are displayed by the rule) is talk of the manifested aspects of 
such a grasp. But if this is the case, why should we render the way in which we 
understand the concept of universal quantification by appeal to a notion (that of a 
domain of all domains) that may very well be out of our epistemic reach? 
 
The formulation does not allow us to respect the Semantic Constraint 
 
Remember what the constraint was: what we take the concept-defining rules to 
display must be consistent with the general inferentialist claim that what counts as the 
correct semantics for a logical concept is determined by its inferential usage. In the 
framework of a theory of the logical concepts based on the notion of an inferential 
commitment, how the rules are understood should thus be consistent with the claim 
that what counts as the correct semantics for a logical concept should be determined 
by (the relevant subset of) our inferential commitments – in the sense of ‘determined’ 
clarified in sub-section 1.2. In particular, what counts as the correct rendering of the 
contribution that the concept of universal quantification makes to the truth-conditions 
of statements in which it figures should be determined by the assertibility conditions 
captured by the concept-defining rules for the universal quantifier.  
Now, a natural way for the commitment-based inferentialist project to 
characterize the assertibility conditions of a universally quantified statement is this: 
such a statement will be assertible if and only if the speaker’s commitments to the 
canonical grounds and to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier are 
fulfilled.   For example, I can assert that all humans are mortal if and only if my 
commitment to the fact that a particular human is mortal is fulfilled, and if this follows 
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from the fact an arbitrary human being, no matter how we choose him, is indeed 
mortal.  
When I make the assertion above, my commitments have a restricted scope: I 
am not committed to the fact that Gods are mortal, but only to the fact that human 
beings are – this scope restriction is precisely what (m) intends to capture by the 
semantic constraint on the constant c.  
In (m), such constraint is rendered as a domain restriction. Therefore, 
according to this understanding of Universal Specification, the scope of my 
commitments when using the universal quantifier in an interpreted language is to be 
rendered in model-theoretic terms: what I am committing myself to is constrained by 
the way in which the model theory formulates the truth conditions of my statement. 
But a model-theoretic rendering the way in which, in interpreted usages of the 
concept, our commitments are often limited (to semantically restricted instances of the 
general rule) contradicts the idea that the truth-conditional interpretation of our 
statements should itself be constrained by our inferential commitments, in the sense 
that it is in virtue of the fact that we undertake such commitments that we take 
statements in which the concept figures as the main logical operator to receive the 
truth conditions (and thus the truth value) that they receive. Simply put: in an 
inferentialist framework, we don’t want to say that, for the concept of universal 
quantification, my inferential commitments are limited by the specification of a 
domain – rather, we will want to say that it is in virtue of the restricted form that my 
commitments take, in the context of particular usages of the concept of universal 
quantification, that, with respect to those usages, we can think of the range of the 
quantifier as restricted. 
 
3.2 On the Plausibility of Option 2 
 
Recall that Option 2 consists in rendering the concept-defining rules for the 
universal quantifier as schematic rules, and in arguing that the default-interpretation 
of the range of the quantifier in Universal Specification is the one according to which 
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they range over the domain of absolutely everything. So, for example, Universal 
Specification can be stated as: 
 
(o) ∀(x) ϕ(x) |- ϕ (s) 
 
Where both ϕ and s are schematic letters. In particular, recall that ϕ can be P(x), for P 
defined as: 
 
(p) P=def (∃y)y=x 
 
Given this definition of P, then one can show that the following instance of Universal 
Specification is valid: 
 
(q) ∀(x) (∃y)y=x |- (∃y)y=c 
 
and the proof of (q) can be given schematically, with a schematic formulation of the 
Everything Axiom (r) as conclusion: 
 
(r) (∃y)y=s 
 
As previously discussed, the Everything Axiom is meant to guarantee that, in the 
formulation of Universal Specification, we can indeed give a schematic reading of the 
conclusion – that is: it is meant to guarantee that for any constant c, the object denoted 
by c will be in the universe of the universal quantifier.  
In [McGee 2000: 62, 66-8, 69-71] and [Williamson 2003: 439-40, 444] the idea 
seems to be that the Axiom is able to play this role because what its proof shows is that 
the domain of quantification includes absolutely everything. The reasoning is the 
following. We can show that if the premise of Universal Specification as formulated in 
(q) is satisfied, then so is the conclusion (the Everything Axiom). To satisfy the Axiom 
is to satisfy all its potential instances (i.e., to satisfy it for all possible assignments to c). 
Therefore each object that can be denoted by c is one that will satisfy the axiom. But 
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then the domain of discourse of (q) must be absolutely unrestricted: it must include all 
possible objects. Therefore the universal quantifier in Universal Specification ranges 
over the domain of absolutely everything. 
 
If we take Universal Specification to be a concept-defining rule, then what the 
argument above supposedly shows is that the very concept of universal quantification, 
rather than simply a sub-class of the inferential usages that we make of the concept, is 
to understood in terms of absolute generality, and that the latter is in turn to be 
understood in terms of a quantifier’s range being the domain of absolutely everything. 
As already noted, this is a controversial idea, in virtue of the fact that it is exposed to a 
number of epistemological, semantic and ontological objections [cf Rayo & Uzquiano 
2006]. Because it is a controversial idea, it is wise to build it, as it were, into the very 
definition of a logical concept only if one has very strong arguments to support it. 
Is the argument from the satisfiability of the Everything Axiom to the 
conclusion that the universal quantifier in Universal Specification ranges over the 
domain of everything a very strong one? In fact, it is not.  
As [Lavine 2006: 127-8] notes, the argument employs quantification over all 
potential instances of the axiom to make sense of the idea of satisfying them all. But 
then the scheme obtained as (r) cannot be used to show that the quantifier in (o) 
ranges over the domain of everything, as it presupposes that this is the case: the 
presupposition is laid down as the idea that ‘each’ object (with no domain restriction) can 
be taken to satisfy the Everything Axiom. 
 
Option 2 is open to the relativist threat 
 
[McGee 2000: 59; 2006: 186-7] offers an argument, based on the notion of 
learnability, which is meant to counter the indeterminacy threat raised by Skolem’s 
construction. The aim of McGee’s argument is to show that we have, in fact, a way to 
distinguish quantification over the domain of everything E from quantification over a 
countable subset S of this domain. In particular, McGee claims that while 
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quantification over S is not learnable, quantification over E is. The argument has two 
parts, which may be reconstructed as follows. 
 
Part 1: S-quantification is not learnable:  
 
To quantify over S, we would have to be able to distinguish the Ss from the non-Ss. Either the 
rule of universal specification would have to be restricted in such a way so that we could only 
infer ϕ(τ) from (∀x)ϕ(x) in the special case in which τ denotes a member of S or the grammatical 
rules would have to include a special provision that forbade closed terms that designated non-
Ss. In either case, it would be necessary to distinguish between the Ss and the non-Ss before 
we could learn and employ the rules. [McGee 2000: 59] 
 
Although the reasoning in the argument above is not entirely clear, I believe that it can 
be rendered as consisting in the following steps. 
 
i) Suppose we could learn how to quantify over the Ss. This would require that we 
learn how to restrict the domain of quantification to all and only the Ss.  
 
ii) How would we do this? Well, in virtue of how S is constructed, we can’t learn how 
to specify such restriction by appeal to the semantics for ∀. We would need, instead, to 
appeal to the concept-defining rules for ∀111. We would, that is, have to stipulate that 
the domain over which the quantifier in the rules ranges is restricted. 
 
iii) For example, we could take Universal Specification to be valid only when the 
quantifier ranges over the Ss, or we could stipulate outright that the only domain 
admissible when interpreting the rule is the domain of the Ss. 
 
iv) In either case, the rules would have to be modified, to reflect a distinction between 
the Ss and the non-Ss. 
 
                                                
111  [McGee 2006: 187] appears to offer an alternative to the view that we could only learn S-
quantification by appeal to the rules. Here he makes use of the idea that we could introduce a 
predicate P that is true of all and only the Ss. In the framework of his discussion, however, this 
seems to be simply another way to say that in order to learn S-quantification we need to view 
the domain S as restricted.  
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v) So we would have to learn how to make this distinction before we can properly 
understand the concept-defining rules for the quantifier. 
 
vi) The relevant concept-defining rules are the means via which we learn how to use 
the universal quantifier. 
 
vii) An aspect of the usage of the universal quantifier consists in the specification of its 
range. 
 
viii) So, if we embedded, as it were, a restriction of the quantifier’s range (to the Ss) in 
the concept-defining rule, we would need to grasp an aspect of the usage of the 
quantifier before we could properly understand the rules via which we are meant to 
grasp this usage. 
 
ix) Therefore, the assumption that S-quantification is learnable leads to the 
implausible conclusion that we learn an aspect of the use of the quantifier (the 
specification of its range) before we learn how to use the quantifier.  
 
Part 2: E-quantification is, instead, learnable: 
 
There isn’t a comparable problem for learning unrestricted quantification, because there aren’t 
any things outside [the domain over which the quantifier ranges]. [McGee 2006: 187] 
 
Once again, although it is not clear exactly what McGee is pointing at here, we can try 
and summarize the view as: 
 
x) To learn quantification over E, we don’t need to learn anything about domain 
restrictions. 
 
xi) Therefore, we wouldn’t need to modify the concept-constituting rules in any way, 
and we face no circularity in accounting for how we learn to use the concept. 
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The first part of the argument can, then, be understood as containing the following 
claims: 
 
1st Claim: to quantify over S we would have to be able to distinguish the Ss from 
the non-Ss.  
 
2nd Claim: we can in principle do this by embedding the domain restriction in (our 
understanding of) the concept-defining rules for the quantifier, in fact, that this is 
our only option. 
 
3rd Claim: learning how to restrict the domain over which a universal quantifier 
ranges is part of learning how to use the concept of universal quantification. 
 
4rd Claim: we learn how to use the concept of universal quantification by learning 
the concept-defining rules of inference. 
 
While the claim in the second part of the argument is: 
 
5th Claim: in order to quantify over the domain of everything we do not need to be 
able to specify the domain in any way, simply in virtue of the fact that the domain 
is unrestricted. 
 
A variety of arguments can be presented against the plausibility of each of these 
claims. Here I will limit the discussion to the points below. 
 
Against the 2nd Claim: Modifying the rules of inference for the universal quantifier in 
the way suggested will not allow us to distinguish between the Ss and the non-Ss. As 
Lavine notes, in Skolem’s construction S is carefully chosen so that the inference from 
(∀x)ϕ(x) to ϕ(τ) is valid for every interpretation of the original language. In other words: 
restricting either the conditions under which Universal Specification is valid or the 
admissible interpretations of the rule won’t help, whichever restriction one chooses to 
167 
go for, because the domain S is construed after an interpretation of the language has 
been fixed – this is precisely what makes S an unintended model, with respect to the 
intended interpretation. 
Furthermore, the claim generates an internal inconsistency in McGee’s account. 
According to [McGee 2006:194], concept-defining rules have to be understood as 
displaying a concept’s purely inferential role. That is: they have to be understood as 
structural rules, in the sense of ‘structural’ given in [Koslow 1992]. 
But under this assumption, the idea that the rule should display a domain 
restriction is implausible. For how is Universal Specification meant to display the 
purely inferential role of the concept of universal quantification if it embeds a reference 
to a semantic restriction (i.e. to a restriction that is typically provided via an 
interpretation of the fragment of the language in which the quantifier occurs)? I will 
come back to this point in the discussion of how Option 2 fares with respect to the 
Semantic Constraint. 
 
Against the 4th Claim: the claim that we learn the concept of universal quantification 
by learning the relevant concept-defining rules does not necessarily follow from the 
fact that such rules are taken to be concept-defining, and thus must be argued for on 
independent grounds. 
To see why it does not follow, consider what our options are for rendering the 
relation between the basic rules of inference for the universal quantifier on the one 
hand, and our usages of the quantifier on the other. We can: 
 
• Take the rules to be tools in a reconstruction of existing inferential practices; or 
 
•  Take them to be a norm for the use of the concept.  
 
In the first case, the most natural option for rendering how an epistemic subject learns 
a logical concept is by appeal to participation in the very inferential practice that the 
rule is intended, in this project, to display the general form of. In the second case, 
there seems to be nothing that prevents us from understanding the rule as simply a 
168 
criterion for evaluating an inferential practice (for determining whether a subject’s 
inferences involving the universal quantifier are correct), rather than as the means by 
which the subject learns the concept in the first place. 
 In neither case the fact that the rules are concept-defining necessitates the 
thought that it is by being presented with them that a subject learns to use the 
concept. 
 
Against the 5th Claim: what Putnam’s generalization of Skolem’s construction shows 
is precisely that, while we cannot hope to give a determinate specification of the 
domain of everything, this independent characterization of the intended model for 
absolutely unrestricted quantification is just what we would need in order to be able to 
distinguish quantification over E from quantification over S.  In other words: the 
upshot of Skolem’s construction is that we need to distinguish the Ss from the non-Ss 
not just to be able to quantify over S, but, crucially, to be able to determinately 
quantify over E. That this is not the case is what the argument must show, rather than 
simply claim112.  
 
Because some of the claims made by the argument are questionable, and in particular 
because the 2nd claim appears to be false, then the argument fails to show that 
quantification over an absolutely unrestricted domain is learnable. 
 
Option 2 does not allow us to render the open-endedness of our commitments unless some 
controversial logical assumptions are made 
 
The reasons for this are substantially the same as the ones given in the parallel 
discussion for Option 1, with the obvious difference that while in the case of Option 1 
                                                
112  In fact, McGee presents another argument for this view, to the conclusion that 
quantification over E allows us to render the open-endedness of our commitments to the 
concept-defining rules of inference. However, the obvious response to this claim is that the 
very fact that the assumption that E is the relevant domain for ∀- introduction and ∀- 
elimination makes the concept defined by these rules open to the threat of indeterminacy, 
shows that the open-endedness of our commitments is probably best rendered in a different 
way – one that does not presuppose E. 
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they applied to quantification over the domain of all sets, here they apply to 
quantification over the domain of everything. Recall that those reasons were epistemic 
in nature: they had to do with the controversial accessibility to an epistemic subject of 
the domain of all sets (here: the domain of everything), and with the idea that if we 
allow the generality achieved by means of an appeal to either of these domains to play 
a role in the definition of the very concept of universal quantification, then we expose 
the concept to the threat of epistemic indeterminacy in virtue of the upshot of 
Skolem’s construction. 
Could one argue that the latter is not really a threat for the inferentialist? After 
all, one might say, the whole point of characterizing the logical concepts purely in 
terms of their inferential role is precisely that neither the semantic nor epistemic 
indeterminacy of the sort highlighted in the Skolem construction really matter in the 
determination of what a concept consists in. For the latter is naturally defined in terms 
of structural rules, and all that matters for pinning down a concept as, as it were, the 
intended one, is the fact that the rules provide a unique characterization – a basic 
requirement introduced by [Belnap 1962]. In other words, it is tempting to argue that 
for an inferentialist it simply doesn’t matter, relative to the project of defining the 
logical concepts, whether, when using a quantifier in an interpreted language, we end 
up quantifying over a non-intended domain: for talk of intended and unintended 
models has (or should have) nothing to do with our ability to render our purely 
inferential commitments by means of the relevant rules. It has, instead, to do with our 
ability to supply an interpretation for the quantifiers that correctly reflects our intention 
of viewing its application as semantically restricted or unrestricted.  
I find myself in partial agreement with this claim, in the following sense. I agree 
that for an inferentialist about the logical concepts, for whom the concept-defining 
rules should be understood as purely structural, the indeterminacy problem per se 
should not matter – it should not affect the way in which we understand and 
reconstruct a concept in terms of its inferential role. However, if we allow the 
formulation of what our inferential commitments consist in to be open to the 
indeterminacy threat, then, obviously, the latter does become a problem. But this is, it 
seems, exactly what is going on in Option 2. For the generality of our commitment to (the 
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inferential pattern displayed by) the rules is rendered in terms of E, and quantification 
over E is subject to indeterminacy113.  
 
Option 2 does not respect the Semantic Constraint 
 
[McGee 2000: 66-71] assimilates each sentence of a language to the class of 
structures in which it is true, and [McGee 2006] gives analogous model-theoretic 
counterparts for formulas. The schematic rendering of a rule such as Universal 
Specification thus amounts to this: that the inference displayed by the rule is said to 
hold for ‘any (isomorphism-closed) class of structures whatsoever’. In turn, because 
the generality of ‘any’ in itself interpreted by appeal to quantification over all classes of 
structures, the idea of ‘any class of structure whatsoever’ commits McGee to a model-
theoretic reading of schematicity.  
Although the semantics provided for the object-language relative to which the 
rules are defined is, as McGee says, rule-based [McGee 2006: 196; and 194-195 for an 
application of this idea to the semantics for conjunction], ‘observance of the rules 
establishes the same domain for the object language as for the meta-language’.  
 
Rather than tackling the details of McGee’s construction, here I wish to make 
the following two general points about his model-theoretic approach to open-
endedness. 
 
i) It is true that prima facie the account does not commit McGee to a rejection of the 
claim, which in fact he explicitly endorses and develops, that what counts as the 
correct semantics for a logical concept is determined by its inferential role. For his 
                                                
113  Recall the last part of our discussion of Skolem’s construction, at the end of sub-
section 1.2. The thought considered there was that it is by fixing a range for the quantifier that 
we get a characterization of the concept denoted by ∀. It is this very thought that may be 
understood as being both: 
 
• Incompatible with a structuralist reading of the concept-defining rules; 
 
• The original source of the indeterminacy problem. 
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model-theoretic account concerns the semantics for the rules of inference, given in a 
meta-language; whatever happens, as it were, at this level, should be kept distinct from 
the specification of a (rule-based) semantics for the object-language. In particular, the 
idea that the semantics for the meta-language is to be formulated model-theoretically 
does not per se have any direct consequence for the way in which the semantics in the 
object-language is to be understood. 
 However, in McGee’s account the claim that observance of the rules establishes 
the same domain for the object-language and for the meta-language is not an innocent 
one. That is: it may be semantically innocent (it is simply a result of using the notion of 
a model given in [Tarski 1983], which presupposes a fixed domain of discourse), but it 
is no epistemically so114. In particular, it is the very idea that observance of the rules for 
the universal quantifier establishes a domain for them that is not epistemically 
innocent. For, as the discussion of option 1 also indicated, then our inferential 
commitments are taken to be further qualified by the introduction of a semantic 
constraint – where ‘further’ here means: in addition to their purely inferential 
characterization. 
 In McGee’s account, what Universal Specification says is not simply ‘infer in 
such and such a way’, but: ‘infer in such and such a way given what the domain for the 
quantifiers is’. When I understand the rule, I don’t understand the commitment that it 
displays simply as a commitment to the conclusion that ϕ(s) for a schematic letter s. In 
virtue of the model-theoretic rendering of s, I understand this commitment to be one 
to ϕ(s) given that the domain of the quantifier in the premise of the rule is absolutely 
unrestricted. If the rule is to display our inferential commitments in their most general 
form, then this ‘most general form’ embeds a model-theoretic qualification. 
 The problem can be rendered via the following reasoning.  
When we are presented with a concept-defining rule of inference, there are three 
levels at which we may read it. The first is purely syntactic: at this level, the rule is 
                                                
114  In view of the well-known difficulties encountered by Tarski’s definition of a model 
with respect to the notions of logical truth and logical consequence, a further qualification is 
required here: ‘semantically innocent’ is to be understood only with reference to McGee’s 
project – it is not intended in any way to be an evaluation of Tarski’s construction taken outside 
the context of the current discussion. 
172 
simply an uninterpreted string of symbols. The second is the level of the inferential 
role that it defines: at this level, we are told, for example, that the symbol for the 
turnstile represents a relation of deducibility, that ϕ is a symbol for a schematic letter, 
etc. The third is the level of the semantics that is determined by the rule – given the 
relation between the premises and the conclusions, the truth-conditions of instances 
of the rules are to be understood in a way that is determined by this relation. Now, it 
may very well be that, at this third level, a convenient way to provide a semantics for 
(thus interpreted) instances of the rule will partly consist in the specification of a 
domain of discourse – a domain that will typically be restricted. But the upshot of 
McGee’s account of open-endedness is that a domain-based semantics is also to be 
provided if we are to achieve, as it were, a second-level understanding of the rule. It is 
this idea that, it seems to me, does not allow the view to fully respect the semantic 
constraint: the idea, in other words, that the rules of inference should be taken to fix a 
(default) semantic value, given in model-theoretic terms, for the concepts that they 
define, and in particular that a default semantic value for the concept of universal 
quantification is a domain. For it seems that there is a confusion of levels here: if our 
concepts are to be defined purely in terms of their inferential role, then the rules 
should not fix any semantic value for the concepts themselves – rather, in the light of 
out initial discussion of the semantic constraint, they should suitably constrain a (level 
3) semantics for the interpreted instances of the concepts.  
 
ii) Furthermore, the conjunction of the claims that the rules fix a default semantic 
value for the universal quantifier and that this default value is the domain of absolutely 
everything generates the following problem for McGee. The default-value of the 
universal quantifier (the way in which we understand the concept independently of 
specific interpretations of its instances) is an absolutely unrestricted domain. However, 
as already noted, when performing inferences in an interpreted language, we usually 
intend the domain of quantification to be restricted – in the case of formal languages, 
we normally use the quantifier to express to make claims about natural numbers, reals, 
groups, etc., rather than to make absolutely general claims. This observation seems 
even more plausible when we consider usages of the universal quantifier in natural 
173 
languages – here we hardly ever speak of absolutely everything there is [Glanzberg 
2006]. 
 There is of course no inconsistency between these two facts per se: the 
generality of the domain in the rule is meant to capture precisely the independence of 
our understanding of the quantifier’s inferential role from any semantic restrictions 
that one may see as limiting the scope of our commitments in an interpreted language. 
However, if we take the rules to also be the means by which we learn universal 
quantification, as McGee does, then we will have to account for this fact: that the 
commitments that we learn to undertake (when we learn universal quantification via 
the relevant rules) are different, in scope, from the commitments that we actually 
undertake when we use the concept in normal circumstances.  
The point is not that this gap between what we learn and what our usage consists in 
cannot in principle be filled: it is, rather, that McGee’s views about what the rules for 
the universal quantifier display makes it harder to motivate the plausibility of an 
account of the concept’s learnability based on inferential usage. 
 
3.3 On the plausibility of Option 3 
 
Recall that according to Option 3, the rules of inference are fully schematic: it is by 
appeal to full schemas that we should render the open-endedness of our inferential 
commitments. As we have seen, the crucial idea in [Lavine 2006] is that whichever 
account we choose to give of schematicity, this should not be model-theoretic in 
nature. 
Lavine’s further claim is that a non-model theoretic treatment of schematicity 
requires that we distinguish between schematic generality and quantificational 
generality – in his view, a commitment to the latter distinction appears to be implicated 
by the rejection, when dealing with schematic generality, of the semantic tools 
provided by model-theory. Although this is not presented as a separate claim by Lavine, 
and in fact his discussion of the problems encountered by a model-theoretic rendering 
of the generality of the rules of inference tends to conflate the two claims, the 
174 
discussion in this sub-section will show that it is important to keep the two claims 
separate. 
 
 So, in Lavine’s formulation of Option 3, the suggestion is that we should: 
 
• Render the open-endedness of our commitments (the idea that ‘what counts as 
an acceptable substitution instance [of a non-quantifiable variable or a letter in 
a formula] (…) automatically expands as the language expands’ [Lavine 2006: 
117] in terms of schematicity, so that, for example, a rule such as ex falso 
quodlibet will have the following presentation: 
 
(s) ϕ, ~ϕ  |- ψ 
 
in which ϕ and ψ are semantically unconstrained schematic letters; 
 
• Render the concept of universal quantification in terms of interpreted 
generality, by making explicit the idea that the universal quantifier always 
ranges over a domain of discourse; so, for example, Universal Specification 
becomes the restricted schema: 
 
(t) ∀D (x) ϕ(x) |- (D(s) → ϕ (s))115 
 
where the quantifier ranges over the domain D, x is a quantifiable variable 
belonging to D, ϕ is a schematic letter for formulae, D is a schematic letter for 
domains and s is a schematic letter for individual terms. The informal reading 
of (t) is: from ‘from the fact that an arbitrary formula ϕ holds of all the members 
of an arbitrary domain of quantification you may infer that it holds for (what is 
named by) an arbitrary substitution instance of s, provided that what is named 
by such instance belongs to (what is named by) the substitution instance chosen 
                                                
115  This is not Lavine’s own formulation, but the result of my interpretation of what he has 
in mind in the specific case of Universal Specification.  
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for D, and where the substitution instances of s are singular terms’. Note that in 
Lavine’s view D can never be the domain of absolutely everything – his 
assumption, that I won’t discuss here, is that we have good reasons not to think 
that such a domain exists and is accessible to us. What is important is that the 
appeal to the domain of everything is prima facie not needed: the schematic 
formulation of the rule is supposed to do, as it were, all the work in rendering 
the generality of the commitments it displays. 
 
Lavine’s proposal, however, is confronted by various difficulties. 
 
Option 3, as developed by Lavine, does not allow us to fully counter the relativist threat 
 
Since in Universal Specification there is no assumption made about the range 
of the quantifier as an absolutely unrestricted domain (i.e. since the generality of our 
commitments is rendered via the schematic letters in (t)), then the formulation of the 
rule in (t) is not subject to Skolem’s skepticism [Lavine 2006: 134-5].  
Is it subject to Geach-style relativism? Prima facie it isn’t. The generality of 
speakers’ commitments, which in Williamson’s argument was rendered by appeal to 
the domain of everything as the default-domain for the quantifier, is now rendered in 
terms of the notion of an ‘arbitrary’ domain for the quantifier, and of arbitrary 
formulas and singular terms. Intuitively, there will be no counter-instance to our 
commitments as the language expands, as ‘arbitrary’ is meant to capture precisely this 
independence from the possible expansions of a speaker’s current language. In the 
current language a speaker’s commitments will already be ‘pooled up’ in the sense in 
which Williamson uses the expression: except that here what allows us to view them as 
‘pooled in the original context’ is not an assumption about the domain of the 
quantifiers, but an assumption about the generality captured by the expression 
‘arbitrary’. 
 However, we now encounter a problem. For consider the following.  
When we say that, in (t), ϕ is to be read as ‘any formula’, and similarly D is to be read 
as ‘any domain that we choose to provide for the quantifier’, we could mean two 
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different things116. Consider ϕ: ‘any’, here, may be taken to mean ‘any formula in the 
current language’ or ‘any formula, for any expansion of the language’.  
If we adopt the first reading of ‘any’, then obviously we won’t achieve the 
generality required by the idea that our commitments are open-ended.  
If we adopt the second reading of ‘any’, then it seems that we encounter a 
circularity in the rendering of the notion of ‘any formula’. For the notion was intended 
to capture the independence of our commitments from what happens to our current 
language: whether it stays the same or it is expanded, this shouldn’t matter for how we 
understand and endorse Universal Specification. So the intuitive rendering of ‘any’ in 
‘any formula’ relied on the (supposedly distinct) notion gestured at by the idea that our 
commitments are independent from what happens to our language. But now we are 
rendering this notion (of an independence from the language) in terms of ‘any’ itself. 
The problem is, of course, not that the occurrence of ‘any’ in the informal rendering of 
the notion of L-independence cannot be paraphrased away (in fact, it can); the 
problem is rather that, under a key-assumption, there appear no other options but 
taking what is denoted by this occurrence to be the same concept as the one via which the 
generality of the rule is displayed117. The assumption is that schematic generality is 
irreducible to quantificational generality; if, as Lavine does, we endorse this, then we 
can’t say that ‘any formula’ means ‘any formula, in the current language and in all its 
possible expansions’ – that is, we cannot provide a semantics for the latter expression 
that treats ‘all’ as standard model-theory interprets the universal quantifier. 
It seems, then, that Lavine’s formulation of Option 3 is only able to counter Geach-
style relativism if we accept a circularity in the informal rendering of the notion of 
‘any’. Note that the circularity at play here has an epistemic nature – it concerns our 
grasp of the notion of ‘any’. 
                                                
116  I am using ‘any’ and ‘arbitrary’ as synonyms, here and in the rest of this sub-section. 
117  Here is a way of rendering the problem. Suppose I ask, with reference to Lavine’s 
characterization of US: what does ‘any formula’ mean? Lavine tells me that it means that, no 
matter how I choose to expand the language, if φ is a formula of the Language, then from the 
fact that it holds of all the members…etc. (see the characterization presented earlier). But then I 
ask: what does ‘no matter how I choose to expand the language’ mean? The natural reply, here, 
is: that for any expansion of the language that you may conceive… 
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In fact, this appears to be an aspect of a much more general problem: if we 
accept the anti-model theoretic constraint on ‘any’, and the idea that the generality 
that it expresses is irreducible to (the way in which) quantificational generality (is 
normally understood), then we seem to lack obvious alternatives for giving a precise 
definition of the notion. How does ‘any’ manage to capture instances that go beyond the 
current language? More precisely, how to we manage to grasp it as capturing this kind of 
generality? When I say ‘for any formula φ’, what is it, in the semantics and in the 
inferential role of ‘any’, that allows me to choose, in principle, (names for) formulas 
that are not yet in the language?  
Note that if the problem with the model-theoretic account of universal 
quantification is, as we have seen, that the semantics is taken to do too much work - to 
constrain, that is, the epistemic commitments that we undertake when using the 
concept -, here we lack an account of both the semantics and the epistemology of the 
proposed notion of generality. In other words, we are left with the suspicion, on which 
I will say more in a moment, that we simply don’t have a clear definition of ‘any’. 
 
Option 3 does not allow us to respect the Semantic Constraint118 
 
The reasons are substantially the same as for option 1 and option 2. The 
assumption that the generality defined by the ∀-rules is quantification over a specified 
domain of discourse is ultimately inconsistent with the idea that the semantics of 
interpreted instances of the quantifier should be thought of as determined by our 
purely inferential commitments. Because this claim has already been explored, I will not 
say anything more about it in the context of the current discussion. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
118  The order of the presentation here is different from the two previous sub-section; this 
choice was made to simplify the exposition, as the rest of the discussion naturally follows from 
what I am about to say concerning open-endedness. 
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Does Option 3 allow us to render the open-endedness of our inferential commitments? 
 
The simple answer is that it is not clear, and that this is because of the upshot 
of our discussion of the anti-relativist constraint. We seem to lack a precise grasp of 
the notion of ‘any’, and we don’t know, so to speak, where to look for the sense that 
the expression might take (we don’t have, for example, rules of inference for ‘any’ to 
play the role that ∀-introduction and ∀-elimination play for the universal quantifier).  
Lavine’s key idea appears to be that our usage of the expression gestures at a 
lack of semantic constraints –when we use it, we don’t have in mind a range for the 
generality that it is intended to capture. As [McGee 2000: 66] puts it for the case of 
reductio ad absurdum, ‘We don’t accept reductio ad absurdum because we have surveyed 
the forms of expression found in English and found that its expressive power is 
circumscribed in such a way as to validate the rule’. 
A usage of the expression seems to allow us to undertake a general commitment 
(for example: consider any formula, and the inference displayed by Universal 
Specification will still hold) by selecting a specific instance of the claim to which we are 
committing ourselves (the idea gestured at by the expression: the inference will hold 
for an arbitrary formula ϕ). But what the epistemic mechanisms are via which we are 
able to undertake such a commitment (that is: what it is that we grasp when we commit 
ourselves thus) remains mysterious. 
 
3.4 A proposal 
 
If this is the intuitive idea behind the notion of schematicity, then I would like 
to make a proposal that, on the one hand, accepts Lavine’s view about the possibility 
(and desirability) of a semantically unconstrained account of generality, but that, on the 
other, rejects his claim that such an account is irreducible to quantificational generality. 
Here the distinction between Lavine’s claim about standard model theory and his 
claim about quantificational generality becomes important. For the core of my 
proposal consists in the following two contentions:  
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• That we have good reasons for rejecting the standard model-theoretic 
treatment of generality (in terms of the specification of a domain to which such 
generality is semantically restricted) if our aim is to define what the very concept 
of universal quantification consists in – that is: model theory should have no 
say when the analysis of the concept concerns its inferential role; 
 
• That, given the first contention, we should take quantificational generality not to 
be distinct from schematic generality, provided that by ‘quantificational generality’ 
we intend to refer to what the concept of universal quantification consists in at 
the level of its non-interpreted inferential role (more precisely: at the level of 
the definition of this role as unconstrained by any model-theoretic assumption). 
 
Simply put, then, the proposal accepts Lavine’s skepticism about model-theoretic 
treatments of full generality, but rejects the consequences that he draws from this 
skepticism to his suggested rendering of the concept of quantificational generality. 
 
So, what good reasons are there for taking the quantifier in Universal 
Specification to be semantically unconstrained? Semantically unconstrained here 
means: the rules do not provide, or fix, or presuppose any reference to, a domain of 
quantification. 
Well, recall the discussion of why the semantic and the anti-relativist 
constraints pose a problem for Options 1 and 2. The upshot of that discussion seems 
to provide us with the reasons that we want, since the fact that the quantifier in the 
concept-defining rules was understood to be semantically constrained (as ranging over 
a domain) in those two options had the following counterintuitive consequences: 
 
• The relation of determination between the scope of our inferential 
commitments and the semantics for (instances of our use of) the logical 
concepts was inverted – the commitments themselves ended up being further 
qualified by means of model-theoretic notions; 
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• In virtue of this, the plausible idea that a rule of inference should be given a 
purely structural characterization is defeated; 
 
• The price paid by rendering the required generality of our inferential 
commitments by means of an appeal to the domain of everything as the range 
of the quantifier in the ∀-rules was very high; in particular, it consisted in: 
 
i) Having to rely on an epistemically, semantically and metaphysically controversial 
notion (the very notion of a domain of everything) in order to counter Geach-style 
relativism; 
 
ii) The inability to counter the problem, highlighted by Skolem’s construction, 
consisting in a relativity of the concept of universal quantification to a semantic 
parameter (the specification of a range for the quantifier) that is itself relative to the 
expressive resources of a language. 
 
iii) In virtue of ii), the inability to counter the indeterminacy and inexpressibility 
objections. 
 
A further undesirable consequence of the view that the very concept of universal 
quantification should be seen as semantically constrained seems to me to be the very 
distinction on which Lavine’s discussion of schematicity relies: the distinction between 
two different kinds of generality.  
The reasons that we can present for regarding such distinction as undesirable are 
the following: 
 
• Economy in a theory of concepts: if there is logical space for the possibility that 
two expressions denote the same concept, or that only one of them denotes a 
concept, then this possibility should be fully explored; 
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• The fact that we have evidence to at least suspect that schematic generality does 
not qualify as a logical concept in itself: what are the relevant concept-defining 
rules?  
 
• The fact that if we accept the idea that absolutely unrestricted generality can 
only be rendered in non-quantificational terms (i.e. that the concept to which 
we should appeal in this case is the one of schematic generality) then we 
commit ourselves to counterintuitive readings of a whole sub-class of our 
claims, including unrestricted metaphysical claims, kind-generalizations, 
universal generalizations from which we draw universal consequences, 
universal generalizations falsified by counterexamples, etc. (for a detailed 
discussion of each of these examples, cf [Williamson 2003: 423-24, 436, 438-
9])119. 
 
The proposal is, then, that we should give up the idea that our understanding of 
the concept of quantificational generality (that is: our understanding of the concept as 
defined purely in terms of its inferential role) requires that we have a pre-determined 
range in mind: something like a totality of objects that we need to be able to survey (as 
was the suggestion in the last quotation from McGee) before we can understand what 
‘for all’ means.  
The idea that we should reject, to be sure, does not come from model-theory itself: 
it comes from an over-generalization of a convenient, and simplified, model-theoretic 
reconstruction of the truth conditions for interpreted instances of the concept, and 
from its application to the concept itself. 
  
The ∀-rules should thus be seen as fully structural, in the sense that the quantifier 
appearing in their formulation should not be taken to range over a domain, and the 
letters that represent individual terms are schematic letters. More specifically, the ∀-
rules display the inferential role of quantificational generality by displaying how, given 
certain inferential constraints, formulated in purely syntactic terms, our commitments 
                                                
119  For Lavine’s reply to Williamson’s arguments, cf [Lavine 2006: 136-41]. 
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to a general claim and our commitments to specific instances of the claim relate to 
each other. According to the reconstruction that the rules provide, the expression ‘any’ 
(or ‘arbitrary’) does not pick out a concept distinct from ‘all’: ‘any’ is, rather, to be regarded 
as referring to the syntactic constraints on the inference displayed by the rules. In 
other words: rather than taking ‘any’ to individuate a concept, we use the expression to 
refer to the standard syntactic constraints on the deducibility relation expressed by the rules. 
 
Universal Specification is, then: 
 
(US) (∀x) ϕ(x) |- ϕ(s) 
 
where ϕ and s are schematic letters whose legitimate instances are formulas and 
singular terms respectively, and the only (syntactic) constraint on x is that it is an 
individual variable. The instruction in which the rule consists is, informally: from for 
all x ϕ(x) you can infer ϕ(s) for an arbitrary s, where s replaces the free occurrences of x 
in ϕ, and where the inferential condition that makes s arbitrary is that no special 
assumption about ϕ or s need to be made. 
 
Similarly, the introduction rule for ∀, Universal Generalization, is: 
 
(UG) ϕ(τ) |- (∀x) ϕ(x) 
 
where τ is a schematic letter for individual terms, and ϕ and x are to be understood as 
in US. The instruction in which the rule consists is, informally: from the fact that ϕ(τ) 
has been derived for an arbitrary τ, you can infer ϕ(x) for all x, where x is not bound in 
ϕ, and where the condition on the arbitrariness of τ is that τ does not occur in any of 
the premises from which ϕ(τ) has been derived – that is: in the derivation of ϕ(τ) there 
were no special assumptions made about τ or ϕ. 
 
The idea in this formulation of US and UG is, thus, that what counts as a legitimate 
instance for the schematic letter used to refer to singular terms should be arbitrary, 
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and that the expression ‘arbitrary’ simply captures the way in which we perform certain 
inferences.  
 
This view has two key-consequences and an important advantage.  
 
The first consequence is that the understanding of quantificational generality 
displayed by the rules is absolutely unrestricted: there is no semantic constraint on the 
quantifier. However, the notion of absolutely unrestricted quantification here has no 
implications concerning the existence or accessibility of a domain of everything – at 
the level of the definition of the concept, above, as it were, its interpreted usages, it is a 
purely inferential notion.  
The second is given by the fact that the distinction between ‘any’ (or ‘arbitrary’) 
and (the purely inferential, uninterpreted concept of) ‘all’ is not a distinction between 
two concepts, but between a way of constraining our inferences by providing syntactic 
conditions on their correctness, on the one hand, and a proper concept on the other120.  
                                                
120  An interesting issue that I hope to investigate further in future research is given by the 
impact of the proposed rendering of the concept of universal quantification on cases of 
apparent formal intractability of natural language expressions that are intuitively understood in 
quantificational terms. The obvious case is the one of so-called donkey pronouns [Geach 1962; 
Lewis 1970; Evans 1980; etc.]. As it is well-known, a challenging feature of so-called donkey 
sentences of the form: 
 
1) ‘Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it’ 
 
is that the most natural rendering of their logical form (in particular: of the way in which the 
scope of the quantifier is parsed in such sentences) in first-order logic is inconsistent with a 
uniform account of indefinites in natural languages: the article ‘a’, which is normally 
understood as an existential quantifier, plays – in such rendering – the role of a nested universal 
quantifier. The relevance of these cases to the view that I have defended here can intuitively be 
highlighted by means of the following consideration. It seems that we can deploy the 
expression ‘any’ so that it de facto behaves as a reinforcement, as it were, on the indefiniteness 
of a pronoun, for example in 
 
2) Get me a warm jumper from the closet. Anyone will do. 
 
A question that, in the light of the account provided in this chapter, deserves some 
consideration is, then, whether and how the ability, that ‘any’ seems to have, to play the role 
displayed by 2), relates to the status that my view ascribes to the expression. 
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The difficulties encountered by attempts to clarify what the concept of ‘any’ consists in 
independently of an appeal to the concept of ‘for all’ can then, perhaps, also be 
explained by appeal to this fact. 
 
The advantage is the following.  
In my proposal, the generality expressed by the universal quantifier is understood as 
purely inferential generality – generality, that is, of the inferences themselves. It is 
unconstrained either by model-theoretic notions (for the letters occurring in the 
concept-defining rules are not given a model-theoretic interpretation) or by the 
expressive resources of the language within which we are inferring. This is also what, 
crucially, distinguishes the proposal that I am making from a substitutional account of 
quantification – the difficulties encountered by which, in terms of availability of 
sufficient linguistic resources, are well-known. 
 In the proposal, the schematic letters occurring in the object position in US 
and UG do not refer to objects in a specified domain, and are not required to be letters 
of any particular language – it is, in other words, in terms of this absolute lack of 
model-theoretic and expressive constraints that the intuitive notion of independence 
of our inferential commitments from any expansion of the current language should be 
rendered. 
 There is, at this point, nothing to stop us from generalizing the view to letters 
that might appear in the predicate position – that is: nothing to stop us from extending 
this model of quantification to higher-order quantifiers. The exclusive focus of the 
discussion in this chapter has been first-order quantification, but one who recognizes 
the legitimacy of higher-order logic will immediately see the naturalness of the 
generalization suggested. 
 More specifically: it is plausible to argue that the natural understanding that we 
have (or should have) of higher-order quantification is one according to which the latter 
expresses purely inferential generality. In higher-order logic, the initial intractability of 
some important notions, such as the notion of logical consequence, appears to dissolve 
once its source is individuated not in the illegitimacy, as it were, of higher-order 
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quantification itself, but in the inadequacy of a model-theoretic treatment of the 
higher order quantifiers. 
 But then the arguments that I have offered for endorsing an account of first 
order quantification that is independent of such treatment can also be understood as 
arguments: 
 
• That support an independently desirable uniformity in the explication of the 
concept of generality – we don’t have, as it were, two different concepts of 
quantification (first- and higher-order), or two different ways in which we grasp 
them. We simply have one inferential concept of generality that receives the 
same treatment across the board; 
 
• That reinforce the plausibility of the anti-model theoretic strategy in higher-
order logic: for in this chapter I hope to have shown that we have good reasons 
for adopting the same strategy, once again, across the board121. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INFERENTIAL COMMITMENTS IN CONTEXT 
 
This chapter intends to complement the discussion of Chapter III by tackling 
two aspects of our usage of the concept of universal quantification in linguistic and 
communicative practices. Such aspects can be rendered in terms of a theoretical 
problem and a linguistic datum. Throughout the chapter, both will be discussed with 
reference to our natural language usages of the universal quantifier.  
The theoretical problem amounts to the question: given that our natural 
language usages of the universal quantifier take place within communicative contexts, 
how should we render the role and status of the inferential commitments that we 
undertake when deploying the concept in context?  
The linguistic datum consists in the fact that our contextual usages of the 
quantifier are often restricted. The discussion of contextual quantifier restrictions will 
focus, here, on the epistemology of such restrictions.  
The chapter then relates to the previous one in the following way.  
 
In Chapter III I defended an account of universal quantification according to 
which: 
 
• The elimination rule for the universal quantifier should be understood as a 
concept-defining rule, in the sense that it displays the logical form of concept-
constituting inferential practices; 
 
• The rule should be given a fully schematic reading; 
 
• The generality expressed by the concept of universal quantification is full 
inferential generality. 
 
An important claim of the view endorsed in that chapter was that our 
understanding of the concept in terms of its purely inferential role (i.e., as an 
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uninterpreted concept) should be thought of as independent of the notion of a domain 
of quantification.  
 
Here I would like to complete the discussion of Chapter III in two ways. I 
intend to provide additional arguments against what I have labeled the ‘domain 
model’, and to defend the claim that we should dispense with the notion of a domain 
also when dealing with (contextually) interpreted instances of the concept of universal 
quantification. 
In so doing, my aim is to sketch a contextualist framework for our 
understanding of interpreted usages of the universal quantifier that begins to clarify 
the role of concept-constituting inferential commitments in (a sub-set of) our 
communicative practices.  
 
The structure of this chapter is the following.  
Section 1 sketches the framework in which the subsequent sections should be 
understood, by: 
 
• Clarifying the terminology that I will use; 
 
• Discussing a more articulate definition of what I have called, in Chapter III, the 
domain model for the universal quantifier; 
 
• Distinguishing between a foundational account of universal quantification and 
a descriptive account of the semantics for the universal quantifier. 
 
Sections 2 to 4 discuss the question of whether the notion of a domain of 
quantification should play any role in a foundational account of universal 
quantification, and in particular in the understanding of how the assertoric sense of 
universally quantified sentences is determined in context. The discussion is articulated 
in terms of three arguments, which target the epistemological relevance of the notion. 
The upshot of the arguments is that an account of the assertoric sense of (contextually) 
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interpreted universally quantified sentences should dispense with the notion of a 
domain. 
Finally, in Section 5 I make some proposals about the shape that a foundational 
account of universal quantification should take, and sketch a suggestion for 
articulating the relation between our concept-constituting inferential commitments 
and contextually supplied interpretations of the universal quantifier. 
 
1. THE DOMAIN MODEL AND A FOUNDATIONAL SEMANTICS FOR THE UNIVERSAL 
QUANTIFIER 
 
1.1 Terminology and Structure 
 
In the next sections I wish to present three arguments. Their structure and 
intended targets can be summarized as follows. 
 
• Argument (a) (Section 2) 
 
Assumption: The plausibility of an inferentialist account of the concept of universal 
quantification based on the notion of a canonical commitment to the consequences of 
the concept; 
Polemical Target: The idea that the notion of a domain of quantification should play 
any role in how the assertoric sense of (contextually interpreted) quantified sentences 
is determined according to such an account. 
 
• Argument (b) (Section 3) 
Assumption: The plausibility of an inferentialist account of the concept of universal 
quantification based on the notion of a canonical warrant; 
Polemical Target: Once again, the idea that the notion of a domain of quantification 
should play any role in how the assertoric sense of (interpreted) quantified sentences is 
determined. 
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• Argument (c) (Section 4) 
 
Assumption: The plausibility of a contextualist account of how the assertoric sense of a 
universally quantified sentence is determined; 
Polemical Target: The idea that the notion of a domain of quantification should play 
any role in such an account. 
 
Both the terminology used in presenting the targets of arguments (a) to (c) and the 
restricted scope of the first two require that we put a few things in perspective before 
we start discussing the arguments themselves. In particular, they require that we spell 
out the assumptions on which the arguments rely, and the framework in which the 
relevance of their targets should be understood. 
 
The first two arguments will not crucially rely on the idea that our interpreted 
usages of the universal quantifier take place in a communicative context. Although I 
will refer to such usages as taking place within assertoric contexts, nothing in the 
arguments depends on any features of a context that we might consider relevant for the 
way in which an interpretation of the universal quantifier is provided. The focus is 
simply on the contribution that the notion of a domain makes to speakers’ 
understanding of the sense of interpreted instances of the quantifier.  
The third argument does bear on the idea that interpretations are contextually 
supplied, in the sense that understanding and evaluating a propositional content 
requires the specification of (at least some of the features of) the context of utterance. 
However, no commitment is either presupposed or implicated by the argument as to 
which such features we should take to be relevant – in other words, no commitment is 
undertaken to a specific notion of context. 
 
 Three further provisos are necessary for a correct understanding of the 
arguments.  
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First, when, in Sections 2 to 4, I speak of a context, I refer to an assertoric 
context – all that I am concerned with in these sections are communicative contexts in 
which the speech acts performed by speakers are assertions.  
In the case of first and third arguments, this is mainly to simplify the exposition 
– nothing in the structure of the arguments depends on the fact that the focus is on 
assertion, and one may reformulate them with respect to speech acts other than 
assertion122.  
In the case of the second argument, the focus on assertion does play a role – 
mainly in virtue of the theoretical framework within which the argument is formulated. 
This is the verificationist account discussed and defended in [Dummett 1991]. The 
scope of the argument is thus restricted in two ways: in terms of its focus (assertoric 
practices) and in terms of its theoretical background (a verificationist theory of sense).  
I take it that the first restriction, however, is not such as to diminish the 
relevance of the argument in the framework of the current discussion. Even if the 
notion of a domain turned out to be problematic only for an understanding of 
assertoric usages of the universal quantifier, this would be enough to at least raise the 
suspicion that an account of sense relying on the notion would be implausible. 
Assertion is, after all, one of our main speech acts.  
The second restriction has to be understood in the framework of the general 
project of which this thesis explores some aspects – namely, in the light of the general 
idea that the logical concepts are constituted by their inferential usage, and that 
                                                
122  Things are in fact more complicated. An assumption of the first four sections of this 
chapter, and an explicit component of some of the claims that I make in Section 5, is that there 
is a sense in which canonical commitments are invariant with respect to illocutionary force. 
That is: their form and quality is stable across variations in speech act type, although they may 
take different (illocutionary) force.  
However, this assumption is, to say the least, not self-evident; it needs to be further 
articulated and defended, in the form of an account of the exact relation between: 
 
• The inferential commitments undertaken by speakers in assertoric practices; 
 
• The Inferential commitments undertaken by speakers in other speech-act practices. 
 
I will clarify the challenges that confront an attempt to provide such an account in sub-section 
5.2.  
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speakers’ grasp of the logical concepts should also be individuated with reference to 
such usage.  
There are two natural ways to articulate the idea that a theory of logical 
concepts should be a theory of inferential usage. One is the pragmatist idea that I 
endorse, according to which it is the canonical consequences of a logical concept that 
are epistemically primary in this usage. The other is the verificationist idea according 
to which it is the canonical warrants associated with sentences in which a logical 
concept C figures that are, instead, primary.  
As the first argument targets the notion of a domain of quantification with 
respect to the first idea, thus complementing the focus of the second argument, the 
restricted scope of the second argument does not per se undermine in any crucial way 
the generality of the claims made in this section. 
 
Second, by the ‘sense of a sentence’ I mean: the proposition expressed by an 
utterance of the sentence. ‘Sentence’ here is to be understood as interpreted 
sentence123. 
 
Third, when I speak of the notion of a domain I don’t intend to commit myself 
to any specific model-theoretic rendering of the notion. What I have in mind is an 
informal notion, according to which the domain over which a quantifier ranges is a 
totality of objects, which the constants in the language can name and which provide 
the possible values for the variable bound by the quantifier.  
Although the natural way to render formally this intuitive notion is, of course, 
by appeal to the notion of a set (and, in particular, of a well-founded set), in these 
sections I will keep the discussion informal. As it is the intuitive idea common to all 
model-theoretic renderings of the notion that is targeted in the arguments, any issue 
concerning any specific such rendering would play a misleading role in the discussion, 
and distract attention from its structure and aims. 
 
 
                                                
123  Further qualifications will be provided when necessary. 
194 
1.2 The Domain Model 
 
Given this intuitive notion, the target of the arguments is the claim that to grasp 
an interpreted instance of the universal quantifier (that is: to grasp its contribution to 
the assertoric sense of a sentence) is, partly, to grasp the domain over which the 
quantifier ranges. The claim relies on the assumption that an interpretation of the 
universal quantifier always requires, or consists in, the specification of a domain of 
quantification. 
Call the conjunction of this claim and of the assumption on which it relies the 
domain model of universal quantification.  
As it is well known, the main difficulty that the domain model faces consists in 
giving a precise articulation of the notion of ‘grasping a domain’. An articulation of 
this notion would, in fact, require that we assign a clear epistemic relation (between a 
competent speaker and a domain of quantification) as the referent of the expression 
‘grasp’. We can try to give a partial rendering of this relation by specifying at least the 
conditions that are necessary for such relation to obtain. There are two options readily 
available in the philosophical literature.  
The first takes these conditions to have an epistemic nature, and to consist in the 
surveyability of a domain. The idea is that a domain of quantification can be grasped by 
a competent speaker only if it is surveyable: intuitively, if and only if it is in principle 
possible for a subject to verify, for each member of the domain, that it is indeed in the 
domain [Dummett 1991: 274-77]124.  
                                                
124  Here and in Section 2, I am assuming that this idea is endorsed by Dummett. However, 
it is not clear whether Dummett does indeed subscribe to it. [Edwards 1994] appears to suggest 
that he does, and various passages in [Dummett 1991] also point to this interpretation.  
Furthermore, Dummett’s discussion of the obtaining of the mathematical paradoxes as 
depending on a failure of quantification over indeterminate (indefinitely extensible) totalities, 
also seems to commit him to this view. For, in the context of that discussion, he argues for the 
indeterminacy (indefinite extensibility) not only of uncountably infinite collections, for which 
the paradoxes obtain, but also of countably infinite collections such as the natural numbers 
[Dummett 1963; 1991: 317]. 
 In any case, when I say that the surveyability idea can be associated with Dummett, I 
don’t mean to make any exegetically informed claim, and the association has no impact on the 
arguments that I discuss. 
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The second takes the conditions that are necessary for a competent speaker to 
be able to grasp the domain specified by an interpretation for the universal quantifier 
to consist in certain semantic properties of the domain. In [Glanzberg 2004], these 
properties amount to the specification of the domain being, in his words, sharp and 
exhaustive. Under the assumption that the specification consists in the introduction of 
a predicate whose extension we take to constitute the domain, the latter must be such 
that it contains all and only the objects that the interpretation assigns to the extension 
of the predicate in question. 
The first argument considers the second option; the second argument bears on 
the idea sketched above that a domain must be surveyable in order to be (in principle) 
grasped by a speaker. 
 
When representing the main claim of the domain model, we must be careful to 
distinguish it from another, much weaker, claim concerning the relation between our 
understanding of interpreted instances of the universal quantifier and the specification 
of a domain. The weaker claim simply consists in saying that, independently of how we 
choose to address the problem of what our grasp of the interpreted quantifier consists 
in, and independently of the mechanisms via which the concept may receive an 
interpretation in a given assertoric context, we may represent the semantic output of this 
grasp and of these mechanisms in terms of the assignment of a domain to the 
quantifier. More precisely, we must distinguish the claim: 
 
i) An interpretation of the universal quantifier always requires the 
specification of a domain over which the quantifier ranges, in the sense that 
the semantic and / or epistemic properties of the domain specified 
contribute to determine the sense of a sentence in which the quantifier 
figures; 
 
From the weaker claim: 
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ii) A convenient representation of the output of an interpretation of a 
universally quantified sentence of the form ∀xFx consists in rendering this 
output in terms of the specification of a domain over which the universal 
quantifier ranges. That is, it consists in rendering it in terms of a collection 
of objects of which an interpreted utterance of the sentence says that they 
are instances of the predicate denoted by F. 
 
In the weak claim above, the specification of a domain of quantification does not 
play any role in determining the sense of a sentence in which the quantifier figures, or 
in how sense is understood by competent speakers. The claim concerns the descriptive 
semantics that one may choose to give for interpreted instances of the universal 
quantifier.  
On the other hand, the first claim says that the sense of a sentence in which the 
quantifier figures is partly determined by the domain specified by its interpretation. 
Both what we grasp when we understand the sentence and whether an utterance of the 
sentence expresses a determinate proposition, partly depend on the properties of the 
domain assigned to the quantifier. One who endorses the first claim, then, will 
maintain that domains of quantification should figure in a foundational account of the 
universal quantifier, as one of the factors which impact on (our grasp of) the sense of a 
sentence in which it figures. 
 
1.3 Foundational vs. Descriptive Semantics 
 
Talk of descriptive vs. foundational semantics can be made more precise by 
explicitly distinguishing between the aims and objects of the two enterprises, in the 
following way. 
The aim of a foundational semantics, or, as [Kaplan 1989: 573 ff] referred to it, 
of a meta-semantic approach to expressions of the language, is to decide, primarily on 
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the basis of extra-semantic considerations, which semantics is the appropriate one for 
a language125.  
A descriptive semantics, on the other hand, assigns semantic values to simple 
expressions, and provides rules for deriving from these the semantic values of complex 
expressions [Stanley & Szabò 2000: 223]. It does not aim to make any decision about 
which facts determine what we should take the semantic values of expressions of the 
language to be, but begins, as it were, once a prior characterization of these facts has 
been given. 
If we endorse the idea that the interpretation of a fragment of the language 
always takes place in a communicative context, then the distinction between the two 
projects can be rendered in terms of the kind of problems that they face in the analysis 
of context. As [Stanley & Szabò 2000: 223 ff] put it, the descriptive problem of context-
dependence for an expression e relative to a context c will be the problem of deriving 
the interpretation of e relative to c, given a prior characterization of which features of 
the context have a bearing on the interpretation of e. On the other hand, the 
foundational problem will consist in specifying what it is about the context that makes 
it the case that certain entities play the role they do in the interpretation of e – in virtue 
of which facts do we take a certain assignment of semantic value to an expression to be 
appropriate, and via which mechanisms does context assign such a value to the 
expression126? 
The foundational problem for the universal quantifier is then: in virtue of 
which facts does an interpreted instance of the quantifier contribute to the assertoric 
sense of the sentences in which it figures in the way in which it does?  
The aim of the arguments that follow is then to rule out one candidate among 
these facts: the specification of a domain of quantification. 
 
                                                
125   [Lewis 1975] renders the distinction between the foundational and the descriptive 
project as the distinction between a Theory of Language and a Theory of Languages.  
The brief account provided in the paragraph above partly relies on [Stanley & Szabò 
2000]. 
126  A primary example of the application of a foundational strategy to the problem of 
context-dependence (in particular: to the problem of contextual resolution of ambiguity and 
supplementation of semantically incomplete information), is [Sperber & Wilson 1986]. 
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2. DOMAINS AND CANONICAL COMMITMENTS 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Assume that an account of concept-possession based on the notion of a 
canonical commitment, such as the one sketched in Chapters II and III, is a plausible 
account of what it is to possess the concept of universal quantification. We will then 
say that a speaker S grasps the sense a sentence of the form ∀xFx if she undertakes, 
when uttering the sentence, a commitment to the canonical consequences of the 
universal quantifier, and recognizes this commitment to be undertaken whenever a 
sentence of this form is uttered.  
This framework is not per se incompatible with the domain model. For example, 
it is tempting to argue as follows. An account of concept possession in terms of 
canonical commitments may take the latter to be the blue print, as it were, of concept 
possession independently of specific interpretations provided, in context, for an 
occurrence of the universal quantifier. But the commitments associated with the 
concept’s inferential role are not sufficient to render a speaker’s understanding of the 
specific contribution that an interpreted instance of the concept makes to the assertoric 
sense of a sentence – what the speaker additionally needs to grasp is precisely what the 
interpretation of the concept amounts to. Simply put, a (contextual) interpretation is 
what makes the difference between grasping a sentence of the form: 
 
1) ∀xFx 
 
and understanding an occurrence of (1) as interpreted in a given context, for example: 
 
2) All men are mortal 
 
In fact, there appears to be, prima facie, a natural way of articulating the 
relation between a speaker’s inferential commitments and the domain supplied by an 
interpretation. For we could view domains as determining the scope of the inferential 
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commitments that we undertake in context: as typically restricting, that is, the range of 
legitimate instances of the quantifier’s elimination rule. 
  Adapted to this framework, the claim that constitutes the core of the domain 
model can then be rendered in the following terms: the gap between grasping the 
sense of 1) and grasping the sense of 2) is to be filled by the contextual specification of 
a domain over which the quantifier ranges, and which restricts the scope of our 
concept-constituting commitments127.  
This claim has, of course, an epistemic nature – it is a claim about grasp of 
sense, rather than simply about the way in which the semantics of (2) can be rendered. 
In particular, it is the claim that while the general reconstruction of the possession 
conditions for the universal quantifier in terms of inferential commitments is silent, 
because of its very object, about the scope that such commitments take, the 
reconstruction of a speaker’s grasp of the sense of 2) in a specific assertoric context has 
to say something about this scope – in this case, it will say, for example, that the 
commitment generated by an utterance of 2) is a commitment to: 
 
3) Socrates is mortal 
 
but not to: 
 
4) Jupiter is mortal 
 
where Jupiter denotes the Greek God. The intuitive idea is then that the specification 
of a domain of quantification will do the job: it will limit the scope of our 
commitments by specifying a range of objects that, in context, are admissible values for 
the bound variable that figures in 1). In order to undertake the correct inferential 
commitments, a speaker will then have to understand her commitments as thus 
                                                
127  More precisely: the gap that needs to be filled is between grasping the general 
contribution that the universal quantifier makes to the sense of the sentences in which it 
figures and the contribution that it makes to the sense of a specific tokening of an interpreted 
sentence in context.  
 I will explicitly discuss the intuitive idea of a restriction on the scope of our inferential 
commitments in sub-section 5.2. 
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restricted – she will have, that is, to grasp the domain supplied by the contextual 
interpretation128.  
 Whether a speaker is able to grasp the domain thus supplied will partly depend 
on facts concerning the speaker herself and partly on certain objective properties of 
the domain. In the philosophical literature, an idea that has gained much popularity is 
that, in order for a quantified sentence to have a determinate sense (and thus for a 
competent speaker to grasp this sense) the specification must be such that the domain 
is a determinate totality [Dummett 1991: 317; 1994; Glanzberg 2000, 2004; Shapiro & 
Wright 2006]. The idea can be spelt out in various ways – here I will rely on the 
rendering of the notion of a determinate totality in [Glanzberg 2004].  
According to Glanzberg, a domain of quantification constitutes a determinate 
totality, and thus its contribution to the sense of a quantified utterance can be 
determinately grasped by a competent speaker, if and only if its specification is both 
sharp and exhaustive. Intuitively, this means that the specification has to deliver a 
listing of the members of the domain that clearly excludes everything that is not 
intended to be part of the domain, and includes everything that is.   
Because a standard way to specify a domain is by using predicates, whose 
extensions individuate the intended domains, then sharpness and exhaustiveness are 
to be seen as semantic properties of the predicate that we use to introduce a domain – 
more precisely, they are seen as properties that the extension of a predicate possesses 
or lacks in virtue of the predicate’s semantic role.  
Consider, following [Glanzberg 2004: 545], the predicate ‘book’ in the sentence: 
 
5) Every book has a cover 
 
whose logical form can be formally rendered, making the restriction explicit, via: 
 
                                                
128  Of course, I am not claiming that this is the way in which, in general, a proponent of 
the domain model should render the epistemic role of domains of quantification. Rather, the 
thought is this.  In the framework of an inferentialist account of sense that takes (what is 
displayed by) the elimination rule for the universal quantifier to be sense-conferring, this 
appears to be the most plausible way of rendering the potential contribution that the 
specification of a domain makes to our grasp of the sense of a quantified sentence. 
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6) ∀x(Bx→Cx) 
 
Given that, in this framework, quantifiers always range over domains, the 
occurrence of ‘∀’ in 6) is taken to range over what Glanzberg calls a background domain 
of quantification – the domain of objects available for quantification in a given context 
C.   
The idea is that the contribution of the predicate ‘Book’ to the semantics of 6) is 
to specify a derived domain, carved out, as it were, of the larger background domain, by 
dividing the latter into two parts: the objects that fall under the predicate, and the 
objects that don’t. The specification of a domain of quantification as a domain derived 
from a larger background domain will usually satisfy sharpness and exhaustiveness: 
‘Book’, for example, will provide a partition of the universe that is sharp (no non-
books, or borderline cases of ‘book’, will be members of the domain thus specified) 
and exhaustive (the extension of ‘book’ comprises all the objects that are books). 
In virtue of the fact that derived domains usually satisfy sharpness and exhaustiveness, 
they are taken by Glanzberg to determinately contribute to fixing the semantics of a 
quantified sentence. 
 
Recall, however, that the claim in the domain model is stronger than the mere 
claim that a domain thus specified merely ‘fixes the semantics’ (i.e. the truth value) of a 
quantified sentence – it is, in effect, the claim that it fixes the semantics in virtue of 
fixing sense: sharpness and exhaustiveness are necessary conditions on a quantified 
sentence receiving a determinate sense (and thus being determinately grasped by 
competent speakers). If the interpretation of a sentence of the form of (1) specifies a 
domain that is not sharp and exhaustive, then the sentence fails to have a determinate 
sense129.  
 
If, in an attempt to reconcile the domain model with a commitment-theoretic 
account of universal quantification, we view the specification of a domain as limiting 
                                                
129  That is, to express a determinate proposition. I take this to be the view in [Glanzberg 
2000; 2004]. 
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the scope of our inferential commitments, then the epistemic relevance of the claim 
becomes clear: a limitation of our commitments that does not respect the semantic 
constraints of sharpness and exhaustiveness will allegedly result in the indeterminacy 
of their scope, and thus in the inability, on the part of competent speakers, to 
understand the sense of the interpreted sentence. 
It is to the plausibility of this stronger claim and of its consequences that I now turn. 
 
2.2 Case I: Unrestricted Usages of The Universal Quantifier 
 
Suppose that, in a context C, I utter: 
 
6) Everything is self-identical 
 
Suppose, for example, that the context is one in which I am having a 
philosophical discussion with another philosopher, Darren. Let us leave aside, for the 
moment, any assumption or preoccupation with skeptical worries about absolutely 
unrestricted quantification.  
Suppose also that, in the course of the conversation to which my assertion of 6) 
gives rise, both Darren and I clearly manifest our commitments to the canonical 
consequence of (the unrestricted instance of) the quantifier. The conversation may, for 
example, proceed as a discussion of the features of specific objects in the environment 
of which, in virtue of my assertion of 6), I am committed to believing that they are self-
identical, etc. Assume also that both Darren and I reveal, in the course of the same 
conversation, that we grasp the concept of identity, and in particular of self-identity – 
choose, in other words, your preferred possession conditions for this concept, and 
assume that we both satisfy them. 
Intuitively, we want to say here that Darren and I grasp the assertoric sense of 
my assertion of 6) – in virtue of the fact that 6) appears to have a determinate assertoric 
sense, and that we possess the concepts that figure in 6). The claim that 6) has a 
determinate assertoric sense, is intuitive in the following respect: that all the 
manifestable aspects of our subsequent assertoric practices reveal that we understand 
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each other (when reasoning on specific instances of the claim), and that we use the 
concepts figuring in 6) in the same way. We may even disagree on the truth value of 6) 
– Darren, for example, may hold a strange metaphysical view according to which only a 
sub-class of physical objects instantiate the property of being self-identical, or a  
linguistic view according to which the concept of identity, in the standard way in 
which I am deploying it when asserting 6), is not well defined, and should thus be 
replaced by a different concept or set of concepts. In either case, we intuitively 
understand each other when discussing my assertion of 6). 
 The domain model, however, tells us that Darren and I cannot understand each 
other in the course of this conversation130. More precisely, it tells us that the sense of 
an assertion of 6) is indeterminate: it cannot be clear to either of us what I am 
committing myself to when I assert 6) because the scope of the commitments that 
come with an assertion of 6) is indeterminate.  
The reason why it is ultimately bears on the semantic properties ascribed by the 
considered version of the domain model to the notion of a domain, and can be 
rendered in terms of the difference between the status of a derived domain and the 
status of what Glanzberg calls a ‘fundamental’ domain. We may identify with a 
genuinely unrestricted domain, following [Glanzberg 2004: 545].  
The idea is this. As already noted, the specification of a derived domain, for 
example by means of a non-vague predicate,131 will typically be sharp and exhaustive: 
the means that we deploy in giving such a specification will guarantee, is the thought, 
that  the semantic partition on a background universe of discourse, with which the 
semantic role of these means is identified, will output a ‘list’ (or the instruction to 
produce such a list) that will include all and only the things that fall within the derived 
domain. It is in virtue of the fact that the predicate ‘book’ successfully fulfills this 
semantic role that we understand, for example, an utterance of 5) as having a 
determinate assertoric sense.  
                                                
130  Rather: Glanzberg’s articulation of the domain model does.  
131  Or by means of a generation procedure of some sort. A standard alternative to the 
specification of a domain via the introduction of a predicate is given by an inductive definition 
– the primary example is of course the specification of the domain of natural numbers. 
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The specification of a fundamental domain such as the one that would be 
required by the interpretation of the quantifier in 6) as absolutely unrestricted, 
however, cannot fulfill this role: there is no means that it could employ that will divide 
the background universe of discourse in two parts, precisely in virtue of the fact that a 
fundamental domain is intended to include absolutely everything. 
Since providing such a partition is ‘the contribution that we need the 
[specification of] a domain to make to the interpretation of [an] utterance” [Glanzberg 
2004: 546], in order for the sense of the uttered sentence to be determinate, in cases 
such as 6) we have no determinate sense, and thus no determinate grasp of sense. 
 
The first upshot of rendering the idea that the scope of our commitments is 
fixed by the specification of a domain, is, then, that we need to revise our intuitions 
about what goes on in cases such as the one just discussed.  
Note that we may achieve a determinate grasp of the assertoric sense of 6) as a 
sentence in which, contrary to appearances, the quantifier ranges over a restricted 
domain. Indeed, this is the bottom line of Glanzberg’s view: all cases of apparently 
unrestricted quantification are in fact cases in which the domain is being restricted by 
context – when I utter 6) in the context of my conversation with Darren, what I really 
mean is: every object that the context supplies, at the time of my utterance, as an 
object ‘available for discourse’ [Glanzberg 2004: 558 ff].  
However, this view raises two major difficulties.  
The first, that I will mention but not discuss here, is that unless it is made clear 
how it is determined what the objects available for discourse in a context are, it 
remains a mystery how, under the restricted reading of the quantifier in 6), the scope 
of my commitments manages to be determinate.  
The second is that there is an intuitive gap between this reading of my assertion 
of 6) and the natural interpretation of the example. For in the example no feature of 
the conversation that follows my assertion of 6) reveals that any particular restriction of 
my commitments is at stake: the manifested behavior of speaker and audience is silent 
about any such restriction (or we may easily imagine it as being so), and nothing in the 
conversation reveals to the participants themselves what the actual restriction is. The 
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problem is, then, that if we go for the contextual restriction view, we will end up with a 
case in which the restriction is hidden to the participants in the communicative 
practice. The upshot is, then, that not only we need to revise our intuitions about the 
fact that the conversation is about an unrestricted interpretation of 6) – we also need to 
revise our intuitions about the fact that Darren and I determinately understand each 
other and grasp our assertions as having the same sense. 
 
A revision of the intuitive reading of the example discussed does not, per se, 
provide us with a conclusive reason to reject the idea that domains should be assigned 
the role of fixing the scope of our inferential commitments. After all, although 
unlikely, it is conceivable that both our intuitions as interpreters and the intuitions 
that, plausibly, the speakers in the example will have, are wrong.  
But now let us ask the question: how, exactly, does the specification of a 
domain of discourse manage to determine the scope of our inferential commitments? 
That is: assume that such a specification, in order to be determinate, has to output a 
partition of a background universe – in other words, that it must be the specification of 
a derived (restricted) domain.  The question is: how does the semantic role played by 
the means deployed by such specification manage to gain an epistemic relevance?  
Asking this question, I want to argue, will put the domain model into trouble. To see 
why, consider a context in which Darren and I discuss the assertion of a sentence 
containing a (contextually) restricted instance of the universal quantifier. 
 
2.2 Case II: Restricted Usages of the Universal Quantifier 
 
Suppose that my utterance of 6) is in fact restricted by context, and that this is 
clear to both me and Darren; suppose, for example, that the utterance is understood by 
both of us as being, in fact, an utterance of 
 
7) Everything inside the flat at 44 Derwent Avenue is self-identical. 
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In the course of the conversation that follows, the commitments that come with 
an (acceptance of the) assertion of 7) will then be determinately restricted to the 
contextually relevant instances of the quantifier’s canonical consequence. We will 
discuss of the fact that particular objects in the flat are self-identical, but will not 
commit ourselves to the claim that anything outside the flat is an instance of the 
concept ‘being self-identical’. As in the previous case, we appear to understand each 
other, and to grasp the sense of our assertions as a determinate sense.  
In virtue of which features of the interpretation of 7) does our assertoric 
practice proceed in this way? Well, in virtue of the fact that the predicate expression 
‘being inside the flat at 44 Derwent Avenue’ (henceforth: F) specifies a derived 
domain: it divides the background universe of discourse into two parts, and outputs an 
exhaustive list of the members of the domain which is relevant for our understanding 
of the commitments that come with an assertion of 7). How do we grasp such a 
partition as being determinate, in Glanzberg’s sense? 
It seems to me that there are two options.  
 
• First option: The first is to say that both Darren and I grasp the predicate F. The 
idea that we grasp the predicate can in turn be rendered in two different ways.  
It can consist in a grasp of its identity and application conditions. Our grasp will then 
be manifested in the fact that we normally use the predicate correctly: we will normally 
apply it to the right sort of things (we will not say, for example, that natural numbers 
are F) and we will not take a sentence of the form ‘x is F’ to have the same assertoric 
sense as a sentence of the form ‘x is G’ (where G is a predicate with different identity 
conditions). Then the alleged epistemic role played by a partition on the background 
domain of a context could be understood in the following terms. A partition produced 
by a predicate such as F will somehow allow a speaker to distinguish between different 
kinds of objects: those that are instances of F and those that are not. It will also allow a 
speaker to tell, for a specific object a, whether or not a is an instance of F.   
An alternative is to articulate the idea that both Darren and I grasp F in terms 
of our possessing a simple recognitional ability of some sort. For example, we could say 
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that our grasp consists directly in the ability to tell, given an object a, whether or not a 
is an F.  
 
• Second Option: The second option is to say that Darren and I both grasp not the 
means but the output of the partition produced by F: we will both grasp, for each 
object in the list of things that are F, that they are indeed instances of F.  
 
Let us consider the second option first. 
 
The Second Option 
 
The second option is clearly implausible – as [Glanzberg 2004: 547] 
acknowledges.  
It amounts to the claim that in order to understand what the domain of quantification 
is for a given occurrence of the quantifier, one needs to have a discriminating 
knowledge of each of the members of the specified domain. Not only this is 
counterintuitive (to grasp the predicate ‘book’, for example, I would have to be able to 
give a full listing of the things that are books): it seems that any way to articulate it 
further generates highly undesirable consequences for a view such a Glanzberg’s. For 
consider the following. 
Such a view includes the three claims: 
 
• Domains of quantification are contextually provided; 
 
• Domains of quantification must be derived domains in order to make a 
determinate contribution to the proposition expressed by (the utterance of) a 
quantified sentence; 
 
 
• We can topicalize the background domain of a context C and speak about it (in 
a different context C’) [Glanzberg 2006]. 
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According to this view, then, the background domain of a context can never be 
itself unrestricted. If it is to be a determinate domain, it needs to be specified by means 
of a semantic partition of the sort discussed.  
It seems intuitively plausible to say that at any given time t the speakers in a 
given context C may grasp what the background domain is – that is, that they may 
grasp the available domain of discourse – unless we commit ourselves to the claim that 
knowledge of the kind of things that speakers may talk about in C is out of their 
epistemic reach.   
Now remember the claim whose plausibility is under discussion: in order to 
grasp the available domain of discourse, speakers would need to have discriminating 
knowledge of each of the objects in the background domain specified by means of a 
semantic partition.  
In the scenario considered, we can view the fact that the domain is specified 
thus, as either playing a direct epistemic role with respect to the speakers’ ability to 
acquire discriminating knowledge (first case), or have no direct epistemic relevance for 
the acquisition of such knowledge (second case). 
 
Consider the first case. The thought would then be the following.  The 
partition via which the relevant domain is specified is an epistemic mechanism: a 
speaker discerns what the domain is by providing this partition.  A speaker, in other 
words, grasps a background domain by deriving it from a larger universe of discourse.  
But then in order to be able to provide such a partition, a speaker would have, 
somehow, also grasp what is being left out by the partition. What can this grasp consist 
in? 
Well, it appears that it cannot simply consist in the ability to tell, for any given 
object a, whether or not a falls in the background domain. For such grasp would not 
guarantee that the partition in question is exhaustive. The reason is the following. We 
are assuming that the mechanisms via which the background domain of C is specified 
are to play a direct epistemic role, that is: that they are the mechanisms via which a 
speaker grasps the domain as a determinate (sharp and exhaustive) domain. But at this 
209 
level, a speaker’s grasp of whether, for any given a, selected from the larger universe 
from which the background domain of C is derived, a is or isn’t in C’s background 
domain, won’t automatically translate into a grasp of the same sort for all the objects 
that may be denoted by a132. To have discriminating knowledge of the background 
domain, a speaker needs, as it were, to make sure that the partition via which she 
grasps such domain is indeed exhaustive: that no objects that should be in the 
background domain are being left out. And this requires, it appears, discriminating 
knowledge of the larger universe from which the background domain is being derived. 
If this is the case, in order to know which objects are available for 
quantification in a given context, speakers would need to also grasp which objects are 
not available in the context. Aside from the fact that this claim is extremely 
implausible, it also contradicts one of the claims of the (contextualist version of) the 
domain model – namely the claim that quantification can never be unrestricted. For 
the ‘universe of discourse’ from which a contextually specified domain is carved out 
will presumably be what Glanzberg calls a fundamental domain – something, that is, 
that we can never quantify over, because we cannot specify it by means of a partition of 
any sort. 
 
Now consider the second case: the fact that the background domain of C is 
specified via a semantic partition on a larger universe of discourse should not be seen 
as playing any epistemic role. One who chooses this option is confronted by the 
following problem: she will have to explain why she is postulating a semantic 
mechanism (the specification of a domain of contextually available objects via a 
partition of the relevant sort) that has no bearing on how speakers understand either 
its output or the very process via which the output is produced. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
132  Under the view to which I refer as the domain model. 
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The First Option 
 
Remember that the first option can either be articulated in terms of speaker’s 
grasp of F’s identity and application conditions (first case), or in terms of a speaker’s 
recognitional ability (second case).  
 
Consider the first case. There are two problems here.  
 
The first is that it is unclear, to say the least, how a purely semantic partition on 
a background universe manages to be informative with respect to the question of what 
kind of things instantiate a predicate. The partition, as Glanzberg appears to 
understand it, will simply output a list of objects – it is silent about the conditions in 
virtue of which the objects in the list are specified as members of the derived domain. 
In other words: a list of all the objects inside the flat at 44 Derwent Avenue provides 
no information about what it is for an object to be inside the flat at 44 Derwent Avenue. 
This is not surprising – for the latter information has an epistemic nature, and 
predicate extensions in which domains are taken to consist are semantic entities.  
 
The second is that, given this, a speaker’s grasp of the identity and application 
conditions of a predicate cannot depend on the specification of the predicate’s 
extension, however such a specification is constrained. It will depend on other, 
independent facts – facts that intuitively have to do with the way in which the 
predicate is used in a linguistic community. A grasp, for example, of the fact that F is 
not vague (that the specification of its extension either does not give rise to borderline 
cases or, if it does, these will admit contextually determinate sharpenings) will 
plausibly be achieved by means of the observation that in normal communication a 
usage of F does not generate misunderstandings or disagreements about its application 
conditions. However one chooses to spell out what it is for a competent speaker to 
grasp the predicate F (to grasp its contribution to the sense of a quantified sentence in 
which the quantifier is restricted by F), it seems clear that domains play no rule in 
such a grasp – they are epistemically irrelevant entities. 
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Now consider the second case – a speaker grasps F iff she can tell, for any 
object a, whether or not a is an F.  
 
As argued in the previous paragraph, such a grasp will not guarantee that we 
grasp the domain thus specified as an exhaustive domain. But then one of the two 
properties that, in Glanzberg’s view, (the specification of) a domain needs to instantiate 
in order to be determinate, is epistemically irrelevant.  
 
The upshot of the argument presented is this. All the renderings, which we 
have discussed, of a speaker’s grasp of a context’s domain as determinate seem to point 
to the following fact. Either a (determinate specification of a) domain, or at least one of 
its features (possession of which was meant to be a necessary condition on the 
domain’s determinacy) is epistemically irrelevant. 
Now, the notion of an inferential commitment is an epistemic notion. We 
commit ourselves to x, for example when asserting y, in virtue of grasping, or believing, 
or knowing that a certain relation holds between x and y. But if domains are 
epistemically irrelevant, why should we view them as capable of determining the scope 
of the commitments that we undertake when deploying a concept? In particular, why 
should we view them as determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical 
consequences of the universal quantifier? 
 
3. DOMAINS AND CANONICAL WARRANTS  
 
3.1 Background 
 
So, if we endorse the idea that a determinate domain is the output of a sharp 
and exhaustive semantic partition on a contextually given background universe, we end 
up with a semantic notion that has no epistemic relevance.  
But what if, instead, we work with a notion of a determinate domain that is 
individuated directly by means of some epistemic properties? What if, in other words, 
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we take the specification of a determinate domain of quantification to be constrained 
by an epistemic relation that must hold between a competent speaker and the domain 
itself? 
 Consider the view that a domain of quantification is determinate only when it is 
surveyable by an epistemic subject.   
The view is associated by at least one of its proponents with two kinds of 
considerations. The first concerns the obtaining of paradoxes when we quantify over 
certain infinite collections [Dummett 1963].  The second consists in the idea that the 
semantics that we choose to give for the logical concepts should be constrained by 
what is required by a subject’s ability to grasp them [Dummett 1991]. The view relies 
on the assumption that an infinite domain cannot be grasped by an epistemic subject – 
it cannot, therefore, be specified as a determinate domain of quantification, simply 
because it cannot make any contribution to the assertoric sense of sentences in which 
the quantifier figures.  
 This extreme simplification of the view leaves out, of course, a whole set of 
questions – concerning, for example, what it is for a domain to be surveyable by a 
speaker (indeed, this is merely a qualified version of a question that we have already 
encountered: what is it for a speaker to grasp a domain of quantification?), whether our 
best available notion of surveyability really does leave infinite domains out of the 
picture, etc. 
I will not tackle any of these questions here – I will simply assume that a 
necessary condition for a domain to be determinate, and thus for its specification to 
make a determinate contribution to the assertoric sense of a quantified sentence, is 
that the domain be finite. As the purpose of the argument that I shall present in this 
section is to show that, no matter how strict the epistemic constraints that we place on 
the notion of a domain are, the notion will still be incapable of playing any epistemic 
role, questions concerning the general plausibility of this articulation of the domain 
model won’t matter. For the idea that a domain must be finite in order to be 
determinate is relevant here simply as the result of the attempt to epistemically 
constrain the notion in the strictest possible terms. 
213 
 What contribution does a finite domain make to the assertoric sense of a 
universally quantified utterance? How, in other words, does our grasp of the sense of 
(an utterance of) a sentence such as 
 
8) All of John’s fingernails are dirty 
 
depend on the fact that we intuitively understand the occurrence of ‘all’ in 8) to range 
over a finite domain133? 
 
 In the philosophical literature, we seem to have a readily available answer to 
this question. The answer is the one provided by Dummett, and it may be rendered as 
the claim that the specification of the domain in 8) contributes to determine what 
counts as a canonical warrant for an assertion of 8).  
Let us, then, review this answer in the framework of Dummett’s verificationist 
account, and under the assumption that in order to make a determinate contribution 
to the sense of sentences such as the one tokened in 8), a domain must be finite. 
 
3.2 The Problem 
 
Assume that the following claims are plausible134.  
                                                
133  The example is taken from [Edwards 1995]. Much of what I say in this sub-section is 
inspired by Edward’s argument, presented in that paper, against Dummett’s verificationist 
account of the concept of universal quantification. However, Edwards relies on the example in 
order to make a different case from the one I make here. In particular, his argument has a 
different target. For Edwards’ aim is to show that: 
 
• A verificationist account of the universal quantifier is ultimately unable to meet the 
epistemic standards at play in Dummett’s own views on assertoric sense; 
 
• This is the case in virtue of the account’s inability to remain faithful to Dummett’s 
‘Fundamental Assumption’ [Edwards 1995: 91-92].  
 
My argument is not intended to undermine the plausibility of a verificationist account of 
the universal quantifier, but rather the notion of a domain when the latter is meant to play an 
epistemic role. 
134  The conjunction of these claims provides a radically simplified rendering of the 
verificationist story about the contribution that the universal quantifier makes to sense. 
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i) The assertoric sense of the sentence tokened in 8) is fixed by the conditions 
that would warrant its use to make an assertion; 
ii) These conditions should be identified with the possession of a canonical 
warrant for the sentence; 
iii) A canonical warrant for a sentence S in which the universal quantifier 
figures as the main concept ingredient (henceforth: S∀) is a canonical proof 
of the sentence from warranted premises– i.e., a derivation of the sentence 
terminated by an application of the introduction rule for ‘∀’, and all of 
whose lines that do not depend on any hypothesis which is discharged in 
the course of the proof are simpler than the conclusion S∀.135 
iv) A canonical proof of S∀ provides a subject with a canonical epistemic route to 
the sense of S∀, in the sense that all other warrants that one may have for an 
assertion of S∀ are subordinate to that provided by the Introduction rule. 
That they are subordinate must be understood in an epistemic sense: as 
Edwards puts it,  
 
other states of information are warrants [for S∀] because they show us that we could have 
had a warrant [for S∀] from warranted premises which were simpler than S∀, a warrant 
terminated by an introduction rule [for S∀].  
         [Edwards 1995: 91] 
 
So, in this framework, to understand the assertoric sense of 8), a speaker must grasp 
what counts as a canonical warrant for 8). We can regiment 8) in standard first order 
notation, as in: 
 
9) ∀x(Fx→Dx) 
 
                                                
135  [Edwards 1995: 91]. For a full definition of a canonical proof, cf [Dummett 1991: 260]. 
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where F is the predicate ‘being John’s fingernail’, and D is the predicate ‘is dirty’. In 
order to understand the sense of 8) a speaker must understand that a proof whose 
penultimate step is an instance of 
 
10) Fa→Da 
 
is a canonical proof of 9), where, in 10), a is a free variable that does not appear in any 
of the assumptions on which 10) depends or in 9).  
 
Our grasp of what counts as a warrant for 9) then presupposes that we also grasp what 
counts as a warrant for 10) – that is, for a sentence containing free variables. In effect, 
Dummett recognizes that to articulate the notion of a canonical warrant for S∀  we need 
a rule for free variables – that is, we need an account of the conditions under which a 
sentence containing a free variable a can be inferred from premises not containing a 
free [Dummett 1991: 259]. [Edwards 1995: 94] renders the relevant rule as follows: 
 
An argument Γ - A(a) where Γ does not contain a free is valid just in case each instance of it Γ 
- A(t) is valid, where t is any constant term in the language substituted uniformly for a 
throughout Γ - A(a)136. 
 
So, in order to grasp the assertoric sense of 9), a speaker must grasp the sense 
of 10), that is: he must understand that a derivation of 10), which respects the 
constraint just formulated as a rule for free variables, is a canonical warrant for 10). 
How does he acquire such a warrant for 10)? Well, the rule for free variables is 
formulated in terms of each instance of the relevant argument being valid – in terms, 
that is, of possession of a canonical warrant for each instance. A speaker must then 
grasp what counts as a warrant for each instance of 10), plus the fact that all the 
                                                
136  As Edwards notes, Dummett does not directly formulate the rule in terms of the 
validity of each instance of the argument – however, he does speak of the argument as being 
valid when we have an effective means for transforming a canonical warrant for the premises 
into the canonical warrant for the conclusion, for each instance of the argument. 
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warrants acquired by verifying each instance of 10) amount to possession of a warrant 
for 10).  
How does he verify each instance of 10)?  
Assume that he knows that he is dealing with a finite totality (the fingernails of John’s 
hands), and assume that John’s fingers are right in front of him, ready for inspection. 
The speaker looks at the first fingernail, and determines that it is dirty (so he has 
verified an instance of 10)); he looks at the second fingernail, at the third, etc.., and 
determines for each of them that it is dirty. He stops at the 10th fingernail, and realizes 
that there are no more fingernails to inspect.  
We are now tempted to say that he has verified each instance of 10) – the 
realization that that there are no more instances to check provides him, prima facie, 
with a canonical warrant for 10). 
Except that it doesn’t – that it: this simple procedure, based on the surveyability of the 
domain to inspect in order to acquire a warrant for 10), does not yield a canonical 
warrant for 10). Why not? Because the instances of the open sentence tokened in 10) 
do not form a finite, surveyable totality: since we can keep introducing names and 
demonstratives in the language ad libitum, the totality of instances of 10) will be 
denumerably infinite.  
The appearance that a warrant such as the procedure described is a warrant for 
10) was generated by the prior knowledge, on the part of the speaker, that the relevant 
instances of 10) form a finite totality (the totality of fingernails of John’s hands). The 
warrant achieved by checking each of John’s fingernails is directly a warrant for 9), not 
for 10) – it is only once this warrant has been gained that 10) may be asserted.  
But, then, the contribution that the specification of a domain supposedly makes 
to the assertoric sense of 9) affects 10), the immediate premise of 9) in its canonical 
derivation, in the following way. We understand what counts as a warrant for 10) only 
once we have understood what counts as a warrant for 9), in particular once we have 
understood that the domain of instances of 9) is finite and thus surveyable.  
If this is the case, the conditions for grasping the assertoric sense of 9) are 
subject to a form of epistemic circularity. For consider that 10) was supposed to 
provide a warrant for 9). In other words, in the verificationist account of the sense of 
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9), our understanding of the assertoric sense of 9) presupposes an understanding of the 
assertoric sense of (10), as establishing 10) was supposed to be a step in the acquisition 
of a canonical warrant for 9). Here we have, however, that an understanding of the 
sense of 10) itself presupposes an understanding of the sense of 9). Worse than this, we 
have that, under the assumption that it is only surveyable domains that allow us to gain 
a warrant for a quantified sentence, possession of a warrant for 10) presupposes 
possession for a warrant for 9).  
 
The upshot of the argument is, then, that the assumption that what counts as a 
canonical warrant for S∀ should be restricted by the relevant epistemic constraint on 
the domain specified for S∀, gives rise to a form of epistemic circularity. If domains are 
not epistemically irrelevant, one is tempted to claim, then, under certain assumptions, 
they contribute to an account of grasping the sense of the universal quantifier that is 
circular. 
 
Furthermore, the idea that only surveyable domains determinately contribute 
to the assertoric sense of universally quantified sentences appears to have another 
disastrous consequence. This can be rendered as follows.  
10) is naturally rendered as a schema. In the view under discussion, it seems 
that schemas such as 10) will only receive a determinate assertoric sense when they are 
understood as restricted. In particular, they will only receive a determinate assertoric 
sense when the legitimate instances of the schematic letters occurring in them are 
taken to belong to a finite domain, i.e. to have a range that is finite. 
However, the very idea that such instances should have a range appears to be 
inconsistent with the notion of a schema. For the generality that a schema is meant to 
express is semantically unconstrained generality. A coherent notion of schematic 
generality, then, requires that the only constraints that we place on a schema be 
syntactic in nature. The association of the notion of a domain of quantification with the 
notion of a schema, won’t, in other words, serve the purposes of any view about 
schematicity – it will simply defeat the very idea. 
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The obvious way out of the difficulties just sketched, of course, to claim that 
what counts as a canonical warrant for 10) shouldn’t be rendered in terms of the 
notion of each instance of the schema, but, rather, in terms of the notion of any 
instance – or of some other notion that is not either semantically or epistemically 
equivalent to quantificational generality.  
In Chapter III I argued that the distinction between quantificational generality 
and schematic generality, as it is spelt out in the current philosophical literature on the 
subject, not only rests on unjustified assumptions, but also runs the risk of being 
devoid of any substance. Here I shall simply offer the following consideration. Until an 
account of what it is to have a warrant for ‘any’ instance of a schema is provided that 
does not itself rely on the notion of a domain, we have no reason to think that an 
appeal to schematic generality will allow us to escape the epistemic difficulties 
encountered by the domain model. 
 
3.3 Qualifications: Which Kind of Circularity? 
 
The structure and object of the argument discussed in this section require 
some clarification. This is partly because the problem that I intended to highlight in 
my discussion of the relation between 9) and 10) may be easily confused with a distinct 
problem, concerning our grasp of basic rules of inference.  
The latter, which was not meant to play any role in the argument, consists in 
the well-known difficulty that arises when we try to articulate how someone may arrive 
at an understanding of a concept-defining rule, e.g. the introduction or elimination 
rule for a logical concept. This difficulty can be rendered in the following terms.  
In virtue of how the rules are presented to us, our grasping them appears to 
presuppose that we already have an intuitive grasp of the concepts that they define 
(think, for example, of the introduction rule for conjunction). If we take a basic rule of 
inference to be the means via which a subject learns a logical concept, then we will be 
confronted either with an obvious epistemic circularity or with the problem of 
clarifying what a subject’s intuitive (pre-conceptual?) grasp of a concept consists in.  
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 As already noted, this is not the epistemic circularity that is at stake in the 
argument discussed. If it were, I believe that both the interest and the clarity of the 
argument would be greatly reduced. For the learnability problem just sketched may 
very well be simply an artifact of our linguistic characterization of basic rules of 
inference137. 
 
 Rather, the difficulty that the argument in this section intended to highlight has 
a very different source. It originates from the conjunction between: 
 
• A model-theoretic rendering of the inference rule for the derivation of 
(statements containing) free variables - that is: a rendering of the rule ultimately 
in terms of (model-theoretic) quantificational generality; 
 
• The idea that domains of quantification must be surveyable in order for 
someone to acquire a warrant for / determinately grasp the sense of assertions 
of sentences in which the universal quantifier occurs. 
 
The line of reasoning in the argument may, then, be further clarified as follows.  
 
According to Dummett’s verificationist account, in order to possess a warrant for a 
sentence of the form ∀xFx, we first need to acquire a warrant for Fa, where a is a free 
variable. Acquiring a warrant for Fa, however, means: acquiring a warrant for each 
instance F(t) of Fa. But, under the assumptions that: 
 
• To possess a warrant for each instance of Fa is to possess a warrant for all of 
them (where ‘all’ ranges over a domain of quantification); 
 
                                                
137  And, in any case, nowhere in this Thesis I have committed myself to the claim that we 
learn the logical concepts by being presented with the relevant concept-defining rules. 
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• The domain of instances of Fa must be finite in order to be surveyable by a 
subject (and thus, under the view that we are considering, for a subject to 
acquire a warrant for Fa); 
 
in order to acquire a warrant for each instance F(t), we already need to possess a 
warrant for ∀xFx. For, since in Dummett’s project a warrant is a reflectively appreciable 
warrant (in order to possess it, we need to know what counts as the relevant warrant), 
we need to know what counts as a warrant for Fa: and a warrant for Fa is a warrant 
that, as it were, doesn’t leave any instance out. To have a warrant for Fa, then, we will 
have to already know that the domain in ∀xFx is surveyable, and have a warrant for 
the claim that its members instantiate the property denoted by F.  
  
One may argue, at this point, that the problem lies not with the appeal to 
domains, whether surveyable or not, but with a further assumption in Dummett’s 
problem, mentioned in the clarification above. The assumption is that a warrant, in 
order to contribute to our grasp of sense, must be a reflectively appreciable warrant.  
 
My reply to this point is the following. That a warrant must be reflective in 
order to count as a warrant is a claim that, in the case of the concept of universal 
quantification, shouldn’t be seen as motivated by considerations independent of the 
inferential role of the concept itself. That is: the problem does not appear to be with 
Dummett’s specific assumptions, but with the universal quantifier itself, and in 
particular with the quantifier’s introduction rule.  
For consider alternatives for rendering the rule, which are not model-theoretic 
in nature. In particular, consider the alternative that I defended in Chapter III, 
according to which quantificational generality must be understood as purely inferential 
generality. Remember the rendering of Universal Generalization as: 
 
(UG) ϕ(τ) |- (∀x)ϕ(x) 
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where τ is a schematic letter for individual terms, ϕ is a schematic letter whose 
legitimate instances are formulas, and x is an individual variable. The rule says: from 
the fact that ϕ(τ) has been derived for an arbitrary τ, you can infer ϕ(x) for all x, where 
x is not bound in ϕ, and where the condition on the arbitrariness of τ is that τ does not 
occur in any of the premises from which ϕ(τ) has been derived – that is: in the 
derivation of ϕ(τ) there were no special assumptions made about τ or ϕ. 
In order to grasp the generality expressed by (UG), and thus to be warranted 
when asserting a sentence of the form (∀x)ϕ(x), we need to grasp certain inferential 
conditions concerning τ - we need, in other words, to have explicit beliefs about the 
circumstances in which we may infer to the conclusion of the rule. The warrant that 
we need in order to correctly assert (∀x)ϕ(x) is, thus, a reflective warrant in this case as 
well.  
The fact that such a warrant has to be reflective appears to have a structural 
link with the concept of generality itself – in particular, it appears to depend on the 
intuitive epistemic gap between a commitment to a specific (arbitrary) instance and an 
exhaustive commitment to ‘all’ instances. 
 The inferentialist solution that I offered in Chapter III attempts to fill this gap 
by appeal to a reformulation of the notion of an ‘arbitrary’ instance as a way to specify 
the correct inferential conditions for the concept of universal quantification; the 
domain model, on the other hand, naturally appeals to a subject’s grasp of the notion 
of exhaustiveness (and is confronted by the difficulties that we have seen in this and in 
the previous section).  
In either case, that a warrant for a sentence of the form  (∀x)F(x)  has to be a 
reflective warrant doesn’t appear to depend on the specific assumptions of any given 
way of thinking about assertoric sense138. 
 
                                                
138  This consideration indirectly strengthens one of the claims that I defended in Chapter 
I. For if I am right, it follows that Boghossian’s notion of a blind inference cannot be applied to 
the introduction rule for the universal quantifier. As the notion relies on the idea that for 
concept-constituting inferences we don’t need a reflectively appreciable warrant, his account is 
potentially confronted by a major difficulty when dealing with UG – in general, when dealing 
with schematic rules. Thanks to Crispin Wright for having clarified this point to me. 
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4. DOMAINS IN CONTEXT  
 
4.1 Background 
 
A view that I take to be plausible, and endorse, is that context affects the 
proposition expressed by an assertion of a quantified sentence S∀139. If we identify the 
proposition expressed by (an assertion of) a sentence with the assertoric sense of the 
sentence in context, then the view amounts to the following general claim: that the 
assertoric sense of an utterance of a quantified sentence, and therefore its truth value, 
is fixed by the context of assertion. When it comes to determining how context fixes 
the assertoric sense of a sentence S∀ there are, of course, a number of options 
available. The option that is relevant here consists in the claim that context fixes the 
sense of a sentence S∀ primarily via the assignment of a domain of quantification to S∀. 
That is: context supplies an interpretation for the universal quantifier, an 
interpretation which consists in the specification of a domain, and this interpretation 
directly fixes, or contributes to fixing, the assertoric sense received by S∀ in context.  
 
In Section 2, the idea with which we started was that the contextual assignment 
of a domain of quantification might contribute to fixing sense by determining (limiting) 
the scope of the inferential commitments that come with an assertion of S∀. The 
argument was then meant to show that the specification of a domain of quantification, 
                                                
139  Although my endorsement of the view commonly referred to as ‘semantic 
contextualism’ for quantifier expressions does not play any crucial role in the argument that 
follows, it will, as it were, be an active assumption in the discussion in Section 5. In sub-section 
5.2, I will explicitly discuss some aspects of the relation between my own articulation of this 
view and a version of contextualism such as Recanati’s, which takes pragmatic features of the 
context to have a pre-propositional impact. 
 It should be noted that semantic contextualism usually takes contextual interpretations 
of the universal quantifier to consist in the specification of a domain [Stanley & Szabò 2000; 
Stanley 2000; Glanzberg 2006]. In the light of this, my adherence to semantic contextualism 
should be further qualified as follows. I agree with the semantic contextualist that context-
sensitivity is to be found at the level of the proposition expressed via an utterance, rather than at 
the level of the proposition pragmatically conveyed, but strongly disagree on the rendering of the 
mechanisms via which it yields an output. 
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constrained by a prima facie plausible formulation of the condition that such domain 
be determinate, is in fact, with certain qualifications, epistemically irrelevant.  
In Section 3, the notion of a domain of quantification was put to the test of 
inferential warrants: the idea was that a domain may contribute to fixing the sense of a 
sentence S∀  by contributing to determine what should count as a canonical warrant for 
S∀. The notion (more precisely: an epistemically constrained version of the intuitive 
notion of a domain) appeared to fail the test.  
 
 The two arguments are not, of course, conclusive – nor is their conjunction. 
For, among the options that they do not consider, is the idea that the difficulties seen 
originate in the attempt to give an inferential account of assertoric sense – that is, not 
with the idea of a domain itself, but with the idea that the assertoric sense received by 
(an utterance of) S∀ in context should be rendered inferentially140.  
 The argument I intend to offer in this sub-section does not rely on such a 
rendering. This is not to say that, by itself, the argument is – if successful – conclusive. 
For it relies itself on a set of general assumptions about what an assertoric context 
should be expected to do if we are to view it as providing a sense-determining 
specification of a domain.  
It is, however, to say the following: that if the argument is successful, the idea that 
domains of quantification are the sort of things that may contribute to fixing the 
assertoric sense of a quantified sentence in context is at least highly implausible. 
 
 Let us assume, then, that, given the utterance in context of a sentence S∀, 
context contributes to the proposition it expresses via the assignment of a domain to 
the (thus) interpreted occurrence of the quantifier in the sentence. I shall henceforth 
refer to this idea as domain-contextualism.  
When I assert, for example: 
 
                                                
140  Of course, the arguments also leave open the possibility that there are other, more 
plausible, ways of articulating the intuitive notion of a domain, which could prove to be better 
candidates, as it were, in the race for epistemic relevance. 
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11) Everyone is a philosopher 
 
in a context C, domain-contextualism will say that the domain that C assigns to 
‘everyone’ contributes to determine the sense of (the relevant tokening of) 11). We 
then understand 11) as expressing the proposition that it does also in virtue of this 
assignment.  
 An intuitive way of characterizing the task that C is performing here is the 
following. C associates a sub-set of the universe of discourse with an occurrence of the 
quantifier, and the output of the performance of this (semantic) task has an impact on 
what is being asserted by a speaker who asserts 11) in C.  
How exactly context manages to do this is, of course, a crucial open question – 
however, I will not focus on it just yet. Let us simply assume, to start with, that context 
does manage to do this.   
 I take it that the following is a plausible assumption. The assertion of a 
sentence S∀ in a context C is normally successful – that is: communication via the 
assertion of quantified sentences normally results in speakers and audience 
understanding each other. If this is the case, then a constraint on the way in which we 
choose to render contextual assignment of a domain is that the assignment be, in 
normal cases of communication, determinate: the resultant sense received by S∀ is 
normally a determinate one, and it is the same for all the speakers in C.  
 There may be, of course, cases in which something goes wrong – cases, that is, 
in which the output of the contextual specification of a domain does not result in 
determinacy of sense for S∀, or in a shared grasp of S∀’s determinate sense. However, 
the constraint that successful communication be rendered as the default case 
implicates that there must be ways, available to domain-contextualism, of explaining 
failures of determinacy, which do not endanger the idea that in normal circumstances 
the contextual specification of a domain determinately contributes to fixing assertoric 
sense.  
 
The status of a domain’s such contribution can be rendered in four different ways: 
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• As necessary for an utterance of S∀ in context to express a determinate 
proposition; 
• As sufficient for an utterance of S∀ in context to express a determinate 
proposition; 
• As both necessary and sufficient for an utterance of S∀ in context to express a 
determinate proposition; 
• As neither necessary nor sufficient for an utterance of S∀ in context to express a 
determinate proposition. 
 
I take it that if the idea that contextually specified domains are to play any 
substantial role in fixing the proposition expressed by an utterance of S∀ is to be 
granted some initial plausibility, then we may rule out the fourth option as simply 
uninformative. 
The claim that the contextual specification of a domain is sufficient for fixing the 
assertoric sense of a quantified utterance is in turn subject to obvious objections – for 
clearly other conditions will have to obtain, which have to do with the other 
constituents of S∀  receiving a determinate sense as well, with the sentence in question 
being grammatical, etc. 
In what follows, I shall therefore assume that the claim that should be associated 
with domain-contextualism is that the contextual specification of a determinate domain 
is a necessary condition for S∀  to receive a determinate assertoric sense. 
 
4.2 A Possible Scenario141. 
 
Imagine that a child, call him Brian, is in his room, counting the members of 
his collection of colored pencils. Lisa, his sister, is also in her room, drawing with her 
own colored pencils. At one point she pauses to look at them, realizes that she has 
                                                
141  The example that follows is inspired by [Gauker 1997], although the use that I make of 
it is different from Gauker’s. He deploys (a slightly different version of) the example in the 
context of an argument against the expressive theory of linguistic communication.  
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quite a few, and, overwhelmed by happiness and pride at the thought of owning so 
many colored pencils bursts into Brian’s room and passionately utters: 
 
12) All the colored pencils are mine! 
 
thinking of her own pencils. Brian, however, who is always very anxious about the 
safety of his possessions, takes Lisa to refer to his own colored pencils – and 
vehemently denies the truth of 12). 
 
Intuitively, the disagreement between Brian and Lisa, and the argument that 
follows, depends on a misunderstanding: a different interpretation of 12) is at stake for 
the two siblings. In particular, we are tempted to say, what is different is the domain 
on which the universal quantifier ranges – in Lisa’s interpretation of the utterance, the 
domain is restricted to the colored pencils in her room; in Brian’s interpretation, it 
includes the pencils in his room. Let us label Lisa’s interpretation of the utterance as 
12-L), and Brian’s interpretation as 12-B). Then the challenge for domain-
contextualism is to explain the mismatch between 12-L) and 12-B) (that is: to say 
whether Lisa and Brian are disagreeing about something, and if so what it is that they 
are disagreeing about) in the light of the task that context is taken to perform with 
respect to 12). 
 
4.3 Interpretation: The Options 
 
 It seems that there are five options available in accounting for such a mismatch, 
which correspond to five different renderings of the intuitive failure of communication 
at play in the example142. I shall first present a simplified version of the options, and 
                                                
142  There is in fact a sixth option: 
 
6) There is no single context shared by Brian and Lisa 
 
The natural way to articulate 6) is by saying that there are two contexts at play in the example, 
and each (or either) assigns  (a) domain(s) to Lisa’s utterance. 
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then articulate the renderings to which they correspond in the course of their 
discussion. 
 
1) In this case, context does not assign a determinate domain of quantification to 
Lisa’s utterance of 12). Therefore the assertoric sense of 12) is indeterminate; 
neither Brian nor Lisa can determinately grasp the sense of 12), and their 
apparent disagreement is merely the result of a confusion; 
 
2) In the example, context does assign a determinate domain of quantification to 
12), but the assertoric sense of 12) is still indeterminate, therefore, as in option 
1), neither Brian nor Lisa can determinately grasp the sense of 12). Thus, once 
again, they are only apparently disagreeing; 
 
3) In the example, context assigns a determinate domain of quantification to 12), 
and the assertoric sense of 12) is determinate, but neither Brian nor Lisa grasp 
it; 
 
4) In the example, context assigns a determinate domain of quantification to 12),  
the assertoric sense of 12) is determinate, and only Lisa grasps it; 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 I shall not discuss this option in the main text, as I believe that it may straightforwardly 
be regarded as: 
 
• Highly counterintuitive; 
 
• Unmotivated, and thus at best able to provide an ad-hoc solution to the problem 
considered (what is the evidence, in the example, for the claim that we should regard 
Lisa and Brian as participants in different contexts?); 
 
• At high risk of over-generalization (any failure of communication can be ‘explained’ by 
an appeal to a multiplication of contexts or sub-contexts embedded in the original 
context of utterance); 
 
• Potentially leading to the discussion of an issue from the one on which I intend to 
focus in what follows. Namely: the lack of clear individuation criteria for a context of 
utterance. 
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5) In the example, context assigns a determinate domain of quantification to 12),  
the assertoric sense of 12) is determinate, and only Brian grasps it. 
 
Discussion of Option 1 
 
According to option 1, context does not assign a determinate domain of 
quantification to Lisa’s utterance of 12).  
Therefore, 12) does not receive a determinate assertoric sense. In virtue of this, 
neither Brian nor Lisa can grasp its assertibility conditions. Neither of them grasps, for 
example, what counts as a justification for 12), or under which conditions 12) is true.  
There is, then, nothing about which Brian and Lisa are really disagreeing – for 
there can be no way to resolve their alleged disagreement.  The appearance of a 
disagreement (the fact that the linguistic features of Brian’s response to the utterance 
of 12) prima facie indicate that there is one) can be explained as follows.  
In the lack of a determinate domain supplied by context, the siblings take the 
sense of 12) to be the sense of their respective (and conflicting) interpretations of 12). 
Brian, then, believes that Lisa is asserting 12-B) (but she is not), and, in turn, we may 
imagine that Lisa polemically responds to Brian’s utterance in a way based on the false 
belief that Brian is denying 12-L). The appearance of a disagreement is then the result 
of a confusion, on the part of the speakers, between the sense that Lisa’s utterance of 
12) would have received had context been successful in specifying a domain for the 
quantifier, and the sense that each of them has ascribed to the utterance of 12) in the 
absence of an objective one.  
We may even think of this confusion between objective assertoric sense and 
subjective interpretation of sense as originating from a plausible expectation on the 
part of speaker and audience: the default-expectation that, as in standard cases of 
communication, context will provide a determinate domain for 12). The suggestion 
would then be: when it doesn’t, speaker and audience will come up, as it were, with 
the substitute that is the most plausible given the subjective circumstances of 
interpretation. 
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The problem with this reading of the example consists in trying to articulate 
why context has failed to specify a determinate domain for 12); in particular, it consists 
in the availability to domain-contextualism of a suitable story for this. For consider the 
following. 
 
When context assigns a domain to the quantifier occurring in a sentence S∀, we may 
represent the task it performs at two different levels.  
The first is the level of the output of the assignment: at this level, context may be 
regarded as performing a purely semantic task. That is: we may think of such an 
assignment merely as the result of the selection of a sub-set of the objects available for 
quantification at a given time, and we may represent this selection as the pairing of the 
relevant occurrence of the quantifier and the sub-set that it receives. In order to 
describe the output of the process, we merely need to understand which semantic 
features of the context are relevant for interpretation. This is what, for example, goes 
on in [Stanley & Szabò 2000]: a context is taken to be merely a sequence of objects, 
and the assignment of a domain in context consists in the specification of a value for a 
function f(i) with which quantifiers are associated at the level of the logical form of a 
sentence S∀. Note that what is being described at the level of the output is not (or 
should not be taken to be) how context manages to fix sense – but merely the 
(simplified and regimented) semantic output of such fixing. 
The second is the level of the process in which the assignment consists: at this 
level, features of the context other than the ones postulated by the semantic 
representation of the output may well (indeed: should) play a role. An explanation of 
what the assignment of a domain to a quantifier consists in, is, at this level, an answer 
to the question: in virtue of which mechanisms does context determinately assign a 
domain to an utterance of, for example, 12)? Because the question concerns the facts in 
virtue of which, in general, contextual interpretation takes the form that it does, the 
answer cannot be given in purely semantic terms – for the semantics is precisely what 
needs to be explained. 
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Now, consider the kind of things that may play a role in determining whether 
the contextual assignment of a domain to an occurrence of the universal quantifier is 
successful, at each of these two levels. 
 
At the level of the representation of the semantic output, these will be linguistic 
facts, and they will include grammatical, syntactic and semantic rules. The rules will in 
turn include semantic rules for interpreting on the basis of context. An example of one 
such rule, if one endorses the account of contextual quantifier restrictions given by 
Stanley and Szabò, is the rule that specifies the range of legitimate values for the 
individual variable which is the argument of the function associated with the quantifier 
at the level of the logical form of S∀ . Provided that the rules are well-defined, that S∀ is 
grammatically correct and syntactically well-formed, and – if we endorse the domain 
model – that the set of objects assigned to the quantifier as the contextually salient 
domain respects certain constraints (for example, that it is not the domain of absolutely 
everything), nothing can go wrong in the production of a semantic output given the 
syntactic input S∀.  
 
At the level of the process, things are of course much more complicated. At this 
level, we need to determine what makes it the case that an instance of the universal 
quantifier receives a specific contextual interpretation – how it is that, in a given 
context C, the output of the domain restriction in C happens to be what it is.  
There are, of course, a number of options for articulating the relevant facts. 
Here we just need to note the following.  
Some of these facts will be linguistic (in particular: semantic) – they will, for 
example, constrain what may be expressed by a speaker’s utterance given her choice of 
words; what counts as a semantic consequence of the propositions that she asserts, etc.  
Some of these facts will have a pragmatic nature: they will for example consist, 
if we follow the Gricean account, in speaker’s intentions, in hypotheses about how the 
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audience will interpret what she intends to convey, in the audience inferring what the 
speaker’s intentions are on the basis of the external context, etc143. 
Finally, we may think of a sub-set of the relevant facts as having an epistemic 
nature – these will be facts concerning speakers epistemic commitments, and beliefs 
about the assertoric sense of a (tokening of a) sentence - beliefs, for example, about 
what counts as a justification of the assertion in question, or which assertoric 
commitments come with it. 
 
So, which ones of the facts above, and at which level, can domain-
contextualism invoke to explain why context does not assign a domain to 12)? 
Intuitively, it seems that, in the example, nothing has gone wrong at the level of 
the grammatical, syntactic and semantic mechanisms that govern the specification of a 
domain. The uttered sentence is grammatically correct and syntactically well-formed, 
any domain that we would intuitively associate with an utterance of 12) in the context 
is, as it were, a ‘semantically innocent’ one, etc. 
What has gone wrong must then concern the facts that have an impact on the 
process of contextual domain specification – either the pragmatic facts or the epistemic 
ones.  
Consider the epistemic facts first. These ultimately concern speaker’s and 
audience’s understanding of (the sense of) 12). To explain the fact that context ends up 
not supplying a domain for 12), one may then argue as follows. In order for context to 
determinately supply a domain for an occurrence of the universal quantifier, there 
must be a match between the speaker’s grasp of what the salient domain is for the 
occurrence in question, and the audience’s grasp of the same fact. If there is no such 
match (if speaker and audience understand the quantifier as ranging on different 
domains), then contextual specification of a domain fails, and the assertoric sense of an 
uttered sentence is left indeterminate. 
 
                                                
143 I am here adopting (and generalizing) the distinction in [Gauker 1997] between context 
simpliciter, which may include speakers’ intentional states, and external context, intuitively 
understood as the context simpliciter minus the speakers’ intentional states. 
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The problem with the claim above is that it rests on a confusion.  
The confusion concerns the direction of the explanation that domain-
contextualism has to offer here. For its main claim is that contextually specified 
domains contribute to fixing the assertoric sense of a quantified sentence uttered in 
context. In virtue of this, they contribute to our understanding, in context, of this 
sense – in particular, they contribute to our grasp of the (relevant contextual restriction 
on) the range of the quantifier. It is, in other words, because of the contribution that 
domains make to sense that we understand the latter as being what it is – indeed, the 
idea under discussion is that speaker and audience don’t grasp the sense of 12) because 
there is no sense to be grasped. But then one can’t appeal to whether speaker and 
audience grasp the sense of 12) in order to explain why 12) supposedly fails to have 
one.  
An appeal to epistemic facts in explaining failure of determinacy, then, raises a 
problem of circularity for domain-contextualism. 
 
Furthermore, there are, intuitively, many things that can go wrong when it 
comes to speakers’ grasp of sense. An audience may fail to grasp the sense of an 
assertion because of linguistic incompetence, because she has misheard, because he 
has false beliefs about the reasons that motivate the speaker’s choice of words, etc. Do 
we want to say that every time one such fact obtains, context fails to specify a 
determinate domain of quantification?  
The epistemic option, it seems, also runs the risk of over-generalizing. 
 
Let us say, then, that it is pragmatic factors that determine whether context 
successfully specifies a domain. This option appears to be in line with our intuitions 
about what has gone wrong in the case of Lisa’s utterance of 12). Suppose, for 
example, that one says that what contributes to determine whether a determinate 
domain is specified for a speaker’s utterance depends on the obtaining of a match 
between the speaker’s intentions and the audience’s interpretation of such intentions. 
The audience will typically infer them from facts about the external context. 
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For example, if a speaker utters 12) and there is only one collection of pencils 
in her visual range, the audience will reasonably infer that the occurrence of the 
quantifier in the asserted sentence ranges over that collection. In the example, this 
seems to be exactly what Brian is doing when he is implicitly ascribing to Lisa the 
intention to convey the information that she owns all of his pencils. But his inference 
happens to be false – Lisa has a different collection in mind. Because Brian fails to 
understand Lisa’s intention on the basis of the external context (intuitively: because 
the external context provides insufficient information to correctly infer such an 
intention), then context does not specify a determinate domain for 12). 
 
The problem with this option is, however, that it is not clear how, in domain 
contextualism, the contextual specification of a domain of quantification is supposed to 
depend on pragmatic facts. For consider the following.  
The distinction between the level of the output of such a specification and the 
level of the process which results in this output can in effect be understood in two 
different ways. In particular, one may regard the level of the output as: 
 
• Merely a way to represent, via the suitable semantic (typically: set-theoretic) 
means, the fact that the process of contextual assignment of sense has been 
successful; 
 
• An accurate description of how, in an assertoric context, speakers understand the 
semantics of their claims. 
 
The first alternative deprives domain-contextualism of any substance. For it 
amounts to the claim that, if all the facts that determine the contextual specification of 
assertoric sense for an utterance such as 12) obtain, then speakers can assign 
determinate truth conditions (and thus a determinate truth value) to their claims, and 
that we can conveniently represent this output by appeal to the notion of a domain. If 
the proponent of domain-contextualism goes for this option, he will commit himself to 
the idea that domains are merely, as it were, useful fictions – they are the way in which 
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we find it convenient to represent the success of contextual determination of sense. 
Domains will, then, be epistemically irrelevant: strictly speaking, they don’t make any 
contribution to the sense of a quantified sentence in context. What does make this 
contribution is a set of pragmatic facts, which have to do with how speakers interpret 
each others’ intentions and with their hypotheses about each others’ beliefs.  
 
The second alternative is incomplete: it requires that domain-contextualism 
provides a story about how speakers understand the semantics of their quantified 
claims, and in particular about why and how they understand it in terms of domains. Until 
such a story is provided, we can remain neutral about the plausibility of the alternative, 
and not consider it for further discussion.  
 
Discussion of Option 2 
 
According to option 2, context does assign a determinate domain to Lisa’s 
utterance of 12), but this is not enough for 12) to have a determinate assertoric sense. 
After all, the claim that contextually specified domains make, given that certain 
grammatical, syntactic and semantic conditions are met, a determinate contribution to 
sense, does not commit us to the stronger claim that this contribution has to be 
understood in terms of sufficiency.  
Other facts will play a role – again, natural candidates are facts about the external 
context, facts about speakers’ intentions and their interpretations, facts about their 
beliefs, etc. 
One who endorses this option as the correct interpretation of what goes wrong 
in the example then faces two tasks. The first is to say what the domain assigned by the 
context to Lisa’s utterance of 12) is. The second is to provide a story about why, given 
this assignment, the sense of 12) is still not determinate. Here I will focus on the first. 
 
So, which domain does the context in the example assign to 12)? There are four 
alternatives. 
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i) The domain of pencils in Lisa’s room, i.e. the domain that corresponds to 
interpretation 12-L); 
ii) The domain of pencils in Brian’s room, i.e. the domain that corresponds to 
interpretation 12-B); 
iii) Neither of these; 
iv) Both of these. 
 
# Consider i). The idea is that the domain specified by context is the one that 
contributes to the assertoric sense that the speaker intends to convey – independently of 
whether she succeeds in doing so (indeed, independently of whether the other facts 
relevant for the determination of sense obtain).  
 
There are two problems with this idea. The first is that one can provide a number 
of examples in which the speakers’ intentions would require that a certain domain is 
assigned to a quantified utterance, but an intuitive understanding of her utterance in 
context suggests otherwise.   
Consider the following scenarios. 
 
• In the context of the original example, Lisa intends to fool Brian. Knowing how 
concerned he is about his private property, she is looking for a way to assert 
something that will make him angry. However, she is preoccupied with what 
her mother will say if she tells a lie. Therefore, she has to find a way to speak 
the truth and mislead Brian at the same time. She then bursts into Brian’s room 
uttering 12), thinking that Brian will interpret it as in 12-B). By doing so, she 
intends to quantify over her own collection of pencils, but to convey the 
impression that she is quantifying over Brian’s. Independently of whether she 
succeeds in fooling Brian, it seems that the reason why she can entertain the 
thought of deploying an utterance of 12) to this aim, is because she can count 
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on the fact that the contextually specified domain for 12) is the domain of 
Brian’s pencils – i.e., the domain corresponding to interpretation 12-B)144. 
 
• In the context of a seminar in theoretical physics, the speaker, John, is 
concerned that not everyone in the room will understand his rather technical 
presentation. He openly discusses the issue with the audience, and is reassured 
by a hearer, William, who utters: 
 
13) Don’t worry, everyone is a Physicist!  
 
John understands the quantifier in 13) as ranging over the domain of people in 
the seminar room – feels reassured, and goes ahead with his technical presentation. 
What William intended to convey by an utterance of 13), however, was that 
everyone (with no restriction) has, in principle, the cognitive resources to 
understand a Physics seminar if suitably introduced to the subject. According to 
our intuitions, John’s interpretation of 12) is, here, the right one: in the scenario 
considered, both the audience and external observers would regard the quantifier 
in 13) as ranging over the domain of people in the room. If our intuitions are 
wrong, then we must explain why it is so – the claim that the contribution of 
context to an interpretation of 12) does not correspond to our intuitive 
understanding of 12) in the scenario considered is empty until it is made clear, as it 
were, why we were all fooled. 
 
It seems, then, that to say that in original example context assigns the domain 
of 12-L) to 12) is either to make an ad-hoc claim, or to make one that, when 
generalized, does not pass the test of our intuitions about contextual interpretation. 
 
# Now consider ii). The idea here is that context specifies the domain that 
corresponds to the audience’s interpretation of a quantified utterance, an interpretation 
that depends on the audience’s inferring the speaker’s intentions on the basis of 
                                                
144  [Kot’àtko 1995] discusses similar cases, but in a different argumentative context. 
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elements provided by the external context. We can try to support this claim by 
appealing to the following considerations. 
 
• It would not appear to be rational to blame Brian for grasping 12) as 12-B): after 
all, nothing in the external context suggested that Lisa intended to assert 12-L). 
More than this, in virtue of the presence of Brian’s collection of pencils in the 
visual range of both speaker and audience, and the absence of Lisa’s collection 
in such range, one could say that the external context directly supported 12-B). 
So Brian is justified in thinking that she is asserting 12-B). But then the natural 
reading of the example consists in saying that context does assign to 12) the 
domain of 12-B) – and it is in virtue of this that he is justified; 
 
• The scenario involving Brian and Lisa resembles the theoretical physics 
scenario, the intuitive interpretation of which provides further evidence to 
support the claim that contextually assigned domains are typically the ones that 
a (linguistically competent) audience takes the speakers’ utterances as ranging 
upon.  
 
There are, however, at least two problems with ii).  
 
The first is that it is not at all clear that our intuitions in the Brian and Lisa 
scenario suggest that the ‘right’ domain is the one assigned in accordance with 12-B).  
Imagine that an external observer witnesses the scene – an observer who knows 
that, in her room, Lisa has a collection of pencils of which she is very proud, and that 
correctly interprets her behavior as that of someone boasting her possessions to annoy 
her brother. The observer will naturally take the quantifier in 12) as ranging over Lisa’s 
collection of pencils – that Brian does not grasp this depends on fact that the evidence 
available to him (the information provided by the external context) is misleading. True, 
Brian may be justified in taking Lisa to assert 12-B) – but this fact does not give us 
conclusive reasons to think that the domain of 12) is, against the speakers’ intentions 
and our intuitions, the one of 12-B). 
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The second is that a generalization of option ii) has a consequence that is both 
implausible and undesirable. If we say that domains are generally fixed by the 
audience’s interpretation in context, then we run the risk of depriving a speaker’s 
assertion of a quantified utterance of any objective normative consequences, because we 
will view the speakers’ assertoric commitments as not having any objective impact per 
se.  
Consider, for example, the case of a speaker, call him Matt, who often makes false 
and unjustified claims. In particular, he constantly makes false and unjustified claims 
involving the universal quantifier. He is, for example, prone to over-generalizations of 
the sort of: 
 
14) Everyone in the United Kingdom carries a knife when walking on the street 
 
Suppose that when he utters 14) his intention is not to make a figurative claim – he 
literally means that all the inhabitants of the United Kingdom carry a knife when 
walking on the street (perhaps he has been over influenced by media attention to knife 
crime).  
Suppose also that every time he utters 14) in context, his audience, who always 
happens to be more reasonable than he is, charitably interprets the quantifier in 14) as 
having a restricted range (for example: many young people, more young people than it 
used to be the case, etc.). In other words, the assertoric sense that all of Matt’s 
utterances of 14) are taken to have by the relevant audience is one that doesn’t really 
commit him to holding the belief that he actually holds. According to ii), this assertoric 
sense is the one that 14) actually takes in the contexts in which Matt asserts 14). 
But then Matt can never be blamed for his assertions of 14). He can, perhaps, still 
be blamed for his intentions, and the belief on which they depend– but what are we to 
make of intentions and beliefs that are never manifested in linguistic behavior145? 
 
                                                
145  Under the assumption that nothing in Matt’s non-linguistic behavior suggests that he 
does hold the relevant belief. 
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# The claim in iii) is incomplete, and there seems to be no plausible way of 
articulating it further. It is incomplete: for if context does not assign either the domain 
of 12-L) or the domain of 12-B) to 12), which domain does it assign, and in virtue of 
which facts? We need an answer to this question before we can even discuss the 
option. And the problem is that we have no indication of where to find such an answer 
– intuitively, once we have fixed the relevant pragmatic, semantic and grammatical 
facts about the context, and we are told that none of these facts determine the domain 
actually assigned to 12), where are we to look for to find the facts that do? 
 
# Finally, consider iv). Here the idea is that context assigns more than one domain 
to 12). Indeed, this may well be the reason why one can regard the assertoric sense of 
Lisa’s utterance of 12) as indeterminate. More precisely, it is the objective assertoric 
sense of 12) that is indeterminate – for 12) may still receive a determinate sense for 
Lisa, and a different one for Brian.  
 
The claim in iv) is subject to the last difficulty that we have encountered in the 
analysis of ii). For if we resolve cases of failure of communication merely by appeal to a 
multiplication, as it were, of the ways in which context determines (one of the elements 
that contribute to) assertoric sense, then we run the risk of depriving our assertions of 
any objective normative force, and speakers of any objective assertoric obligation146.  
 
Discussion of Option 3 
 
Recall that, according to this option, context assigns a determinate domain to 
12) (first claim), the assertoric sense of 12) in context is determinate (second claim), but 
both Lisa and Brian fail to grasp it (third claim).  
In virtue of the first claim, one who endorses this option faces the task of 
clarifying which domain context actually specifies for 12) – in doing so, one will 
encounter the difficulties discussed with respect to option 2.  
                                                
146  The claim also runs the risk of over-generalizing, in a way similar to option 6, which I 
sketched in the first footnote of the current sub-section. 
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In virtue of the second claim, one who endorses option 3 also needs to give a 
story about what the objective assertoric sense of 12) is in the context considered – 
again, under the assumption that contextual specification of a determinate domain is a 
necessary condition on the utterance of a quantified sentence expressing a determinate 
proposition, such a story will inherit the difficulties just mentioned. 
In virtue of the third claim, one who endorses the option additionally faces the 
problem of explaining why we should take context to determine objective sense in a 
way that is entirely independent of speakers’ grasp of sense. That is: via mechanisms 
that have no bearing on such a grasp. 
 
Discussion of Options 4 and 5 
 
Now consider options 4 and 5. Recall that according to both options, context 
assigns a determinate domain to 12) (first claim), the assertoric sense of 12) is 
determinate (second claim), and only one of the two participants in the context grasps 
it (the two options differ with respect to which one). 
 In virtue of the first claim, both options face the difficulties encountered by 
option 2 (and by option 3)). In particular, option 4 is confronted by the problem 
addressed in the discussion of option 2 – i); option 5 is confronted by the problem 
addressed in the discussion of option 2-ii). Both problems need to be resolved before 
we can begin to lend plausibility to either of the two options. 
 
5. COMMITMENTS IN CONTEXT 
 
Let us take stock.  
Argument a) in Section 2 and argument b) in Section 3 intended to show that if, in the 
framework of an inferentialist account of sense, we take the notion of a domain of 
quantification to contribute to fixing the assertoric sense of a sentence S∀, then we end 
up with either a circular account (if we reason in terms of inferential warrants) or a 
mystery – concerning what, exactly, the epistemic relevance of a domain amounts to. 
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Argument c) was meant to show that if we take the notion of a domain to make 
this contribution, in the framework of a contextualist account of propositional 
determinacy, then we end up with a series of difficulties in the attempt to explain what 
goes wrong when the proposition expressed by an utterance of S∀  appears to be 
indeterminate.  
 
The upshot of the arguments is this: given what I take to be plausible ways of 
understanding how the assertoric sense of S∀  is determined, the contribution that the 
notion of a domain makes to such an understanding appears to be either problematic 
or irrelevant. 
As already noted, the arguments were not meant to be conclusive – both their 
scope and the claims they supported were modest. However, if they are successful, 
they do give us good evidence for the claim that we shouldn’t understand the role 
played by domains of quantification in terms of a contribution to the (contextual) 
determination of sense, or of our grasp of sense.  
 
However, the distinction between the foundational approach and the 
descriptive approach, was meant to point to the following thought.  
Even if we endorse the claim above, we can still regard domains as playing a 
role in interpretation. This role has to be understood in the framework of a descriptive 
semantics: domains can still be treated as convenient semantic tools for giving a 
simplified representation of the output of the interpretation supplied by context for an 
uttered sentence S∀. Such a representation will typically render the output of 
contextual interpretation in terms of a domain restriction. 
 
In the light of this, the big task that an account of universal quantification has 
to face is to provide a foundational story, which does not employ the notion of a 
domain, about how context impacts on our usages of the universal quantifier147. In 
particular, if one endorses the views that: 
                                                
147  In fact, this is of course the big task that an account of quantification in general has to 
face. The restriction to universal quantification in spelling out the task is merely dictated by the 
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• (A sub-set of) our inferential commitments determine the semantics for the 
universal quantifier; 
 
• The context of utterance of a sentence S∀  typically restricts our usages of the 
universal quantifier; 
 
then the task consists in articulating, without reference to domains, how context 
manages to restrict such usages.  
The intuitive idea that I have mentioned in the discussion of argument a), is 
that we should regard context as determining the scope of our inferential commitments. 
Articulating this idea requires that one takes a stand on a number of issues, including: 
 
i. How exactly a determination of the scope our 
commitments should be understood; 
ii. The mechanisms via which context provides such a 
determination; 
iii. Which features of context are relevant for the process 
that results in the determination of a (typically) 
restricted scope for our inferential commitments – that 
is, which notion of context is best suited to an account 
of our contextual usages of the universal quantifier that 
rests on the idea presented above, and whether its 
choice can be independently motivated; 
iv. What the status and role of our inferential 
commitments are in a communicative context. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
focus of (large part of) this Thesis, and should not be understood as a way to underestimate the 
scope, and object, of the task in question. 
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An attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to any of these questions would 
require at least another Thesis. My aim in what follows is far more modest – both in 
terms of the scope and of the object of the discussion.  
In terms of the object: I will address some aspects of iii) and iv), and will not 
attempt to provide a foundational picture of contextual restrictions in context – 
although, in sub-section 5.2, I will spell out an important question that a commitment-
theoretic formulation of such a picture needs to be able to answer.  
The reason for this choice is an intuitive one: a foundational account of the 
mechanisms and processes via which our commitments are restricted in context has 
the initial obligation of clarifying what the notion of a context is meant to capture, and 
which role our inferential commitments are best regarded as playing in contextual 
communicative practices. Once this is clarified, we can then start providing a theory of 
what, in context, restricts our commitments, and how. Such a theory will be partly 
constrained by what we think a context is and how it fixes an interpretation for the 
sentences that we utter. 
 The discussion is also modest in scope: my intention is not to provide a 
systematic account of iii) and iv). Rather, I would simply like to sketch a proposal for 
iv), and to indicate a research framework for iii) – a framework, that is, within which 
contextual restrictions on our usages of the universal quantifier should be 
subsequently understood and articulated. I will start with the proposal for iv). 
 
5.1 Commitments as Propositional Presuppositions 
 
The proposal can be articulated in terms of a series of related claims, which I 
will present and discuss in sequence148. In sub-section 5.2, I will complicate the 
picture, by: 
                                                
148  The reader should be warned that the discussion will mostly consist in the articulation 
of a series of intuitions about what I take to be the natural interpretation of the linguistic 
evidence that I present. None of the claims below will be systematically defended – I simply 
want to make a case for the initial plausibility of each of them.  
Even with this modest aim in mind, I am aware that there are crucial challenges that 
need to be confronted in order for the proposal to become more than a mere sketch. Two of 
these, in particular, consist in: 
244 
 
• Discussing an important assumption, which was implicitly made throughout 
the chapter (although it had no direct bearing on the arguments presented), 
and which is explicitly articulated in some of the claims presented below; 
 
• Clarifying some aspects of my proposal in terms of their relation to a pragmatic 
story about contextual determination of propositional content. 
 
a) An utterance of a sentence in which the universal quantifier figures always comes 
with the undertaking of a commitment, on the part of the speaker, to the canonical 
consequences of the quantifier, provided that the speaker grasps the concept of 
universal quantification. The undertaking of such a commitment is a presupposition 
for the utterance to receive a determinate sense in the context of utterance (i.e. for the 
utterance to express a determinate proposition). 
 
Consider the following scenarios, in which different speech-acts are involved. 
 
# (Assertion) In a context C, Darren and Chiara are discussing about the party they 
gave the night before. The conversation goes as follows: 
 
C: Everyone who was invited came to the party 
D: Brian didn’t, and he was invited 
C: I never said he came to the party 
D: …. 
 
# (Promise) In a context C’, Chiara and Darren are discussing about the fact that 
Chiara has just dropped a box containing all of their glasses, which, as a result, broke 
into pieces. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
• Providing far more linguistic evidence to support the claims; 
 
• Articulating a credible methodology for the interpretation of the evidence discussed.  
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C: I will fix all the glasses, I promise! 
D (pointing to a few that are in very bad shape): you can’t fix these! 
C: I never committed myself to fixing those. 
D: … 
 
# (Question) In a context C’’, Chiara and Darren are discussing about the concept of 
self-identity. 
 
C: Is absolutely everything self-identical? 
D: Well, take the chair in front of you – if we say that it is self-identical… 
C: Oh, I didn’t mean to ask about that chair / that chair is irrelevant for my question 
D:… 
 
In all the scenarios above, we can imagine Darren as being puzzled by Chiara’s 
second utterance. Intuitively, in each case communication breaks down after her 
utterance – what appeared to express a determinate proposition (in each case, Chiara’s 
first utterance) isn’t clearly interpreted as doing so any longer: we can imagine Darren 
as now being unsure about what Chiara actually said.   
In each case, we can expect Darren to attempt a repair: if he is charitable, he 
will perhaps assume, first, that he has misheard, and attempt a repair by questioning 
Chiara about what her utterance was, perhaps indirectly, by means of an indirect 
report such as: 
 
D (in context C): But you said that everyone who was invited came to the party, didn’t 
you? 
 
Suppose that, in each case, Chiara makes it clear that the utterance which 
Darren has heard is indeed the utterance that she produced. What we can imagine 
Darren as questioning next is what I have referred to as the scope of Chiara’s 
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inferential commitments – intuitively, he will assume that the misunderstanding 
concerns the range of the quantifier: 
 
D (in context C’): But when you said that you will fix all the glasses in the kitchen, you 
meant all of them, right? 
 
Suppose the attempt to repair communication fails at this level too – imagine, 
for example, that Chiara’s reply to Darren’s last question reveals that she did mean all 
of them. What we expect Darren to do at this point is to indirectly test Chiara’s 
understanding of the quantifier in each of the uttered sentences, as in: 
 
D (in context C’’): but when you asked about whether absolutely everything was self-
identical, your question also concerned this chair – so how is this chair not relevant? 
 
Suppose that it now becomes clear that in none of the scenario above Chiara 
intended to commit herself to the canonical consequences of the (statements 
containing the) universal quantifier. Suppose, for example, that in reply to Darren’s 
first repair attempt in C, she now utters: 
 
C (in context C’): yes, I did say that everyone who was invited came to the party. And I 
do know that Brian was invited and that he didn’t come to the party. But when I said 
that everyone who was invited came to the party, I never meant to say that Brian came 
to the party. 
 
Imagine, also, that she makes analogue claims in the other contexts. Darren will 
now plausibly believe either that she is using a deviant concept of universal 
quantification, or that she is linguistically incompetent (assuming that she is a rational 
subject, and that she is speaking sincerely).  
What is, then, the proposition expressed by Chiara’s first utterance in each 
context?  
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Our intuitions suggest that neither Darren nor we can take her first utterance 
to express a determinate proposition, and that this is in virtue of what is revealed by 
Chiara’s reply to Darren’s last repair attempt in C’.  
Given the plausible assumption that failure to express a proposition always 
originates in a failure in the obtaining of a propositional presupposition [Glanzberg 
2005], a plausible interpretation of what goes wrong in the scenarios considered is the 
following. In each case, Chiara has failed to undertake certain inferential 
commitments. In each case, there was an expectation, on the part of Darren, that such 
commitments were being undertaken – Darren’s puzzlement after Chiara’s second 
utterance in each context reflects such expectation. A failure in the undertaking of 
these commitments appears to result in failure to express a determinate proposition. 
 
b) The expectation that a speaker undertakes, in the relevant circumstances, the 
commitments above is well-entrenched, and it is an expectation about the holding of an 
objective presupposition for the determinacy of sense of a(n utterance of) a universally 
quantified sentence in context149. 
 
Consider, again, the scenarios introduced in the discussion of claim a). Neither 
Darren nor, I take it, we – as external witnesses- will conclude that Chiara’s usage of 
the concept of universal quantification does not correspond to ours (or that she is an 
incompetent speaker) immediately after her second utterance in each context. Attempts 
to repair the conversation will usually tackle the most likely causes of failure first – for 
                                                
149 Once again, it should be noted that the claim of objectivity with respect to inferential 
presuppositions of propositional determinacy is not related to the specific anti-relativist 
preoccupations highlighted in Chapter I. In particular, it is a claim that has: 
 
• An independent content – the claim concerns an epistemic presupposition of our usage 
of the language, rather than a justificatory ground; 
 
• An independent raison d’etre, partly given by the search, as it were, for the factors 
responsible for inter-contextual stability. 
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example, the possibility of a mishearing or of a misinterpretation of the speaker’s 
intentions, an indeterminacy in the contextual restriction of the quantifier150, etc.  
An intuitive explanation can perhaps be given in pragmatic terms – we tend to 
be charitable towards a speakers’ utterances, and assume that certain basic conditions 
for successful communication, which have to do with what is required of a speaker 
who enters a communicative practice, are met. In particular, we normally tend to 
assume that the speaker uses the expressions that figure in the sentences she utters in 
a standard way, and that she is a competent speaker.  
The expectation that Chiara undertakes the relevant commitments is, I want to 
suggest, as well-entrenched as the expectation that she is a competent speaker of the 
language. It is, as it were, a default-expectation of the audience in a communicative 
context, and, in normal cases of communication, a condition for engaging in a rational 
discursive practice151.  
If this is the case, then we can perhaps sketch a criterion for the individuation 
of such an expectation in a communicative context: in a standard context, where no 
external information about the participants’ linguistic competence is available to the 
speakers, a failure in undertaking the commitments associated with our usage of the 
universal quantifier will usually be the most resistant to an attempt to repair a 
propositional failure, in the sense that the default expectation that such commitments 
are undertaken will typically be held until all other candidates for the factors 
responsible for propositional failure are ruled out.  
 
The expectation that the relevant commitments are undertaken when the 
universal quantifier is deployed is, I suggested, an expectation with an objective 
content. That is: it is the expectation that an objective presupposition for successful 
communication holds.  
                                                
150  Although Chiara’s utterances were phrased so as to minimize the risk of such an 
indeterminacy. 
151  The qualification provided by the expression ‘in normal cases of communication’ is 
meant to exclude, for example, cases in which an incompetent speaker is being taught the 
language. 
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To say that the presupposition is objective is to say the following: that is does 
not depend on any subjective belief or hypothesis, on the part of the speakers, about 
what the choice of the words in a sentence uttered in context is meant to convey. 
It does not depend, for example, on contextually formed hypotheses about the 
speaker’s intentions, or on hypotheses about her beliefs regarding how the proposition 
that she intends to convey will be interpreted by her audience. Instead, it is a 
presupposition of communicative success that is resistant to variations in such beliefs 
and hypothesis, and that is not affected by the obtaining of defeating factors for 
speakers’ and audience’s hypotheses about each other’s beliefs and intentions. For it is 
one of the epistemic conditions that need to obtain in order for a speaker’s choice of 
words to be able to reflect a certain intention – it contributes, I want to suggest, to the 
shared epistemic background against which such intentions can be expressed and 
determinately grasped. 
Consider, once again, the fictional scenarios involving Chiara and Darren. It is 
easy to conceive, for each scenario, the proposition that she intended to express as 
diverging from the proposition that we intuitively take her utterances to express in 
context.  
For example, in the glasses scenario, where Chiara is making a promise, we 
might think of her intention as the intention to express the proposition that she will fix 
all the glasses that are not too badly damaged. Such an intention, however, has no 
bearing on the quality and form of the inferential commitments that she should 
undertake in order for her utterance to be successful – intuitively, it only has a bearing 
on the scope of her commitments.  
We can for example imagine a successful attempt to repair a potential 
indeterminacy in the scope of her commitments that does not address the suggested 
source of propositional failure: 
 
C: I will fix all the glasses, I promise! 
D (pointing to a few that are in very bad shape): you can’t fix these! 
C: No, I can’t. What I meant was: all the glasses that are not too badly damaged. 
D (pointing to a glass that is still in decent shape): That one, for example? 
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C: No, not that one. 
D: But it isn’t badly damaged! 
C: I agree, it isn’t. 
D: … 
 
It seems, then, that the natural theoretical framework in which the idea of 
canonical commitments as epistemic presuppositions for propositional determinacy 
could be further articulated, cannot consist in a theory that crucially relies on speakers’ 
and audience’s intentions, hypotheses and beliefs to render the proposition expressed 
by an utterance. 
Rather, we need an account that frames a sub-set of the conditions responsible 
for successful communication in terms of the objective normative features of the 
proposition expressed via an utterance.  
An account of this sort is spelt out by [Kot’àtko 1995, 1998], who also discusses 
its independent advantages over one that relies exclusively on the notion of a match 
between intentions and interpretations in rendering the conditions for successful 
communication152.  
There is, however, at least one major difference between the framework that I 
am suggesting here and the one endorsed by Kot’àtko. While Kot’àtko regards the 
objective normative features of our speech acts as structurally related to the 
illocutionary aspects of such acts, in my proposal such features bear directly on the 
proposition expressed by any such speech act. Thus, while he speaks of normative 
commitments as contributing to determine utterance meaning, I want to suggest that 
the sub-set of such commitment with which I am concerned here contributes directly 
to propositional determinacy, in a way that is independent of the illocutionary force 
associated with an utterance153.  
 
                                                
152  Kot'àtko’s general idea is that we incur objective obligations when performing a speech 
act, and that these obligations should be regarded as performing a key-role in the 
determination of utterance meaning. 
153  For other attempts to frame the notion of utterance meaning in terms of speakers’ 
objective commitments, cf for example [Alston 1991] and [Pollock 1982]. 
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c) Undertaking a canonical commitment in the relevant circumstances is an epistemic 
presupposition of the determinacy of sense of an uttered sentence S∀ that is stable 
across contexts of utterance and across variations in the illocutionary force of the speech act 
performed when uttering S∀. 
 
The proposal that canonical commitments are stable contextual 
presuppositions amounts to this: that we should regard their epistemic quality and 
their object to be invariant across contextually provided interpretations. Intuitively, 
then, we should think of a context of utterance as providing an interpretation for our 
quantified claims that impacts on their semantics only in so far as it impacts on the 
scope of the commitments undertaken.  
Remember the fictional scenarios already discussed. In each of those scenarios, 
the contextual restriction (or lack of restriction) on the quantifier is implicit, but is 
clearly grasped by the audience.  
Intuitively, in each of these cases, although context provides a different 
interpretation for the quantifier, the latter concerns the kind of things that are 
required to instantiate the relevant property (coming to the party, potentially being 
fixed, being self identical) if the commitments undertaken are to be fulfilled.  
It does not concern their form: what counts as a legitimate instance of a 
canonical consequence differs in each case, but the fact that the commitment is to a 
canonical consequence, understood in the same way across the scenarios presented, is 
stable. 
The hope, in my proposal, is that it also does not concern the epistemic quality 
of such commitments, i.e. the fact that they undertaken, and grasped, as commitments 
to the canonical consequences of the relevant usages of the universal quantifier. In 
sub-section 5.2 I will discuss the challenges that confront such a hope. 
The independent advantage of the idea that context does not affect either the 
form or the epistemic quality of our inferential commitments, is that it allows us to 
view tokenings of the same sentence S∀ in different contexts as having the same 
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epistemic presuppositions, while at the same time receiving a different 
interpretation154.  
 
The proposal that canonical commitments, as objective normative 
presuppositions, are stable across variations in the illocutionary force of an utterance 
amounts to the claim that they are not speech-act specific. In fact, the original 
scenarios concerned different types of speech-acts, and we intuitively read Chiara’s 
first utterance in each scenario as involving a commitment of the same form. What will 
vary, I want to suggest, across types of speech-acts, is the illocutionary force that our 
commitments will themselves take.  
Consider, now, the following scenarios. 
 
# (Assertion) In context C, Orsetta, who has just finished cleaning up the dust on her 
books, utters: 
 
O: All the books are clean! 
 
# (Promise) In context C’, Orsetta is promising Nicola that she will clean up the dust on 
all her books; she utters: 
 
O: All the books will be clean, I promise! 
 
# (Conjecture) In Context C’’, Orsetta is wondering about whether she should stay 
home and clean up, or go out and have a drink. With the books out of her sight, and 
                                                
154  If one takes seriously (as I think one should) the objections to semantic 
contextualism that are based on the problem of shared content, then the proposal can be read as 
sketching a framework for a reply to such objections. More precisely, it can be read as sketching 
an initial framework in which the following two claims can be reconciled: the claim that context 
contributes to fixing what is said via an utterance of a quantified sentence and the claim that 
there is a level at which what is said via such an utterance is stable across contexts. 
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while attempting to remember when was the last time she cleaned the dust off them, 
she mumbles to herself: 
 
O: I suppose all the books are clean… 
 
Orsetta’s utterances have different correctness conditions, and thus receive 
different truth conditions, in virtue of their different illocutionary force. One might 
say, for example, that her utterance in C is correct if and only if she possesses sufficient 
evidence for her claim; her utterance in C’ is correct if and only if she intends to fulfill 
her promise and knows of no obvious defeating factor; her utterance in C’’ is correct if, 
in the absence of conclusive evidence for her conjecture, she at least possesses the best 
available evidence in the circumstances. 
However, if my proposal shows any promise, a sub-set of the objective 
commitments that she undertakes in each case will remain stable in quality and 
form155.  
In the first case, we can take her to be committing herself to the availability of 
sufficient evidence for the claim that an arbitrary instance of the property ‘being one of 
Orsetta’s books’ is clean; in the second case, she commits herself to bringing it about 
that this will be the case; in the third case, the commitment is to the availability of 
(non-conclusive) good evidence for the claim that an arbitrary instance of the property 
‘being one of Orsetta’s books’ is clean. The source of stability, is the thought, is the 
epistemic contribution that the quantifier makes to the sense of the asserted / 
promised / conjectured sentence.  
Intuitively, we regard her three utterances as somehow related. We have three 
options for spelling out what this relation consists in.  
The first is to say that the three utterances share the same semantic content –
however, as their truth-conditions clearly differ, this cannot be the case.  
The second is to say that what they have in common is the semantic (rather 
than epistemic) contribution that ‘all’ makes. But this won’t explain why we intuitively 
                                                
155  And, in this case, scope. 
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regard the form of the obligation that she is undertaking in each case as related – rather 
than simply the semantics.  
The third, which is the one that I am endorsing here, is to say that the three 
utterances share commitments of the same form, but of different force. 
 
To sum up – the proposal that I have sketched by means of claims a) to c) 
consists in the following. In contextual communicative practices, canonical 
commitments to the consequences of the concept of universal quantification are those 
normative, objective commitments undertaken in the performance of a speech-act by 
competent speakers, whose epistemic quality and form are stable across variations in 
contexts and in illocutionary force, and the undertaking of which is an objective and 
stable presupposition of S∀ expressing a determinate proposition. 
 
5.2 Qualifications and Clarifications 
  
 In the light of the claims above, two qualifications seem necessary.  
 
The first concerns the suggestion that we should regard the epistemic quality of 
our inferential commitments as an element of contextual stability. As I have already 
noted, this suggestion encounters some intuitive difficulties. The aim of the first part 
of this section is to clarify what these difficulties consist in, and sketch the challenges 
that originate from them. 
   The second concerns the relation between the commitment-theoretic account 
of propositional determinacy that I am endorsing, on the one hand, and a pragmatic 
account on the other. I will discuss certain aspects of this relation in the second part of 
this section; in so doing, I also hope to further clarify  some features of the 
commitment-theoretic view with respect to the problem of contextual domain 
restriction. 
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Commitments: Assertoric and Non-Assertoric 
 
Consider 15): 
 
15) Everyone is here 
Imagine that the sentence tokened in 1) is asserted by Simon, the health and 
safety advisor in the Department of Philosophy of the University of St Andrews, 
during a successful fire drill. As a result of the assertion, the members of the 
Department who are gathered in the courtyard start going back inside the building.  
Simon’s assertion in context C is a simple assertion, and the universal 
quantifier occurs in the sentence asserted. According to the commitment-theoretic 
account, whether 1) expresses a determinate proposition in C, also depends on the 
obtaining of the following facts: 
 
• Simon undertakes an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of 
(an assertoric usage of) the universal quantifier – that is: he commits himself to 
believing, or holding as true, that for any particular member of the Department, 
that member is in the courtyard; 
 
• Context restricts the scope of his canonical commitments in the appropriate 
way, so that the proposition expressed by his assertion of 15) is that every 
member of the Department is where Simon is. 
 
In asserting 15), Simon incurs an obligation towards the audience of the utterance. If, 
in the course of a subsequent conversation, it comes out that at the time of the original 
utterance Simon believed, for example, that the head of the Department was still in the 
building, provided that his assertion of 15) was sincere and that there is no ambiguity 
in the scope of his commitments, I take it that we can plausibly make the following two 
claims: 
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• Simon should not be ascribed possession of the concept of universal 
quantification; 
 
• The assertoric sense of 15) (the proposition that 15) expresses in C) is 
indeterminate. 
 
Now consider the same scenario, but imagine that Simon utters, instead, either of the 
following: 
 
16) Is everyone here? 
 
17) If everyone is here, we can all go back inside. 
 
That is: imagine that he asks the question in 16), or makes the conditional assertion in 
17).  
There is an intuitive difference between the obligation which Simon incurs 
when asserting 15), and whichever epistemic presuppositions we may regard as 
impacting on the content of the utterances of 16) and 17). This difference, I believe, 
may be rendered as follows. While we regard the obligation that Simon incurs in 
asserting 15) as generated by his commitment to the consequences of the fact that 
something is the case, no such commitment is undertaken in 16) and 17)156. Intuitively, 
that is, we regard a speaker’s commitment as a commitment to the truth of what the 
speaker says, or, for example in the case of a promise, to bringing it about that what is 
said is true157. 
Note that this intuitive difference is in principle able to play an important role 
in a commitment-theoretic account: for without this further qualification of, as it were, 
the default (illocutionary) force of an inferential commitment, we would confront the 
                                                
156  Consider also assertions by which a speaker expresses a doubt, such as: 
 
18) I am not sure whether everyone is here…  
157  It seems that in this respect promises behave in a way that is much more similar to 
assertions than the way in which other speech-acts behave. 
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difficulty of articulating the distinction between an inferential commitment and the 
mere ability to infer in a certain way.  
So now we have a problem. On the one hand, we have two plausible theoretical 
requirements. The first is this: if the undertaking of a canonical commitment when 
deploying the universal quantifier in a communicative practice is the blue-print, as it 
were, of concept-possession, we would like to say that a speaker undertakes this 
commitment in usages that consist in uttering sentences in which the universal 
quantifier may also figure as an embedded component of (the proposition expressed by) 
the utterance in question. That is: in cases that are not restricted to simple assertions.  
The second requirement is this: if the commitment-theoretic account is to 
regard the contribution of the universal quantifier to the sentences in which it figures 
in terms of sense (that is: as a contribution to the proposition expressed), then we want 
this contribution to generalize to non-assertoric usages of the quantifier, or even 
simply to conditional assertions. We want, in other words, to render the intuitive 
relation between the sense of 15) and the sense of 16) or 17) also in terms of the 
contribution made by the universal quantifier158. 
On the other hand, we have a defeating intuition: in the light of the fictional 
scenario presented above, inferential commitments don’t seem to straightforwardly 
generalize across speech-act types, or even beyond simple assertions. 
The problem, then, is: can we reconcile the theoretical requirements with the 
prima facie defeating intuition? 
 
A natural suggestion is to render the proposition expressed by an utterance of, 
for example, 16) or 17) as parasitic on the proposition expressed by an utterance of 15). 
In commitment-theoretic terms, the suggestion would then be to say that the 
obligations which a speaker incurs in uttering 16) or 17) are parasitic on the 
commitments undertaken when asserting the corresponding asserted content.  
A possible way to articulate this suggestion is in terms of a counterfactual – that 
is, to spell out the contribution that commitments make to propositional determinacy 
                                                
158  Under the assumption, which I take to be intuitively plausible, that the propositions 
expressed via different utterances (that is: utterances bearing different force) of S∀ are related. 
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in cases other than simple assertions, in terms of a counterfactual contribution, 
parasitic on assertions. An initial formulation of the suggestion could look like: 
 
A) A sentence S∀ uttered in a context C expresses a determinate proposition only 
provided that, were the utterer to simply assert (the relevant embedded proposition in) 
S∀, he would undertake a commitment to the canonical consequences of (the simple 
assertoric usage of) the universal quantifier. 
 
And the corresponding formulation for what I have referred to as the pragmatic 
expectation, stable across contexts of utterance and types of speech-act, that the 
relevant commitments are undertaken, would be: 
 
B) In any context C and for any utterance U of S∀, there is a pragmatic expectation, on 
the part of the audience, that the following holds: were the utterer to simply assert the 
(embedded) proposition expressed by U, she would undertake the relevant inferential 
commitments. 
 
Consider, then, an utterance of: 
 
18) I am not sure whether everyone is here 
 
in C. The thought behind formulation A) is that the contribution made by the 
universal quantifier to the proposition expressed by 18) in C is the contribution that 
the quantifier makes to the content that 18) would express were the utterer to simply 
assert the embedded proposition in 18).  
 In intuitive terms: what Simon is not sure about, when uttering 18), is whether, 
for an arbitrary member of the Department, say: Peter, that member is where Simon is. 
Were he to simply assert that ‘everyone is here’, he would commit himself to the fact 
that Peter is indeed where Simon is. 
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 However, there seems to be a crucial difficulty with this view. The difficulty 
impacts on my idea that there are, on the part of the participants in a communicative 
context, pragmatic expectations that a usage of the universal quantifier comes, as it 
were, with the relevant inferential commitments. It impacts, in other words, on the 
implications of formulation B). For consider the following. 
 
 I have defined such expectations as objective and stable across contexts, and 
have taken them to be the pragmatic indicators of stable and objective inferential 
presuppositions for propositional determinacy. Their object, in the original 
formulation of my view, was simply this: that a speaker undertakes the relevant 
inferential commitments when deploying the universal quantifier.  
But now the expectation that such commitments are undertaken becomes the 
expectation that a counterfactual holds: were the speaker to simply assert (the 
embedded proposition in) S∀, she would undertake the relevant commitments. And 
since we want this expectation to be a stable and reliable indicator of (epistemic) 
presuppositions of sense, we will now have to assume that: 
 
• The antecedent of the counterfactual conditional, expressing the possibility that 
an assertion of the relevant sort is made, expresses a live possibility in any 
context of utterance (that is: in any context in which a sentence embedding the 
universal quantifier is uttered)159; 
 
•  That it does so in relation to any kind of speech-act performed: when, for 
example, Simon utters 16), the claim would be, the audience has the 
corresponding assertion in mind; 
 
• The counterfactual conditional will be interpreted in the same way by all the 
participants in a context C, independently of their beliefs and hypothesis. 
                                                
159  Here I am using the notion of a ‘live possibility’ with [Stalnaker 1975] in mind, 
although, of course, Stalnaker defines and deploys the notion with respect to indicative 
conditionals. 
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We have, however, good reasons for regarding none of the assumptions above as 
independently plausible. For example, it will often not be the case that different 
speakers will give the same interpretation of a counterfactual, because the epistemic 
and pragmatic factors that affect such an interpretation will typically differ across 
speakers. The idea that the antecedent of a counterfactual should be seen as 
expressing a live possibility in a context of utterance seems to rest on a confusion 
between counterfactual conditionals and indicative conditionals (and is, moreover, 
highly counterintuitive). Even the thought that to understand an utterance of, say, 16) a 
speaker needs not only to understand an utterance of 15) first, but also to have 15) in 
mind appears to be counter-intuitive, and needs to be argued for160. 
 
A crucial challenge for my proposal is, then, to answer the following question: how 
should we articulate, in the light of the considerations above, the idea that relevant 
epistemic presuppositions of speech-acts other than simple assertions should be seen 
as parasitic on assertoric commitments? 
 
Inferential Commitments and Pragmatic Features of Context 
 
The second issue that, I feel, needs to be addressed in order to gain a clearer 
initial picture of the proposal that I have sketched, concerns the relation between: 
 
• The contributions that inferential commitments undertaken in context make to 
the proposition expressed by an utterance of S∀ in context; 
 
• The contribution that pragmatic features of context make to an utterance of S∀ in 
context. 
 
                                                
160  The difficulties that originate from the second and third assumptions will also affect, it 
seems, a re-formulation of B) in terms of indicative conditionals, so that this local fix, as it were, 
would probably not resolve them.  
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While, here, I cannot offer a detailed account of such a relation, I would like to clarify 
at least some of its aspects. 
 
 First, it should be noted, once again, that the concern of the commitment-
theoretic view that I endorse is with the proposition expressed by S∀ in context, rather 
than with the proposition pragmatically conveyed by an utterance of S∀.  
In virtue of this, the theoretical framework in which we should understand the 
notion of a pragmatic feature of context, is the view that some pragmatic processes (in 
particular, according to Recanati: the processes of saturation, disambiguation, 
enrichment, and semantic transfer) can be pre-propositional: without them, it may be 
the case that no proposition is expressed by an utterance [Bach 1992, 1994, 1999; 
Recanati 2004]. 
 
Second, it should be noted that the natural counterpart, in a commitment-
theoretic story about (utterances in context of) universally quantified sentences, of the 
pragmatic processes mentioned above, is not given by inferential commitments 
themselves, but by the contextual mechanisms via which the scope of these 
commitments is typically restricted in context. For, in my proposal, the undertaking of 
the relevant inferential commitments is to be regarded as a context-insensitive 
presupposition of propositional determinacy.  
If we render the distinction between the context-insensitive and the context-
sensitive aspects of what is expressed via an utterance in context in terms of the 
standard distinction between the literal meaning of a sentence on the one hand, and 
the meaning that the sentence receives in context, then the status of inferential 
commitments in my proposal can be clarified as follows.  
The undertaking of the relevant inferential commitments, without further 
qualifications about their scope, directly contributes to a sentence receiving a 
determinate literal meaning161. Such a presupposition will remain stable in form and, 
the hope is, in epistemic quality, across contexts of utterance.  
                                                
161  In the light of the considerations that I present in the next paragraph, this talk is 
somewhat imprecise – the appeal to the notion of ‘literal meaning’ here is simply meant to give 
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At the same time, however, a feature of the commitments that we undertake 
when deploying the concept of universal quantification, is that they take a scope: this 
scope is to be regarded as the context-sensitive feature of otherwise stable epistemic 
presuppositions.  
Inferential commitments thus impact on the proposition expressed in context 
by an uttered sentence S∀ in the following way: 
 
• Their having the appropriate form and epistemic quality is a necessary 
condition on S∀  expressing a determinate proposition, in virtue of the fact that it 
is a necessary condition on the determinacy of (what we may take to correspond 
to) the literal meaning of S∀; 
 
• Their taking a determinate (typically restricted) scope in a context C is a 
necessary condition on an utterance of S∀  expressing a determinate proposition 
in C: the contribution that a context of utterance makes to the proposition 
expressed by an utterance on S∀  in C is to be understood precisely as a 
determination of the scope of our inferential commitments. 
 
If one takes sentence-tokens, rather than sentence-types, to be the bearers of 
propositional content, and a tokening of a sentence to always occur in context, then 
the idea in the commitment-theoretic account is this: our commitments taking a 
certain form and epistemic quality plus their taking a determinate scope is a 
presupposition of (a tokening of) S∀  expressing a determinate proposition. Such a  
presupposition will then have objective, context-insensitive components (form and 
quality), and a context-sensitive component (scope)162. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the reader a standard term of comparison for understanding the distinction between context-
insensitive and context-sensitive aspects of inferential presuppositions.  
162  This is, in fact, my view. Until now I have referred to S∀  as a sentence receiving a 
determinate sense, or expressing a determinate proposition in context. The reason for this was 
simply to ease the exposition – in the light of the qualification just offered, talk of a sentence S∀  
expressing a determinate proposition should be understood as talk of a tokening of a sentence S∀  
as doing thus. 
263 
 The commitment-theoretic view, then, agrees with a variety of contextualism 
such as Recanati’s that certain contextual mechanisms are pre-propositional: under the 
assumption that sentences express a determinate proposition when tokened in context,  
contextual fixation of the scope of our commitments is a necessary condition for 
propositional determinacy. 
However, two qualifications are important here.  
The first is that the undertaking of inferential commitments of a certain form 
and quality (namely: the undertaking of the commitments displayed by the elimination 
rule for the universal quantifier) is not to be seen as a pragmatic presupposition of 
sense. It is a distinctively epistemic presupposition (it is, in other words, what our grasp 
of the universal quantifier consists in), and is entirely independent on speakers’ 
hypotheses, intentions and interpretations163. 
The second is that the agreement between the commitment-theoretic view and 
a pragmatic account of contextual presuppositions, simply concerns, at this stage what 
context impacts on. Nothing has been said about how context determines the scope of 
our commitments. That is: nothing has been said about the contextual processes in 
virtue of which (the commitments undertaken with) an utterance of S∀  receive a 
determinate scope in context. 
In a commitment-theoretic account of the concept of universal quantification, 
to address this issue is to address the intuitive epistemic gap between: 
 
• A subject’s grasp of a fully general inferential instruction, such as the one in 
which the rule of Universal Specification consists; 
 
• A subject’s grasp of a contextually interpreted instance of this instruction. 
 
Recall that, in the last section of Chapter III, I rendered the generality displayed by 
Universal Specification (what I referred to as the full inferential generality expressed 
                                                
163  As I have already noted, it is an open question whether it is independent of speakers’ 
inferential beliefs, due to the fact that the concept-constituting inferences for the universal 
quantifier are schematic inferences. 
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by the concept of universal quantification) in terms of the absence of semantic 
constraints in the rendering of the rule. The idea was that the rule displays the correct 
inferential conditions for drawing the canonical consequences of a statement of the 
form ∀xϕ(x), and that it does so by telling us that we should infer to ϕ(s), where ϕ and s 
are given a schematic reading, without the need to make any special assumption about 
s. The latter condition, the suggestion was, is what the notion of an ‘arbitrary instance’ 
captures: talk of an arbitrary instance of ∀xϕ(x) is to be rendered as talk of an 
inferential parameter. 
Now, at the level of the definition of the universal quantifier’s purely inferential 
role, the parameter is assigned no value – the rule doesn’t tell us what things we 
should make no assumption about (what counts as instantiating the property of being 
an arbitrary instance of ∀xϕ(x) in a specific application of the rule). 
The suggestion that the scope of our inferential commitments is determined in 
context, then, amounts to this: context assigns a value to such parameter. 
For a commitment-theoretic account, the questions that, thus, become crucial are: 
 
• In virtue of which facts, and by means of which processes, does context manage 
to do this? 
 
And: 
 
• How do speakers manage to grasp the value thus specified by context? 
 
A contextualist view about contextual quantifier restrictions such as Recanati’s will 
answer such questions in terms of speakers’ beliefs, hypotheses, intentions and 
interpretations. 
As I have already noted, I don’t (yet!) have a commitment-theoretic answer to 
either question. I do have, however, two considerations to offer. 
With respect to the second question: however speakers’ grasp is rendered, the 
rendering should dispense with the notion of a domain of quantification, in virtue of 
the arguments presented in this chapter and in the previous one. 
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With respect to the first question: it may well be that pragmatic processes do enter 
into the picture, as it were, when it comes to articulating the mechanisms via which 
context fixes the scope of our inferential commitments. In any case, a crucial constraint 
on how we choose to render such mechanisms, given the assumptions of the 
commitment-theoretic account, is this: that their contribution to the proposition 
expressed by an utterance of S∀ in context be a distinctively epistemic one.  
 
5.3 Commitments, Contexts and Propositional Failure 
 
A story about the mechanisms in virtue of which inferential presuppositions 
affect propositional determinacy, will partly be a story about the mechanisms in virtue 
presuppositional failure generates failure propositional failure.  
The initial hope is that at least the general structure of such a story be already 
available in the philosophical literature on contexts, propositions and presuppositions.  
A prima facie plausible candidate is the story offered by [Glanzberg 2005] for 
assertoric contexts. Glanzberg’s story has the following two distinctive advantages.  
In following the classical analysis of presuppositions offered in [Stalnaker 
1974], it relies on a well tested, as it were, notion of context as an information state, 
which behaves as a kind of record of what has been said [Heim 1983, 1992; Krahmer 
1998; Beaver 2001; etc.]164.  
The idea of a context as a record is one that is also intuitively plausible for the 
project with which I am concerned – for inferential commitments are typically 
individuated and assessed by speakers against the background of a series of utterances, 
rather than in terms of single utterances.  
The second advantage is that Glanzberg’s story offers a treatment of 
presuppositions that provides both an explanation of the mechanisms in virtue of 
which presuppositional failure brings about propositional failure, and a criterion, 
based on such an explanation, for individuating, among the various facts that may 
                                                
164  However, Glanzberg is explicitly concerned with assertoric contexts – the idea is that 
context behaves as a record of the assertions made. 
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bring about propositional failure, those that specifically have to do with 
presuppositional failure.   
The criterion is articulated both in terms of the manifested aspects of 
propositional failure (in terms of tests that concern the speakers’ assertoric behavior) 
and in terms of the contextual mechanisms responsible for such failure (in terms of 
contextually supplied update instructions, following [Heim 1982; Kamp 1984; 
Groenendirjk & Stokhof 1991]. 
 
Glanzberg’s tests for propositional failure rely on the intuitive idea that the 
latter requires an obligatory repair of a speaker’s utterance before the utterance can be 
assessed as correct or its content reported by the audience. They are thus tests for 
what he calls the ‘repair-obligatory’ status of an utterance – for the fact, that is, that 
‘without initiating a repair it is not possible to assess the information conveyed or 
report it as the information conveyed’ [Glanzberg 2005: 363]. In particular, Glanzberg 
describes two such tests: 
 
• The Echo-Assessment test: speakers will only give an assessment by initiating a 
repair, as they tend to avoid echoing defective constructions; 
 
• The Indirect Speech report test: speakers will be unwilling to provide indirect 
speech reports without initiating a repair [Glanzberg 2005: 360]. 
 
The idea that canonical commitments are necessary presuppositions for 
propositional determinacy seems to find an initial confirmation in the fact that a 
relevant application of the tests above appears to reveal a repair-obligatory status for 
assertions of a sentence S∀ which do not carry the relevant commitments.  Compare 
the following three utterances: 
 
• It was John who solved the problem. Mike solved it. 
 
• I regret voting for Bush. I did not vote for Bush. 
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• Everyone who was invited came to the party. Brian, who was invited, didn’t 
come to the party. 
 
(Variations on) the first two utterances are considered by Glanzberg; the idea is that 
we have clear cut cases in which the first sentence in each utterance can be taken as 
not receiving a determinate assertoric sense in virtue of the presuppositional failure 
revealed by the second165. Speakers will not report or assess the utterances without 
initiating a repair first. 
Now consider the third utterance – intuitively, we have the same expression failure, 
and we can expect the same behavior on the part of speakers. 
 
So we have that one side of Glanzberg’s story, the one which consists in 
providing and scrutinizing the available linguistic evidence, appears to lend some 
promise to my proposal.  
However, things become much more complicated when it comes to the other 
side of the story – the one which consists in the analysis of the contextual mechanisms 
in virtue of which propositional failure is brought about. Glanzberg’s analysis is 
semantic in nature – it consists in the description of the mechanisms in virtue of which 
semantic update instructions succeed or fail to be determinate in context. This is in line 
with the assumption that the information state in which a context consists is merely a 
record of the semantic contents of the speech acts performed in context  - in fact, it 
can represented simply as a set of propositions.  
My proposal, however, concerns presuppositions that are epistemic in nature. An 
account of how their failure affects the proposition expressed by an utterance of a 
sentence S∀ in context thus requires that: 
 
                                                
165  In the first case, the presupposition concerns the semantic rules that govern the clefted 
constituent in the first sentence; in the second case, it concerns the expectation that the 
complement of a factive be implicated by the factive. 
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• We view the relevant contextual mechanisms as mechanisms for the update of 
epistemic information (namely: the commitments undertaken by a speaker via 
the utterance of a sentence in context); 
 
• We provide an account of propositional determinacy in context that relies on 
distinctively epistemic features of the context, that is: we formulate a notion of 
context that includes the epistemic, as well as the semantic and pragmatic, 
features of the context among the features responsible for successful 
communication.  
 
These two tasks, together with an account of how contexts, suitably understood in 
the light of the requirements above, determine the scope of our canonical 
commitments, constitute crucial challenges for the commitment-theoretic account.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this Thesis, I hope to have sketched a credible inferentialist account of the 
logical concepts in general, and the concept of universal quantification in particular.  
This account relied on a few key-notions, which I hope to have clarified and 
refined: 
 
• Grasp or possession of a concept; 
 
• Concept-constitution; 
 
• Canonical consequence; 
 
• (Canonical) inferential commitment; 
 
• A rule of inference as displaying the general form of our canonical 
commitments. 
 
The inferentialist view that I endorsed and defended consisted in the following two 
general claims:  
 
• A sub-set of our actual inferential practices, namely, those consisting in 
drawing canonical consequences from statements in which a logical concept 
figures as the main concept ingredient, are constitutive of the logical concepts; 
 
• To possess a logical concept C is to undertake an inferential commitment to the 
canonical consequences of a statement containing C when deploying C in a 
speech-act practice. 
 
A substantial part of the Thesis was devoted to the investigation of the concept of 
universal quantification. 
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With respect to this concept, my work intended to defend the cogency of two 
main ideas.  
The first is the idea that the concept is best understood, at the level of the 
definition of its inferential role, as expressing full inferential generality. In virtue of this, 
an explication of the concept should dispense with the tools and assumptions of 
standard model-theoretic treatments of the universal quantifier. In particular, it should 
dispense with the idea that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain – a 
notion that we have independent reasons for regarding as expendable also in a 
foundational account of the correct semantics for interpreted instances of the universal 
quantifier. 
 The second is the idea that our inferential usage of the universal quantifier is 
context-sensitive, in a way that is, however, not accommodated by standard 
contextualist accounts.  
More specifically, I hope to have successfully argued for the claim that we 
should regard the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier as independent of the 
idea of a contextually supplied domain of quantification. 
A suggestion, made in Chapter IV, was that we should instead view such context-
sensitivity as impacting on the scope of the inferential commitments that we undertake 
when deploying the universal quantifier.  
 
In proposing that we should understand the role played by such commitments 
in our speech-act practices as that of objective epistemic presuppositions for the 
propositional determinacy of sentences tokened in context, I hope to have laid the 
ground for an investigation of: 
 
• The impact of contextual factors on the epistemology of a sub-set of our 
concepts; 
 
• The notion of an epistemic presupposition of propositional determinacy; 
 
• An epistemically-minded notion of a context of utterance. 
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In defending my views about the logical concepts, I have argued in support of a 
series of specific contentions. Among these are the following. 
 
• The logical concepts that we deploy in the course of formal reasoning practices 
are the same concepts that we deploy in our informal reasoning practices – that is: 
a logical concept is invariant across logic and natural language; 
 
• An account of concept-possession that relies on the notion of an inferential 
(canonical) commitment has considerable theoretical advantages over an account 
that relies on the notion of an inferential disposition; 
 
• In particular, the notion of a canonical commitment allows us to provide a 
natural articulation of the independently plausible idea that participation in a 
communicative practice requires competent speakers of a language to incur 
objective obligations; 
 
Many of the arguments that I presented were restricted in scope, both because 
they relied on various crucial assumptions and because they were discussed with 
specific reference to the concept of universal quantification. 
 
One of the principal aims of this Thesis was to lay the ground for future 
research, by drawing a conceptual map of at least some of the options available to 
mixed inferentialist and contextualist account of sense. 
 One of the philosophical projects that naturally flow from this Thesis consists 
in understanding whether and how a sub-set of inferential presuppositions can be 
regarded as elements of invariance across contexts.  
The project relates to one of my main research interests, usually referred to as 
the problem of shared content. The problem consists in making sense of and reconciling 
two diverging sets of linguistic intuitions. On the one hand, we seem to be able to 
share content across contexts (different utterances of a sentence can express the same 
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proposition in different contexts). On the other hand, we can also utter the same 
sentence to express different contents in different contexts. 
Some of the considerations that I offered in the last two sections of Chapter IV 
were thought of with this research interest in mind. In particular, in the immediate 
future I would like to explore the following questions: 
 
• Does the epistemic notion of a speaker’s objective commitment allows us to 
articulate the notion of shared content in a way that is consistent with a 
contextualist view? 
 
• How does the notion of an objective commitment relate to: a) the notions 
deployed by pragmatist accounts of context-sensitivity; and b) the notions 
deployed by relativist accounts of the contextual variability of truth-value? 
 
• What are the methodological constraints on gathering and interpreting 
linguistic evidence either in favor of contextual variability of content or in favor 
of contextual stability – more specifically, what are the methodological 
constraints on interpreting such evidence in favor of a pragmatic, semantic or 
epistemic explication of either phenomenon? 
 
As often is the case, the problems raised in this Thesis are far more than the ones 
that it explicitly intended to address. In particular, it seems to me that the following 
issues deserve further investigation. 
 
• Whether an account of concept-possession and concept-constitution based on 
the notion of a canonical commitment can play any role in an anti-expressivist 
epistemology of our basic logical principles; 
 
• Whether, and to what extent, (aspects of) the inferentialist-contextualist 
account that I have offered for the universal quantifier, can be generalized to 
the other logical concepts; 
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• What are the implications of the idea, discussed in the last section of Chapter 
III, that we should understand first-order quantificational generality as full 
inferential generality. The suggestion at the end of that chapter was that a 
promising research direction consists in articulating the relation between such 
generality and higher-order quantification in terms of a unified notion of 
quantificational generality; 
 
• What are the implications of my proposals for understanding quantificational 
generality on our grasp of some natural language constructions naturally 
rendered in quantificational terms, such as, for example, so-called donkey 
pronouns; 
 
• How we should articulate the relation between assertoric (inferential) 
commitments, on the one hand, and the obligations incurred by speakers when 
performing speech acts other than assertions on the other hand; 
 
• How we should address the methodological problems originating in the 
intuitive gap between speakers’ intentional states on the one hand, and their 
manifest indicators on the other – in particular, how we should address the 
implications that, in the framework of a theory of sense, such a gap has on the 
status of the manifestability requirement. 
 
Finally, an informal note for the reader. Conceiving and writing this Thesis has 
been an exciting intellectual adventure. In what is the result of much re-thinking and 
re-formulating, I hope to have conveyed my sincere enjoyment of the problems that I 
have addressed. 
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